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ABSTRACT 
Many models of accident investigation have been created and have served 
as the basis for other tools and techniques. One of the most prominent 
techniques, Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990), is based on the idea of active 
and latent failures. Expanding on this idea, the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) was created with the idea to associate 
contributing factors and errors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).  
While HFACS has been frequently applied in the field of aviation in 
literature, other industry types are under-represented. Seventeen data sources 
encompassing various industry types were collected and included in this 
dissertation analysis. While each industry type is unique, the human constituent 
is a shared element among industries. A multi-industry analysis will allow for 
common high-level human error patterns to emerge and for benchmarking 
standards to be created. It is also important to identify relationships between 
active errors and latent conditions without limiting data to one specific industry 
type while concurrently using a taxonomy that systemically identifies both active 
errors and latent conditions at all levels of an organization. Doing so could 
potentially allow for the shifting of intervention target areas from active errors to 
latent conditions and for assistance in identifying other potential errors and 
latent failures during investigation. 
As a result, four sets of benchmarking standards were established, and a 
decision support tool was created to assist in selecting the correct benchmarking 
standard set. Additionally, twelve adjacent tier causal factor associations and 
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three additional non-adjacent tier causal factor associations were found to be 
significant. Due to the tiers’ ease of investigation and classification, most 
associations were between the preconditions for unsafe act tier and preconditions 
for unsafe act tier. 
Overall, this dissertation furthers the research field of HFACS and its 
application. Originating in Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese Model, the HFACS 
taxonomy aims to identify the holes in the Swiss cheese. This dissertation 
furthered progress in determining the size of the holes and the interactions 
among the holes. A company who has adopted the HFACS taxonomy should 
first classify its accident and near miss cases using the HFACS taxonomy. The 
company can then judge its findings against the benchmarking standards 
determined in Chapter Four. In order to enhance mitigations, association 
findings can help to identify other areas for mitigation or other areas, which may 
be affected by mitigation efforts. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
ABSTRACT 
Many models of accident investigation have been created and have served 
as the basis for other tools and techniques. One of the most prominent 
techniques, Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990), is based on the idea of active 
and latent failures. Expanding on this idea, the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS) was created with the idea to associate 
contributing factors and errors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). This technique has 
been successful in enhancing an organization’s knowledge level of the system’s 
safety (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2004). Yet, the findings have not been synthesized to assess the 
results as a whole. Similarly, the association between the contributing factors and 
errors has been minimally investigated (Li & Harris, 2006, Celik & Cebi, 2009). 
Data-driven knowledge regarding associations between contributing factors and 
errors would allow for an organization to employ a top-down – rather than an 
error-driven – approach to interventions 
WHAT IS HUMAN ERROR? 
Human error can be defined and categorized in a variety of manners and 
methods. Similar to variability, human error can be viewed as a deviation from a 
norm or also as “unsuccessful experiments with unacceptable consequences” 
(Rasmussen, 1982). In a similar definition, Senders and Moray (1991) determined 
that human error results in consequences that were intended by the individual 
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involved, were not desired by a set of standards, or caused the system to operate 
outside of acceptable limits. While undesired, human error will always exist 
since it is human nature to make mistakes or commit errors (Alkov, 1997). 
Therefore, the goal of the safety manager should not be to eliminate human error 
all together, but to reduce human error and its impact or consequence by 
examining those errors and their contributing factors. 
THE ‘SWISS CHEESE’ HUMAN ERROR MODEL AND TAXONOMY 
In order to further examine the wide spectrum of human error, James 
Reason (1990) categorized errors as one of two types: active errors or latent 
errors. While active errors can have immediate consequences, latent errors can 
remain dormant for an extended period of time and can act in a dynamic manner 
at many levels of an organization. Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (Figure 1) 
describes how a latent error or failure at any level can provide an opportunity for 
an accident. If the holes of the Swiss cheese line up, then an accident has the 
potential for occurrence. If just one of these critical holes is closed or reduced (i.e. 
one of the latent errors corrected), the accident has lost the potential for 
occurrence. 
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Figure 1: Reason's Swiss Cheese Model  (Adapted from Reason, 1990) 
With Reason’s framework in mind, HFACS was created to investigate 
accidents and the associated latent and active errors (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). Since human error is very complex and elusive, an investigative 
methodology is difficult to apply to all events and incidents (Shappell, Detwiler, 
Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, & Wiegmann, 2007). However, an investigative 
methodology is imperative in order to improve safety conditions and prevent 
future incidents. The HFACS methodology (Figure 2) classifies human error at 
four different tiers: organizational influence, inadequate leadership, 
preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Each tier is comprised of causal categories and each causal category is comprised 
of groups. Groups are sets of similar error types within each causal category. For 
example, some skill-based error groupings are attention failures, postural errors, 
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timing errors, technique errors, knowledge-based errors, and personal protection 
equipment (PPE)/tool/equipment errors. 
 
Figure 2: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (Shappell et al., 2007) 
The HFACS methodology has been successfully applied to many facets of 
the aviation industry. In general aviation (GA), skill-based errors proved to be 
the leading HFACS causal category (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2004; Wiegmann, Faabog, Boquet, Detwiler, Holcomb, & Shappell, 
2005; Detwiler, Boquet, Pfleiderer, Wiegmann, & Shappell, 2006; Pagan & de 
Voogt, 2008). However, when comparing fatal and non-fatal GA accidents, fatal 
accidents were “more than four times more likely to be associated with a 
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violation” (Wiegmann et al., 2005). The pattern of skill-based errors being the 
leading HFACS causal category contributor extended to both US military 
aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004) and 
commercial aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Shappell et al., 2007).  
In addition to the US aviation industry, HFACS has successfully been 
applied in other countries. The skill-based error pattern was also evident in the 
aviation fields of Taiwan, India, and China (Gaur, 2005; Li & Harris, 2006; Li, 
Harris, & Chen, 2007). While HFACS has frequently been applied in the field of 
aviation in literature, other industry types are under-represented. With the 
development of HFACS for the mining industry, the skill-based error pattern 
was expanded beyond the aviation field (Patterson, 2009). Additionally, Celik & 
Cebi (2009) found a similar result in the maritime shipping industry. 
Although a skill-based error pattern has emerged from the various studies 
employing the HFACS methodology, the similarity has not been proven 
statistically across all the studies. On the other hand, commonalities across 
industries have been found in designing for system safety (Drogoul, Kinnersly, 
Roelen, & Kirwan, 2007). The way safety is built into a system provides many 
similarities, and it is believed that the disparities are due to “the specific nature 
of the industry” or variations in emphasis (Drogoul et al., 2007). However, before 
an industry implements any safety practices from another industry, a deep and 
thorough knowledge of its own safety practices is vital (Drogoul et al., 2007). 
Additionally, similarities across industry types exist in predictive safety 
assessments (Flin, Mearns, O’Conner, & Bryden, 2000). Parallels, in regards to 
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predictive measures, also exist across industry locations (Seo, 2005; Johnson, 
2007). Yet, many of these studies (Flin et al., 2000; Seo, 2005; Johnson, 2007) 
focused mainly on survey data, rather than accident or incident data. 
While each individual industry type is unique, the human constituent is a 
shared element among industries. A multi-industry analysis will allow for 
common high-level human error patterns to emerge. Since each industry type is 
unique at the detailed nanocodes level, the need for human error accident 
investigation and analysis has not been eliminated. However, a high-level 
analysis will allow for the identification of any similarities or disparities among 
HFACS main causal categories (i.e. decision errors and physical environment) 
and causal category groups (i.e. attention failure and weather).  
HUMAN ERROR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
Extending beyond the typical HFACS tier analysis, the investigation of the 
associations among the HFACS main causal categories allows for the 
relationships between the categories to be statistically defined. Associations 
would assist in guiding interventions by highlighting statistically high occurring 
pathways among the HFACS tiers. For example, Li and Harris (2006) explored 
interactions using accident data from the Republic of China Air Force. Using the 
HFACS analysis results, the associations of the HFACS main causal categories 
were able to be determined (Figure 3). To aid in targeting safety improvements, 
the pathways starting at the HFACS main causal category of either 
organizational climate or organizational process have a high possibility of 
manifesting at either decision errors or skill-based errors - the main contributors 
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at this tier. Therefore, safety improvements should be focused on the start of 
these pathways – organizational climate and organizational process – to achieve 
the optimal benefits from the implemented safety improvements (Li & Harris, 
2006). Celik & Cebi (2009) investigated priority weighing HFACS main causal 
categories in the maritime shipping industry. Similar to pathways, clusters of 
similar priority weights can be used to “determine precautionary roadmaps” 
(Celik & Cebi, 2009). 
 
Figure 3: Example of HFACS Associations (Li & Harris, 2006) 
Associations between errors and contributing factors have not been 
limited to the HFACS methodology, but have extended to various accident 
investigation taxonomies. Using accident survey results from aviation 
maintenance employees, associations between errors and contributing factors 
were determined using a correspondence analysis (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003), 
and then the organizational roots of main errors were determined. In another 
example, a Bayesian network analysis was utilized in determining associations 
between various contributing factors (Martin, Rivas, Matias, Taboada & 
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Arguelles, 2009). Using data from fall from heights accidents, various states of 
the contributing factors were determined and served as the foundational 
knowledge regarding accidents of this type. 
Extending beyond the traditional HFACS tier analysis, incorporating 
associations among HFACS main causal categories is imperative to appropriately 
indentifying target areas for safety improvements. Using a multi-industry 
database to determine associations would ensure the ability of the associations to 
be applied across various industry domains and not bounded by one industry. 
While other studies (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003; Li & Harris, 2006; Celik & Cebi, 
2009; Martin et al., 2009) have investigated associations between error and 
contributing factors, these studies are limited in nature. While Hobbs and 
Williams (2003) found strong associations, their results are limited to the aviation 
maintenance industry. In fact, Hobbs and Williams (2003) called for the 
determination of “whether the association found between errors and 
contributing factors would be apparent in other maintenance-occurrence 
databases, or indeed, in safety data from other industries.” Likewise, the findings 
from Li and Harris (2006) are limited to the aviation industry, and in particular, 
the Republic of China Air Force. The method of determining associations using 
priority weights (Celik & Cebi, 2009) is currently at the beginning stages and has 
only been applied to one accident case within the industry. Additionally, the 
priority weight method has the potential to be timely and is limited to the 
maritime shipping industry. Despite myriad methods, one of the main, 
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consistent benefits of determining associations is the ability to implement 
interventions at a higher level rather than at the error level (Rasmussen, 1997). 
RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
While each individual industry type is unique, the human constituent is a 
shared element among industries. Initially, HFACS accident data and case 
information will be populated from a variety of industries. These industries will 
include, but will not be limited to, aviation maintenance, GA, commercial 
aviation, field maintenance, show entertainment, large-scale food services, and 
mining. Additionally, HFACS data from previously published data sources will 
be requested from the published authors. The creation of a multi-industry 
HFACS database would allow for the following questions to be investigated:  
1) When investigating human error accidents using HFACS, what 
similarities and disparities of HFACS causal categories exist across 
various industry types?  
2) Does the potential to determine industry HFACS benchmarks exist? If 
so, what are the industry HFACS benchmarks? 
An across industry analysis can be used to determine if any differences 
among HFACS main causal categories for each industry exist. If any disparity is 
present, the variation can be investigated to determine any industry unique 
characteristics. Such an analysis would allow for benchmarking standards to be 
created for the HFACS taxonomy. The benchmarking standards will allow for a 
company or organization employing the HFACS taxonomy to determine the 
organization’s safety position in respects to other companies or organizations 
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employing HFACS. Furthermore, the system safety manager has the task of 
determining where and how many resources should be allocated for a variety of 
safety interventions. HFACS benchmarking standards can be used to assist in 
validating the allocation of resources. For example, if Company A has a level of 
supervisory violations that greatly exceeds the benchmarking standards for that 
causal factor, the system safety manager at Company A can now justify allotting 
both monetary and human resources for determining interventions for 
supervisory violations. 
Subsequently, associations among HFACS main causal categories should 
be fully examined. This analysis should not be limited to the unsafe acts tier 
alone, but should include the entire HFACS taxonomy. Doing so would allow for 
the following questions to be examined:  
1) Since the HFACS taxonomy represents three tiers of latent conditions 
and one tier of active errors, what latent conditions are associated with 
the active errors found at the unsafe act tier?  
2) Can similar HFACS pathways and relationships be reflected in various 
industries or do differences exist among the various industry types? 
The identification of relationships among HFACS main causal categories will 
provide the system safety manager with supplemental information for a more 
directed intervention.  
The HFACS pathways can guide resources allocated for interventions. For 
example, Company A has identified skill-based errors to be a problem causal 
category for the corporation and have also identified a significant pathway that 
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includes skill-based errors, physical environment, failure to correct known 
problem, and resource management. Upon the identification of this pathway, 
Company A can also allocate intervention resources towards the category at the 
utmost level of the pathway: resource management. Interventions applied at this 
top level of the pathway would permit the benefits of interventions to “trickle 
down” not only along the above pathway, but also any other pathway, including 
top-level categories.  
Additionally, the HFACS pathways can be used to enhance reactive 
accident investigations. Initially, the high-level human error patterns that emerge 
from the multi-industry analysis can be used to focus current accident and near 
miss investigations. Near miss cases investigate incidents that do not result in an 
unsafe act, but do identify pertinent contributing factors. Any associations will 
also enhance investigations. For example, if a high association between skill-
based errors and personal readiness categories is found, further investigation 
regarding one of the two categories can be prompted by the identification of the 
other category. 
The second chapter of this dissertation describes previous research within 
the fields of human error, the HFACS taxonomy and its applications, and 
contributing causal factors in accidents. The third chapter of this dissertation 
outlines the methodology followed during this dissertation. The results and 
discussion for the benchmarking analysis and the HFACS pathways and 
contributing factors associations can be found in chapters four and five, 
12 
respectively. The final chapter of this dissertation includes concluding statements 
and possibilities for future work. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
ACCIDENTS AND SYSTEM SAFETY 
James Reason (1990) described accidents as a combination of active errors 
and latent conditions. Active errors are often viewed as the consequence of a 
series of contributing factors. Being an outcome, active errors tend to have an 
immediate, direct, and typically short-lived effect on a system (Reason, 1995). 
The contributing factors or foundation of an active error can be viewed as 
‘upstream systemic factors’ (Reason, 2000) and can act in a dynamic manner at 
many levels of an organization. These latent conditions have the ability to be 
unapparent, and in essence, remain dormant within a system for a period of 
time. Latent conditions can be recognized and then corrected before the 
occurrence of an undesirable event; however, active failures can be difficult to 
predict due to their connection to the variability of human nature (Reason, 1990; 
Reason, 2000). 
Building on these ideas, Reason’s (1990) module of accident causation 
(Figure 4) illustrates how the possible combination of latent conditions and active 
errors can result in an accident, injury, or loss. The model is frequently called the 
Swiss Cheese Model due to its ability to show how a failure at any system level 
has the potential to provide an opportunity for an accident. If the failed or absent 
defense of a system or the “holes of the Swiss cheese” line up, an accident has the 
potential for transpiring. However, if just one of the holes is closed or one of the 
latent conditions corrected, the accident has lost the potential of occurrence. 
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Figure 4: Reason's Swiss Cheese Model  (Adapted from Reason, 1990) 
Expanding on his base model, Reason (1997) revised the model of 
accidents to be the Mark III version (Figure 5). As can be seen in the top box of 
the Mark III model, an accident must include the three fundamental elements of 
hazards, defenses, and losses. The Swiss cheese slices from the original model are 
represented by ‘planes’ in the top box of the new model (Reason, Hollnagel, & 
Paries, 2006). Additionally, the creation of the holes in the defenses was also 
further established. Errors and violations of ‘front-line operators’ produce short-
term gaps, while local and system decision makers produce longer-term gaps 
(Reason et al., 2006). Gaps and latent conditions created by designers, top-level 
managers and maintainers, and other similar individuals are more dangerous 
and are systemic in nature (Reason et al., 2006). 
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Figure 5: Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model – Mark III Version (Reason, 1997) 
HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
Using Reason’s model as a foundation, HFACS was created to fill the need 
of a common accident investigation and analysis taxonomy (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). The HFACS framework (Figure 2) incorporates one tier of active 
errors called “unsafe acts.” The remaining three tiers of the HFACS taxonomy – 
preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational influences – 
address the latent conditions of a system. The framework provides a 
methodological approach to investigating and analyzing both accidents and near 
miss incidents (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
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Unsafe Acts 
The first tier of causal categories is the unsafe acts tier (Figure 6) 
representing Reason’s active errors. An unsafe act can be classified as either an 
error or a violation. Errors are actions that deviate from an individual’s planned 
intentions and ultimately do not achieve the intended goal (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003). In contrast, violations represent the willful and deliberate 
disregard of rules, regulations, or policies.  
 
Figure 6: Unsafe Acts Tier 
Both errors and violations are further classified into various causal 
categories. Errors are partitioned into decision, skill-based, and perceptual errors. 
A decision error denotes intentional actions that proceed as planned, but the plan 
is inappropriate or inadequate for the situation at hand. Example decision errors 
are “incorrect tool for job” or “exceeded ability of operator.” A skill-based error 
has its foundation in basic skills that occur without any significant or conscious 
thought. A skill-based error is denoted by a weakness or a lapse in such skills. 
Example skill-based errors are “omitted step in checklist” or ‘failure to see and 
avoid.” While skill-based errors are rooted in abilities, perceptual errors are 
rooted in sensory input. A perceptual error is signified by a disagreement 
between one’s perception of the world and the actual world. Example perceptual 
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errors are “misjudgments in distance” and “misjudgments due to visual 
illusion.”  
Violations are classified as either routine or exceptional based on their 
etiology (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Routine violations are typically habitual 
in nature. That is if one person is committing that particular routine violation, 
then other individuals are also committing that particular routine violation. Also, 
management often condones routine violations. An example of a routine 
violation is speeding five miles over the posted speed limit. On the contrary, 
exceptional violations are not habitual in nature and not condoned by 
management. An example of an exceptional violation is speeding forty miles 
over the posted speed limit. 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
The HFACS taxonomy encompasses three tiers of latent failures. The first 
tier of these latent failures is “preconditions for unsafe acts” (Figure 7). The 
preconditions of unsafe acts tier can be classified into three components: 
environment factors, condition of operators, and personnel factors. 
  
 Figure 7: Precondition for Unsafe Acts Tier  
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“Environmental factors” is the first component of the preconditions for 
unsafe acts tier and is segregated into two causal factor categories. The physical 
environment causal category refers to the both the operational and ambient 
environment of the operation. Examples of physical environment causal factors 
include weather, lighting, housekeeping, and surface conditions. The 
technological environment causal category refers to the technology or the 
automation the operator must interact with in order to perform a task. Examples 
of technological environment causal factors include equipment or procedure 
design or display/interface characteristics. 
“Condition of operators” is the second component of the preconditions for 
unsafe acts tier and is divided into three causal factor categories. The adverse 
mental state causal category takes into account the mental conditions that have 
the potential to affect performance. Examples of adverse mental state causal 
factors include complacency, awareness, and overconfidence. The adverse 
physiological state causal category incorporates medical or physiological 
conditions that have the potential to affect performance. Examples of adverse 
physiological state causal factors include physical fatigue, medical illness, and 
intoxication. The physical/mental limitations causal factor category includes 
those instances when an individual’s capabilities are exceeded by the task 
requirements. Examples of physical/mental limitation causal factors are visual 
limitations and insufficient reaction time. 
“Personnel factors” is the final component of the preconditions for unsafe 
acts tier and is divided into two causal factor categories. The crew resource 
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management causal category refers to the communication, coordination, and 
planning associated with a task. Examples of crew resource management causal 
factors include lack of teamwork and failure to conduct an adequate brief. The 
personal readiness causal category refers to instances when an individual does 
not come to work ready to perform at his or her optimal level. Examples of 
personal readiness causal factors include failure to meet rest requirements, self-
medication, and overexertion while off duty. 
Unsafe Supervision 
Expanding beyond the operator involved in the task and their operative 
environment, the unsafe supervision tier (Figure 8) accounts for those individuals 
who influence the condition of the operator and also the operating environment. 
This second tier of latent conditions is divided into four causal factor categories – 
inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct 
problem, and supervisory violations. 
 
Figure 8: Unsafe Supervision Tier 
The inadequate supervision causal factor category refers to instances 
when the supervision fails to provide personnel with the opportunity to succeed. 
Examples of inadequate supervision causal factors include failure to provide 
proper training and over-tasked supervisor. The planned inappropriate 
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operations causal factor category applies to the occasions when the operational 
tempo is degraded to the possibility of affecting operator performance. Examples 
of planned inappropriate operations causal factors include poor team member 
pairing and excessive tasking/workload. The failure to correct a known problem 
causal factors category refers to when a supervisor is aware of imperfections 
among equipment, training, individuals, or other factors, but fails to remedy 
those imperfections. Examples of failure to correct known problem causal factors 
include failed to initiate corrective action and failed to report unsafe tendencies. 
The supervisory violations causal factor category is similar in nature to the 
unsafe acts violations causal factor, but occurs at the supervisory level. Examples 
of supervisory violation causal factors include failed to enforce rules and 
regulations and fraudulent documentation. 
Organizational Influences 
Finally, the organizational influences tier encompasses upper-level 
management and the decisions made at this organizational level. This third level 
of latent failures is divided into three causal factor categories and includes 
resource management, organizational climate, and organizational process. 
 
Figure 9: Organizational Influences Tier 
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The resource management causal factor category refers to the corporate-
level decisions regarding human, monetary/budget, or equipment/facility 
resources. Examples of resource management causal factors include training, 
excessive cost cutting, and purchasing of unsuitable equipment. The 
organizational climate causal factor category refers to the various factors that 
influence operator performance, including structure, policies, and culture. 
Examples of organizational climate causal factors include delegation of authority, 
drugs and alcohol policies, and organizational customs. The organizational 
process causal factor category refers to the various factors that affect the day-to-
day activity of an organization including operations, procedures, and oversight. 
Examples of organizational process causal factors include inadequate time 
pressures, performance standards, and inadequate performance measures. 
APPLICATION OF HFACS 
The HFACS taxonomy was originally applied to the aviation industry. 
The applications within aviation range from GA to military aviation and extend 
beyond the US. Upon the success within that industry, other industries have 
started to apply the taxonomy outside the field of aviation. In the following 
sections, findings from HFACS studies will be discussed.  
Aviation 
The HFACS framework has been applied to the many facets of the 
aviation industry, including commercial, military, and GA. In commercial 
aviation, an HFACS analysis (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001) of accidents from 
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1990 to 1996 determined the leading HFACS causal categories for the industry. 
Skill-based errors proved to be the most frequently occurring unsafe act causal 
category with 60.5% of cases being associated with at least one skill-based error. 
However, the analysis did not include either environmental factors causal 
category. An additional analysis into commercial aviation investigated the 
differences between air carriers and commuter/on-demand accidents (Shappell 
et al., 2007); environmental factors were classified in this analysis. In fact, 
physical environment causal factors were found to be the leading precondition 
for unsafe acts for both air carrier and commuter/on-demand accidents. 
The military has also taken advantage of the HFACS taxonomy to 
investigate military aviation accidents. In a comparison of several US military 
branches, GA, and commercial aviation, the US Navy was found to have a higher 
than expected percentage of cases associated with a violation (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2004).  
The HFACS taxonomy has also been extended beyond the US to include 
civil aircraft accidents in India (Guar, 2005) and military aircraft accidents in 
China, Taiwan, and India (Li & Harris, 2006; Li & Harris, 2007; Li, Harris, & 
Chen, 2007). In an analysis of the Republic of China’s Air Force, both decision 
errors and skill-based errors proved to be the leading source of errors for the 
unsafe acts tier (Li & Harris, 2006; Li & Harris, 2007). Li, Harris, and Chen (2007) 
extended their analysis beyond the Republic of China to include Taiwan and 
India and the variations among the two countries military aviation and the US 
military aviation. 
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In a similar manner, the GA industry has also been scrutinized. GA 
accidents from 1990-2000 were evaluated in a fine-grained HFACS analysis 
(Wiegmann et al., 2005). The various unsafe acts were tracked over the time 
period, and the differences between fatal and non-fatal accidents were outlined. 
In particular, it was found that “fatal accidents were more than four times more 
likely to be associated with violations than non-fatal accidents” (Wiegmann et al., 
2005). The HFACS taxonomy was also utilized in investigating other specific 
concerns, such as accidents involving flight into terrain (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2003) and accidents involving a gyroplane (Pagan & de Voogt, 2008). In addition, 
accidents occurring in Alaska were compared to accidents in the rest of the US 
(Detwiler et al., 2006). In all of the above mentioned aviation industry studies, 
one common finding is skill-based errors being the leading HFACS causal 
category. This is not limited to the confines of the unsafe act tier, but 
encompasses the entire HFACS taxonomy. Extending beyond the US, civil 
aviation has been examined in India, China, and Australia. Skill-based errors 
were determined to be the leading causal factor for both Indian civil aviation 
(Guar, 2005) and Australian civil aviation (Lenné, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 2008). In a 
similar manner, both skill-based errors and decision errors were the leading 
causal factors for Chinese civil aviation (Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008). 
The HFACS taxonomy was originally designed for the aviation field, and 
in particular, those actions inside the cockpit, but the taxonomy has been applied 
to the operation of unmanned aerial vehicles, aviation maintenance (Boquet et 
al., 2004; Krulak, 2004), and air traffic control (Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 
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2005). The organizational tier impacts on accidents were outlined using HFACS 
in the field of military unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) (Tvaryanas, Thompson, 
& Constable, 2006). The adverse effects of less than adequate resource 
management were determined to be system-wide, but fortunately, 44.8% of 
organizational influence cases were not associated with an unsafe act (Tvaryanas, 
Thompson, & Constable, 2006). The pattern of organizational influence was 
represented in another study of only US Army unmanned aerial vehicles 
(Manning et al., 2004). In an investigation of fifty-six UAV accidents, eighteen 
accidents were attributed to human error. Of those eighteen cases, fourteen were 
associated with the causal factor organizational process. However, a modified 
version of HFACS was utilized and environmental factors were not investigated. 
HFACS was also applied retrospectively to errors committed in air traffic 
control (Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 2005). The already determined air traffic 
control operational error codes were first matched to an HFACS causal category 
and then cases already investigated with the air traffic control operation error 
codes were classified with HFACS based on the pairings previously determined. 
Because HFACS was not originally used to investigate cases, the only causal 
categories determined in this analysis were skill-based errors and decision errors 
and were classified at levels of 86% of cases and 14% of cases, respectively 
(Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 2005).  
In an analysis involving aviation maintenance, GA cases, which involved 
maintenance issues, were identified (Boquet et al., 2004). These cases were then 
classified utilizing the HFACS taxonomy, and skill-based errors were determined 
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to be the leading unsafe acts causal category for the eleven-year period. This 
pattern of skill-based errors was recognized by the authors who explained the 
pattern “by the fact that even in complex environments, the bulk of the behaviors 
performed by operators tend to be low processing, highly automatized 
behaviors” (Boquet et al., 2004). In a separate analysis, Krulak (2004) investigated 
aircraft mishaps from the Maintenance Error Information Management System 
database using HFACS-Maintenance Extension. While HFACS-Maintenance 
Extension is originated from HFACS, the causal categories found in HFACS-
Maintenance Extension differ from the traditional HFACS.  
Non-Aviation Fields 
While HFACS has primarily been applied within the field of aviation, the 
HFACS methodology has been extended to the mining industry (Patterson, 
2009), rail industry (Baysari et al., 2008; Baysari et al., 2009; Reinach & Vaile, 
2006), maritime industry (Celik & Cebi, 2004), and surgical operations (ElBardissi 
et al., 2007). In an investigation that examined accidents within the mining 
industry, US fatal accidents were compared to Australian non-fatal accidents 
(Patterson, 2009). In both US and Australian mining accidents, skill-based errors 
proved to be the most frequently occurring unsafe act causal category with 43.7% 
of US cases and 58.9% of Australian cases associated with the causal category. 
Decision errors were also prominent within both data sets, and violations 
occurred in less than 7% of cases for both data sets. Interestingly, the most 
frequently occurring overall causal category for US mining cases was inadequate 
leadership with 44.1% of cases associated with the causal factor. This application 
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of the HFACS methodology proved that HFACS has the ability to extend beyond 
the cockpit and the aviation industry (Patterson, 2009). 
Accidents occurring in the railway industry have also been analyzed 
utilizing the HFACS methodology. In Australia, twenty-three accident cases 
were investigated with HFACS (Baysari et al., 2008; Baysari et al., 2009). In these 
analyses, the leading causal categories were resource management, adverse 
mental state, and skill-based error. In order to further examine the railway 
industry, the HFACS – Railroad extension was created (Reinach & Viale, 2006). 
HFACS – Railroad added the new tier “outside factors” and the organizational 
factors causal category “organizational contraventions (violations).” 
Additionally, HFACS – Railroad incorporated a new sub-causal category of 
violations: acts of sabotage. Using HFACS – Railroad, six US railway 
accidents/incidents were investigated and classified. While the high frequency of 
skill-based errors was evident in both the Australian and US rail studies (Baysari 
et al., 2008; Baysari et al., 2009; Reinach & Viale, 2006), the causal category 
adverse mental state was not reflected in the US investigation. However, this 
may be due to the small number of accidents/incidents investigated in the US 
analysis. 
While the mining and railway industries have been assessed in detail, the 
maritime and medical industries are still in the beginning stages of HFACS 
analysis. In order to investigate the maritime industry, Celik and Cebi (2004) 
integrated the HFACS methodology with the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process. 
The Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process methodology aims to quantify HFACS 
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causal factor comparisons with expert opinions. As a result, the causal categories 
are weighted towards the contributing factors of an accident. While innovative, 
the methodology has only been applied to one maritime accident (Celik & Cebi, 
2004).  
In the medical industry, the cardiovascular surgery operating room has 
been examined with the HFACS methodology (ElBardissi et al., 2007). In 
interviews with individuals involved in the operating room, interviewees were 
questioned regarding their opinions of the occurrence of the various HFACS 
causal categories in the operating room. Additional non-aviation industries, 
including large-scale food services, field maintenance, and show entertainment, 
have also been investigated and reported by Berry, Stringfellow, and Shappell 
(2009). 
ERRORS AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
Errors and violations are not random events, but instead can be attributed 
to a combination of causes or contributing factors (Senders & Moray, 1991). 
These causes or characteristics of an accident multiply over time creating a 
complex interactive network of causal factors (Pidgeon, 1991). Additionally, 
Reason (1990) established the existence of interaction between active failures and 
latent conditions. It is important to note that the identification of contributing 
factors does not equate to the identification of a single, absolute cause, but rather 
to the identification of causal chains or networks (Senders & Moray, 1991). The 
accident investigator or safety manager must identify these networks during an 
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investigation in order to predict when and under what circumstances future 
accidents may occur (Alkov, 1997). 
Contributing Factors Associations 
Extending past traditional frequency accident analysis, many studies have 
investigated the associations between contributing factors and errors. Identifying 
those associations have allowed for the potential to generalize across domains 
(Hobbs & Williamson, 2003). Using data from survey questionnaires, Hobbs and 
Williamson (2003) investigated error and contributing factors using 
correspondence analysis within the field of aircraft maintenance. A 
correspondence analysis was initially completed to identify contributing factor 
and error pairs for further investigation. Then chi-square and odds ratios were 
calculated based on the hypotheses. In this study, a taxonomy of seven error 
types and ten contributing factors was utilized. Table 1 outlines the significant 
pairings found. 
Table 1: Contributing Factor Associations in Aviation Maintenance (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003) 
Contributing Factor Associated Error (p<0.05) 
Fatigue Perceptual error, memory lapse 
Pressure Memory lapse, violation 
Coordination Rule-based error 
Training Knowledge-based error 
Procedure Perceptual error, knowledge-based error, mischance 
Equipment Slip 
Previous deviation Mischance 
Environment Perceptual error 
 
Building on this work, Hobbs & Kanki (2008) extended the same analysis 
to actual aircraft maintenance incident cases. From this data, many of the survey-
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based hypotheses from the previous study (Hobbs & Williamson, 2003) were 
supported by the empirically based data from the incident reports (Hobbs & 
Kanki, 2008). However, analysis only included hypothesis creation with 
correspondence analysis and did not extend to chi-square and odds ratio 
calculations. This analysis of actual accident cases did not follow the same 
taxonomy for classifying contributing factors and errors as the previous study. 
As illustrated by Figure 10, the errors and the closely related factors represent 
potential hypotheses. For example, hypotheses exist for knowledge-based errors 
to be associated with both procedure and training/qualifications. However, 
some hypotheses were represented in both studies including coordination being 
associated with rule-based errors, training being associated with knowledge-
based errors, and procedures being associated with knowledge-based errors 
(Hobbs & Kanki, 2008). While these works allow for the initial identification of 
hypotheses, the results are restricted to the field of aircraft maintenance. Also, 
the correspondence analysis does not permit for testing of statistical significance 
but is “useful in developing hypotheses” (Hobbs & Kanki, 2008; Clausen, 1998).  
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Figure 10: Plot of Errors & Contributing Factors in Aviation Maintenance (Hobbs & Kanki, 2008). 
Contributing factors were also examined within Australian work-related 
fatalities (Feyer, Williamson, & Cairns, 1997). In this analysis, a taxonomy of four 
precursor events and eight contributing factors was utilized, and errors were 
categorized as slips, rule-based, knowledge-based, or none. Through 
correspondence analysis, three findings arose:  
1) equipment work practices are associated with rule-based errors,  
2) PPE, safety equipment practices and individual unsafe procedure 
practices are associated with slips, and  
3) management’s unsafe procedures are associated with knowledge-
based errors (Feyer, Williamson, & Cairns, 1997).  
These findings indicate that various work practices are associated with different 
error types and should be examined further. These networks of contributing 
factors and human error aid not only in providing insight into accidents, but also 
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presenting information that can be used in the creation of interventions targeted 
at contributing factors, rather than unsafe acts. It is believed that interventions 
targeted towards contributing factors or latent failures are more likely to be 
effective because latent failures are frequently the origins of accidents (Feyer, 
Williamson, & Cairns, 1997). 
Bayesian Networks 
In a different approach to contributing factors and errors, a Bayesian 
network analysis was performed on accidents caused by falls from a height 
(Martín et al., 2009). Seven possible contributing variables, which lead to a 
previous accident or incident, were defined as experience, task duration, 
training, knowledge of regulations, hazard perception, safety harness use, and 
incorrect posture. Within each of these variables, various states were identified. 
The Bayesian network created for this specific type of accident allows for 
relationships to be defined and estimates or predictions to be determined (Martín 
et al., 2009). Additionally, Rasmussen (1997) identified the need for an analysis 
regarding contributing factors. Research should depart from the traditional focus 
of human error and should focus “on the mechanisms generating behavior” 
(Rasmussen, 1997).  
HFACS Causal Factor Associations 
Seldom are accidents an outcome of one single event or unsafe act. Most 
often, accidents are a culmination of various factors including, but not limited to 
environmental factors, task related factors, situational factors, and organizational 
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factors (Reason, 1995). While many of these factors exist without an accident 
occurring, it is when an unsafe act is committed that these latent factor pathways 
extend to the active errors (Maurino, Reason, Johnston, & Lee, 1995). Since latent 
conditions have the ability to remain dormant in a system, the unpredictable 
combinations of latent failures result in continuing and more hazardous gaps 
(Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006). 
In order to shift to the new focus identified by Rasmussen (1997), a 
taxonomy that identified both hazard sources and their characteristics should be 
utilized. The HFACS taxonomy allows for unsafe acts to be identified. In 
addition, contributing factors at the three levels of operator, supervision, and 
organizational are also systematically classified and analyzed. The relationships 
between the four causal tiers of the HFACS taxonomy have been investigated in 
various manners. In fact, the creators of the HFACS taxonomy recognized the 
need for identifying causal factors. Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) wrote, “if the 
accident is going to be reduced beyond current levels, investigators, and analysts 
alike must examine the accident sequence in its entirety and expand it beyond 
the cockpit.” 
In a survey- and interview-based study, relationships between HFACS 
causal categories were identified for potential incidents in the cardiovascular 
surgery operating room (ElBardissi et al., 2007). Members of the operating staff 
were questioned about the frequency of occurrence of various errors and 
contributing factors. From this information, several notable relationships were 
proposed. For example, it is believed that when there is a physical/mental 
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limitation present, the probabilities of a skill-based error, decision error, routine 
violation, or exceptional violation occurring were increased. While many 
relationships were recommended, one limitation of this study is the lack of actual 
accident or incident data. Employing a case study approach, Luxhoj (2003) used 
the Bayesian Belief Networks to construct an influence diagram for the case 
study. Using an accident case study from the aviation maintenance field, case-
specific relationships were hypothesized by experts regarding the causal factors 
(Luxhoj, 2003; Luxhoj, Jalil, & Jones, 2003).  
Incorporating military aviation accident cases, the relationships between 
unsafe acts and contributing factors were identified for the Republic of China Air 
Force (Li & Harris, 2006). Using the HFACS taxonomy, accident cases from 1978 
to 2002 were classified and analyzed. Various error pathways were identified 
among the four levels of the HFACS taxonomy (Li & Harris, 2006). In particular, 
when a failure at the organizational process category is present, an increase in 
the probability of occurrence for a failure at the inadequate supervision category 
exists. The pathway continues to increase in the probability of occurrence for a 
failure at the crew resource management category, which increases the 
probabilities of occurrences for both a decision error and a skill-based error (Li & 
Harris, 2006). Building on this work, Li, Harris, & Yu (2008) extended the 
military dataset to 2006 and determined further HFACS relationships. 
Particularly strong relationships exist between the organizational influences tier 
and the unsafe supervision tier and between the preconditions for unsafe acts 
tier and the unsafe acts tier. The relationship between crew resource 
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management and both decision errors and skill-based errors was strengthened 
and extended to include violations (Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008). While initial work (Li 
& Harris, 2006; Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008) in defining HFACS relationships has 
determined several pathways, this work has been limited to the aviation 
industry, in particular the Republic of China Air Force aviation.  
The interaction of various causal factors has also been investigated within 
the maritime industry. Celik and Cebi (2009) outline a new process for assessing 
cases based on the idea of HFACS tier interaction. The Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy 
Process quantifies experts’ opinions to identify the leading causal factors of an 
accident or incident. Then using fuzzy mathematics, pairwise comparisons 
between causal factors at different tiers were quantified and the relationship 
assessed. Celik and Cebi (2009) applied their methodology to a single maritime 
accident case and determined the strength or weight of HFACS causal categories 
to shipping accident outcome. The causal factor pathway can be used as a 
precautionary tool for similar circumstances within the shipping industry. While 
this new methodology allows for causal categories to be assessed more 
quantitatively, the methodology can be viewed as laborious and extensive. 
Error pathways were also preliminarily assessed in Australian GA 
accidents (Lenné, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 2008). In the 169 human error GA crashes 
studied, several associations were identified as significant with Pearson’s Chi-
Square and odds ratio. For example, the presence of fitness for duty, 
physical/mental limitation, or adverse mental state increases the likelihood of 
decision or skill-based errors. Additionally, the presence of crew resource 
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management or adverse mental state increases the probability of violations 
occurring. While several key pathways were identified, the associations from this 
study were limited to only the unsafe acts and preconditions for unsafe acts tiers.  
Aviation System Risk Model 
While the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis technique identifies essential 
risk factors, it is impossible for the technique to identify all combinations of 
causal factors and all possibilities of errors. Luxhoj (2003) identified a need to 
further the risk analysis field by improving system modeling and assessing the 
dense combinations of causal factors. To do so, Luxhoj (2003) suggested 
combining error classification techniques with various risk assessment 
techniques. This combination would enhance the ability to predict or project the 
impact of system failures and eventually, the interventions applied. 
Using risk analysis tools and Bayesian Belief Networks, Luxhoj (2003) 
developed the Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM). Based on the HFACS 
framework, ASRM relies on case studies and expert opinions. ASRM investigates 
the interactions between various causal categories. The ASRM approach 
successfully identified associations among causal factors in a variety of cases 
(Luxhoj, 203; Luxhoj, Jalil, & Jones, 2003). Using the results from the causal factor 
associations, conditional probability tables were created based on the opinions of 
subject matter experts. These opinions were integrated into a Bayesian Belief 
Network representing the aviation maintenance industry. Then by using 
sensitivity analysis, the effectiveness of targeted interventions on HFACS causal 
factors was elicited from experts (Luxhoj, Jalil, & Jones, 2003). Since an 
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intervention can affect multiple causal factors, the effectiveness or relative risk of 
the individual causal factors were combined to determine the relative risk of an 
individual intervention. Additionally, a user interface was created to examine 
accident cases and targeted interventions. A sample user interface can be found 
in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: ASRM User Interface (Luxhoj, Jalil, & Jones, 2003) 
While the ASRM process provided a good initial approach toward 
correlating human error and risk management, the methodology is limited. The 
case study approach applied during the creation of the ASRM limits the ability to 
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generalize the results (Cohen et al., 2000); hence the lack of statistical 
generalizations not applied by the ASRM (Luxhoj, Jalil, & Jones, 2003). 
Additionally, the ASRM approach only incorporates aviation maintenance data 
without extending beyond that one industry. Although relative risk was 
calculated in the ASRM approach, the risk applies only to an improved system 
and does not measure the current system. Consequently, the relative risk is not 
an actual risk based on an actual situation, but is a predictive intervention-based 
risk, and is in essence, a best-case scenario. Because the model employs Bayesian 
Belief Networks, subject matter experts provided insight to interactions and 
interventions when empirical data was not available. This has the possibility of 
limiting the ASRM model to those expert opinions on a small number of accident 
cases rather than expert opinions on a large number and variety of accident 
cases. 
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PURPOSE 
While each industry type is unique, the human constituent is a shared 
element among industries. A multi-industry analysis will allow for common 
high-level human error patterns to emerge. Since each industry type is unique in 
the detailed nanocodes level, the need for human error accident investigation 
and analysis has not been eliminated. However, a high-level analysis will allow 
for the identification of HFACS main causal category and causal category group 
similarities and disparities.  
While HFACS has been frequently applied in the field of aviation in 
literature, other industry types are under-represented. However, would the same 
HFACS pattern emerge from industries other than aviation? The purpose of the 
first section of this study is  
1) to gather HFACS data that was not limited to aviation, but 
encompassed a variety of industry types and  
2) to determine any HFACS benchmarking standards. While each 
industry type is unique, the human constituent is a shared element 
among industries. A multi-industry analysis will allow for common 
high-level human error patterns to emerge. 
Using Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese Model, accidents are determined to be 
a combination of latent conditions that lead to an active error. While typical 
accident analysis aims at identifying active errors, implementing effective 
interventions at this level is difficult due to the variability associated with the 
errors. Since latent conditions are associated with less variability and more easily 
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predicted, interventions aimed at latent conditions have the potential to produce 
“the greatest gains in safety benefit” (Li & Harris, 2006). The purpose of the 
second section of this study is to identify relationships between active errors and 
latent conditions without limiting data to one specific industry type and using a 
taxonomy that systemically identifies both active errors and latent conditions at 
all levels of an organization. Doing so could potentially allow for the shifting 
intervention target areas from active errors to latent conditions. 
In addition to proactive interventions, the proposed framework can be 
used to enhance reactive accident investigations. The high-level human error 
patters that emerge from the multi-industry analysis can be used to focus current 
accident and near miss investigations. Additionally, any causal factor 
associations will also enhance investigations. For example, if a high interaction 
between skill-based errors and personal readiness categories is found, further 
investigation regarding one of the two categories can be prompted by the 
identification of the other category. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
DATA SOURCES 
The various data sources included in this analysis represented seven 
different industries including aviation, maintenance, food service, entertainment, 
and mining. Information regarding data sources can be found in Table 2. Several 
unpublished data sources were included in this analysis. The unpublished 
critical cases data source includes only OSHA level A and B accident cases from a 
large company. The unpublished site maintenance data source includes accident 
cases involved in on-site maintenance. The researches for the Middle East 
Aviation data source, which is also unpublished, have requested to remain 
anonymous. Additionally, any overlapping cases from Wiegmann et al. (2005) 
GA study and the Pagán & de Voogt (2008) gyroplane study were removed from 
the Wiegmann et al. (2005) study. Data was organized and analyzed using 
Microsoft Excel, OpenOffice, and SPSS. 
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Table 2: Data Sources 
Author Year Data Source Industry Type 
Number 
of Cases 
Berry, Stringfellow, 
& Shappell 
2009 Field Maintenance Maintenance 486 
Berry, Stringfellow, 
& Shappell 
2009 Large Scale Food 
Services 
Food Services 384 
Berry, Stringfellow, 
& Shappell 
2009 Show Entertainment Entertainment 336 
Li & Harris 2006 Chinese Military 
Aviation 
Aviation 509 
Li, Harris, & Yu 2008 Chinese General 
Aviation 
Aviation 41 
Pagán & de Voogt 2008 US Gyroplane 
Aviation 
Aviation 223 
Patterson 2009 Australian Mining Mining 508 
Patterson 2009 US Mining Mining 255 
Shappell et al. 2007 US Commercial 
Aviation – FAR 121 
Aviation 181 
Shappell et al. 2007 US Commercial 
Aviation – FAR 135 
Aviation 839 
Tvaryanas, 
Thompson, & 
Constable 
2006 Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft Operations 
Aviation 95 
Wiegmann et al. 2005 US General Aviation 
– FAR 133 
Aviation 124 
Wiegmann et al. 2005 US General Aviation 
– FAR 137 
Aviation 1288 
Wiegmann et al. 2005 US General Aviation 
– FAR 91 
Aviation 16511 
Unpublished --- Middle East 
Aviation 
Aviation 40 
Unpublished -- Critical Cases Various 216 
Unpublished -- Site Maintenance Maintenance 129 
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HFACS CLASSIFICATION 
Data sources were classified using the tradition HFACS taxonomy and 
framework (Figure 2). All accident cases were classified using one of two 
methods. For the first method, at least two independent experts separately 
classified each accident case. When discrepancies occurred, another expert 
performed a quality assurance arbitration. This method has continuously 
produced high inter-rater reliability (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004; Shappell et al., 
2007; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Wiegmann et 
al., 2005). In order to increase efficiency in the classification method, a second 
consensus method was created. Multiple experts classify a case together and 
come to an agreement on the causal factors. This method eliminated the need for 
a quality assurance arbitration due to the ability of the experts to discuss the 
case. For those unpublished data sources, the consensus classification method 
was utilized. 
For each case, simply the presence or absence of each HFACS causal 
category was determined. This binary method allows for the percentage of cases 
associated with each HFACS causal category to be determined; however, HFACS 
causal categories at each HFACS tier are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
one accident case can include both a decision error and a perceptual error. Also 
for this study, unsafe acts were classified as decision errors, skill-based errors, 
perceptual errors, or violations. Violations were not categorized as routine or 
exceptional due to lack of certain descriptive information in certain datasets. 
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HFACS BENCHMARKING STANDARDS ANALYSIS 
Two statistical tests were applied to evaluate the null hypotheses that each 
data source pairing within each causal category was the same. First, a traditional 
analysis using a two-proportion z-test assuming unequal variances was 
performed. Although the data was binomial in nature, this test was selected since 
the normal can be approximated. Additionally, the data is not mutually 
exclusive. A pooled estimator as seen in Equation 1 was utilized. 
! 
ˆ p =
x
1
+ x
2
n
1
+ n
2
 
Equation 1: Pooled Estimator 
Second, an analysis based on the premise of reducing the number of false 
positives associated with single-inference procedures was completed (Benjamini 
& Hochberg, 1995). To reduce the number of falsely rejected hypotheses, the 
methodology proposed by Benjamini & Hochberg (1995) was utilized. The false 
discovery rate (FDR) methodology originates in signal detection theory. Table 3 
describes the number of errors committed when testing m-null hypotheses.  
Table 3: Basis of False Discover Rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) 
 Declared  
Non-significant 
Declared 
Significant 
Total 
True null hypotheses U V m0 
Non-true null hypotheses T S m -m0 
 m-R R m 
 
R is the number of hypotheses rejected. While R is an observable value, U, 
V, S, and T are unobservable. Benjamini & Hochberg (1995) continued by stating 
“the proportion of errors committed by falsely rejecting null hypotheses can be 
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viewed through the random variable Q=V/(V+S).” The FDR QC is further 
defined as 
! 
Q
C
= E Q( ) = E V V + S( ){ } = E V R( )  
Equation 2: False Discovery Rate QC (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) 
Employing this methodology, individual hypotheses (
  
! 
H
1
,H
2
,…,H
m
) were 
tested using p-values for each data source pairwise comparison for each HFACS 
causal category. The p-values were then arranged from 
  
! 
P
1( ) " P 2( ) "… " Pm( ) 
understanding that the null hypothesis H(i) corresponds to P(i). The following 
test was then performed (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995): 
let k be the largest i for which 
 
! 
P i( ) "
i
m
q*; 
then reject all H(i)=1,2,…,k. 
Equation 3: False Discovery Rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) 
In a similar manner, Q is a random variable, and q is unobservable. The 
FDR methodology allows for the procedure to control the FDR at q*. As such, q* 
is frequently chosen to equal ! (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995), and for this 
analysis, q* was 0.01. HFACS benchmarking standards were determined based 
on the results of the FDR analysis among the various causal categories. For each 
individual causal category analysis, data sources were individually eliminated 
from the analysis based on frequency of data sources in the rejected hypotheses. 
When none of the data source hypotheses were rejected, the remaining data 
sources were included in the calculation for the causal category benchmarking 
standard. The benchmarking standards were determined based on the mean and 
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confidence intervals. Since both the mean and standard deviation of the 
population are unknown, the confidence intervals were determined using 
Equation 4 and an alpha value of 0.001. 
! 
x ± t" 2 s n  
where 
! 
x  is the arithmetic mean, s is the standard deviation, and n is the 
number of data sets
 
 
Equation 4: Confidence Interval 
In addition to the FDR analysis, the arithmetic mean and standard 
deviation for each causal category was calculated. An additional FDR analysis 
was conducted on those data sources individually eliminated for each causal 
category to determine the existence of a secondary FDR mean. 
DATA FILTERING 
For the data source cases in Table 2, some of the data sources include both 
accident cases and near miss cases. Initially, the benchmarking analysis was 
completed on the accidents and near miss data. Afterward, the data sources 
including near miss cases were reexamined. All the near miss cases or cases 
without at least one unsafe act were eliminated. The benchmarking analysis was 
then performed on accident only data for all data sources. 
In an ideal world, all tiers and all causal categories would be fully 
investigated for each accident and near miss. Unfortunately, that is not the case. 
Since the HFACS analysis was performed on previously investigated cases, gaps 
in the accident information exist causing a lack of classification at several causal 
categories, especially causal categories at the two upper tiers. In order to 
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accommodate for the non-ideal world, the data was filtered based on a separate 
benchmarking analysis. 
First the data sources were examined at the four HFACS tier levels: unsafe 
act, precondition for unsafe act, unsafe supervision, and organizational influence. 
A benchmark analysis for the four individual tiers was performed and the 
confidence intervals determined. For each individual causal tier, those data 
sources that did not exceed the lower confidence interval were identified. The 
benchmarking analysis was then repeated for each causal category with the data 
sources identified as not exceeding the lower confidence interval at that 
particular tier excluded from the analysis. The filtering was conducted initially 
for the full data (accidents and near misses) and then the accident only data. In 
the end, the causal category benchmarking analysis was conducted four times as 
illustrated in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12: Data Filtering 
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HFACS ASSOCIATIONS ANALYSIS 
Data Organization  
Drawing upon Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese Model, active errors are 
associated with more systemic latent failures. According to the HFACS 
taxonomy, each tier is associated with its adjacent tiers. For example, the 
preconditions for unsafe acts tier is linked with the unsafe act tier and the unsafe 
supervision tier. As previously mentioned, the HFACS analysis was conducted 
post-hoc and was not an integral part of the initial case investigation. To 
compensate for the information gaps, association analysis was not limited to only 
adjacent tier analysis, but allowed for tier jumping. For example, associations 
among unsafe acts causal categories were not limited to only the precondition for 
unsafe acts causal categories but were extended to both the inadequate 
supervision causal categories and organizational influence causal categories.  
In order to examine associations, the lowest tier – unsafe acts – was 
examined for associations with the three upper tiers. First, the raw data for all 
data sources was separated and only those cases with at least one unsafe act 
causal category and at least one upper tier causal category were included. Doing 
this ensures that associations between unsafe acts and other tiers are examined 
with less noise since it is believed that cases with only unsafe act causal 
categories lack thorough upper tier investigation.  
With this new data, a benchmarking analysis was conducted for the three 
upper tiers. Since the data already includes cases with at least one unsafe act 
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causal category, the value of unsafe act for each data source is 100%. The mean 
and confidence intervals for the three upper tiers and data sources that do not 
exceed the lower confidence interval were identified and then excluded from 
further analysis. As mentioned above, since the HFACS analysis was performed 
on previously investigated cases, gaps in the accident information exist causing a 
lack of classification at several causal categories, especially causal categories at 
the two upper tiers. The data was then separated into three separate databases 
that include those cases with at least one causal category from each tier indicated 
by the names: unsafe acts X preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe acts X unsafe 
supervision, and unsafe act X organizational influences. 
This process was for the second tier preconditions for unsafe acts and 
resulted in two addition databases: precondition for unsafe acts X unsafe 
supervision and precondition for unsafe act X organizational influences. Finally, 
the process was repeated for the two upper tiers and resulted in the sixth and 
final database: unsafe supervision X organizational influences. 
Sampling 
As can been seen in Table 2, the sample sizes of the various industry data 
sets are vastly different and range from 40 to 16,511. In order to reduce the 
possibility of any of the datasets biasing the analysis, a sampling of the datasets 
was performed. Each of the six new databases described above were individually 
examined, and the number of cases from each data source in each of the 
databases was calculated. A sample size based on the mean number of cases for 
each data source was calculated for each database. If a data source exceeded the 
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newly determined sample size, a random sample without replacement was 
conducted. 
Statistical Analysis 
After the databases were combined sampled, cross tabulations of causal 
factors were created and displayed in contingency tables (Table 4). As a 
reminder, a “1” indicates the presence of a causal factor and a “0” indicates the 
absence of a causal factor. For this analysis, causal factor A (
! 
CF
A
) precedes causal 
factor B (
! 
CF
B
) causally. For example, crew resource management (preconditions 
for unsafe acts tier) causally precedes a decision error (unsafe act). 
Table 4: Sample Contingency Table 
  
! 
CF
B
  
  1 0  
1 a b a+b 
! 
CF
A
 
0 c d c+d 
  a+c b+d n 
 
Where 
! 
CF
A
 and 
! 
CF
B
 are HFACS causal factors. 
In order to estimate the statistical strength of the associations between the 
causal categories, Pearson’s Chi-Square (
! 
" 2) analyses were performed. The 
following is the hypothesis that was investigated in the Pearson’s Chi-Square 
analyses (Sheskin, 2004) for independence 
! 
H
0
:oij = "ij  for all cells 
! 
Ha :oij " #ij  
for at least one cell 
Where 
! 
oij  and 
! 
"ij  is the observed and expected frequency of cell ij 
respectively 
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For each contingency table testing the above hypothesis, there exist r rows and c 
columns. The test statistic value for determining the independent of the causal 
factors is determined by 
 
! 
" 2 =
Oij # Eij( )
2
Eijj=1
c
$
i=1
r
$  
Where 
! 
Oij  is the observed frequency and 
! 
Eij =
Oik
k=1
c
" Okj
k=1
r
"
n
 
Equation 5: Pearson’s Chi-Square Test Statistic 
A p-value of 0.001 was utilized to identify significance. 
The Pearson’s Chi-Square test relies on several assumptions. One 
assumption regarding sample size requires the expected frequency of any cells in 
a 2x2 contingency table to be more than two (Sheskin, 2004). In cases where this 
assumption was not met, the Fisher Exact test was applied. The following is the 
hypothesis that was investigated in the Fisher exact test  
! 
H
0
:"
1
= "
2  
! 
H
a
:"
1
# "
2 
Where 
! 
"
i
 is the proportion of observations in row i 
The Fisher exact test relies on the 2x2 contingency tables with the layout as 
seen in Table 4. The test statistic value for determining the independence of the 
causal factors is determined by 
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Equation 6: Fisher Exact Test Statistic 
A p-value of 0.001 was utilized to identify significance. 
While the Pearson’s Chi-square test and the Fisher exact test determined 
the significance of an association, odds ratios determined the degree of an 
association and were utilized to further assess the causal factor pairs. Only those 
pairings found significant in the Pearson’s Chi-square test or Fisher exact test 
were moved forward in the analysis. The odds ratio is helpful in establishing the 
likelihood of a causal factor occurring given the presence of another causal 
factor. Odds ratio is based on the concept of odds, which can be described as 
(Sheskin, 2004) 
Odds(X) = p(X will occur)/p(X will not occur) 
For a 2x2 contingency table arranged in the same manner as Table 4, the odds can 
be calculated as follows 
! 
Odds CFB =1CFA =1( ) =
p(CFB =1CFA =1)
p(CFB = 0CFA =1)
=
a
b
 
! 
Odds CFB =1CFA = 0( ) =
p CFB =1CFA = 0( )
p CFB = 0CFA = 0( )
=
c
d
 
Equation 7: Odds Calculation 
The odds ratio is the determined by the ratio of two odds for a 2x2 
contingency table (Sheskin, 2004). For example, the odds ratio for a contingency 
table arranged in the same manner as Table 4 is determined by  
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Equation 8: Odds Ratio 
The above odds ratio determines the extent to which the condition 
! 
CF
B  is present 
when 
! 
CF
A
 is present is more likely to occur than the condition 
! 
CF
B
 is present 
when 
! 
CF
A
 is not present. An odds ratio of one indicates a neutral association 
between the two conditions. A neutral association is an association where given 
the knowledge of a causal factor, the odds of a secondary causal factor occurring 
is equal to the odds of the secondary causal factor not occurring, therefore 
producing a lack of knowledge regarding the association. 
Additionally, the odds ratios were tested for significance. The following 
are the hypotheses being investigated 
! 
H
0
:OR =1
H
a
:OR "1
 
An odds ratio equal to one represented by the hull hypothesis would indicate a 
neutral association between the two factors. The test statistic utilized for the odds 
ratio test of significance is determined by 
! 
z =
ln OR( )
SE
 
Where for a 2x2 contingency table (Table 4)  
! 
SE =
1
a
+
1
b
+
1
c
+
1
d
 
Equation 9: Test Statistic for Test of Significance for an Odds Ratio 
A p-value of 0.01 was utilized to identify significance. 
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Similar to the Pearson’s Chi-Square statistic, the odds ratio statistic is 
symmetrical (Sheskin, 2004) meaning that odds ratio based on the presence of 
! 
CF
B
 is the same as odds ratio based on the presence of 
! 
CF
A
. Since the HFACS 
classification incorporates causal categories at various levels, an asymmetrical 
measure of association strength is also required. In addition to odds ratio, the 
relative risk was also calculated for each causal factor pairing found significant 
either in the Pearson’s Chi-Square test or the Fisher’s Exact Test. Relative risk 
measures the relative probabilities of a condition. Relative risk is the probability 
of 
! 
CF
B
 occurring if 
! 
CF
A
 occurs divided by the probability of 
! 
CF
B
 occurring if 
! 
CF
A
 does not occur. The relative risk of 
! 
CF
B
 for a contingency table arranged in 
the same manner as Table 4 is determined by 
! 
RRB =
p CFB =1CFA =1( )
p CFB =1CFA = 0( )
=
ac + ad
ac + bc
 
Equation 10: Relative Risk of Causal Factor B 
Relative risk, in addition to be asymmetrical in direction, has the benefit of 
benefit being more intuitive than odds ratios (Sheskin, 2004). The relative risk of 
! 
CF
A
 was also calculated with the following equation: 
! 
RRA =
p CFA =1CFB =1( )
p CFA =1CFB = 0( )
=
ab + ad
ab + bc
 
Equation 11:Relative Risk of Causal Factor A 
Similarly, the relative risks were tested for significance. The following are 
the hypotheses being investigated. 
! 
H
0
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A relative risk equal to one would indicate a neutral association between the two 
factors. The test statistic utilized for the relative risk test of significance is 
determined by 
! 
z =
ln RR
B( )
SE
 
Where for a 2x2 contingency table (Table 4)  
! 
SE =
1
a
+
1
b
+
1
c
+
1
d
 
Equation 12: Test Statistic for Test of Significance for a Relative Risk 
A p-value of 0.01 was utilized to identify significance. In the following chapters, 
the methodology outlined in this chapter will be applied to the HFACS data. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: HFACS BENCHMARKING STANDARDS 
 
In this chapter, the HFACS findings from the various data sources 
incorporated in this dissertation will be presented at the tier level and the causal 
category level. The benchmarking results extracted from the data sources will 
also be presented. As illustrated in Figure 12, the benchmarking analysis was 
conducted four times in order to account for near miss cases and data source 
filtering. The results of these four analyses will be presented and discussed. 
DATA SOURCE HFACS CLASSIFICATION 
The seventeen data sources represented a wide variety of industry types, 
ranging from aviation to food services. These seven industry types do not 
confine these results to one specific industry or one specific country, but allow 
for an analysis that encompasses various types of work and tasks and the effects 
of cultural issues. Additionally, the inclusion of multiple data sources 
strengthens the analysis with an increase in data. This analysis includes a total of 
22,165 safety cases, which include not only accident cases, but also near 
miss/incident cases. While the total number of cases is overwhelming, the size of 
GA FAR 91 (approximately 75% of the total number of cases) was accounted for 
in the findings. 
Classification of Accident and Near Miss Cases 
All the accident or near miss cases from every data source were classified 
at least to the causal category level, and many of the data sources classified errors 
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and latent conditions at the nanocode level. In order to examine to what extent 
each data source examined a particular HFACS tier, the presence or absence of 
each tier was classified for all the accident and near miss cases. Based on this 
binary value, the percentage of cases with at least one causal factor was 
calculated. This statistic is most commonly used in HFACS analysis, but is not 
without weaknesses. Due to its binary nature, the statistic lacks detail and 
strength. For example, a case with one decision error is given the same value of 
one as a case with five decision errors ultimately causing some of the detail 
regarding the accident case to be lost in the analysis.  
Additionally, this method of reporting might bias one data set over 
another. For example, by nature of the industry, GA accidents are reported in 
more detail, and therefore are more thoroughly investigated, while accidents in 
other industries such as, entertainment, do not report or investigate in such 
detail. In contrast to the percentage of cases statistic, the percentage of codes 
statistic would permit for the diligence of reporting and investigation to be 
illustrated. While this percentage of cases statistics is not without limitations, the 
percentage of cases statistic was utilized for this analysis for two main reasons: 
1) many of the data sources only classified cases in the binary method, 
thus making the percentage of codes statistic difficult or even 
impossible to accurately calculate, and  
2) the focus of this analysis is furthering HFACS research and not 
assessing the thoroughness of various industries accident investigation 
methodology.  
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Using the percentage of cases method, the results of the HFACS classification for 
accident and near miss cases at the tier level can be found in Table 5.  
Table 5: Accident and Near Miss Cases HFACS Classification – Tier Level 
 
Results from Table 5 can easily be interpreted. For example, 93.50% 
(475/508) of US mining cases had at least one occurrence of an unsafe act. It is 
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important to remember that the percentages do not add to 100% since a case can 
have multiple causal factors among multiple tiers. The values that do add to 
100% are embedded at each individual data source and each individual HFACS 
value being investigated. For example, while 93.50% of US mining cases had at 
least one occurrence of an unsafe act, 6.50% (100% - 93.50% = 6.50%) of US 
mining cases have an absence of an unsafe act. This concept is repeated for all the 
HFACS classification tables represented in this dissertation. 
Since this analysis is more focused on findings across industry types, the 
details regarding each individual data source finding will not be discussed here. 
For more information regarding individual findings, please see the references 
listed in Table 2. All but one of the data sources (US GA– FAR 133) has at least 
one unsafe act in at least 50% of the data source’s cases. For those cases that do 
not include an unsafe act causal factor, one of two reasons could account for this 
absence for each individual case: 
1) the case is a near miss incident, or  
2) the case did not provide enough information to classify an unsafe act. 
In option two, the presence of either an error or violation was recognized by 
experts classifying the cases, but due to the ambiguity of the case narrative, a 
resolute decision could not be made regarding the specific nature of that unsafe 
act. 
As mentioned in previous sections, in an ideal world, each individual case 
would include a causal factor at each HFACS tier. However as illustrated in 
Table 5, that is not the case. In fact, the percentage of cases dwindles as the 
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HFACS tier moves away from the operator level. Take for example US GA – FAR 
91 (GA91). For GA91, 75.80% of cases have at least one unsafe act, and 57.10% of 
cases have at least one precondition for an unsafe act, but the percentage of cases 
statistic decreases in the upper tiers. Only 3.17% of GA91 cases have at least one 
unsafe supervision causal category, and less than 1.00% of GA91 cases have at 
least one organizational influence causal category. It is important to note that all 
of the US GA data sources have a relatively low occurrence rate at the 
organizational influence level, which could be attributed to the nature of the GA 
industry. GA includes individuals who fly for a hobby and therefore lack the 
presence of an organization, such as a company or the military. However, the 
pattern of decreasing causal factor occurrences is present in many of the other 
data sources that have the presence of an organization. 
In order to examine each tier in more detail, the causal categories among 
each causal tier were also investigated. The findings of the accident and near 
miss cases classification at the unsafe act tier and precondition for unsafe act tier 
are displayed in Table 6 and Table 7, respectively. The findings of the accident 
and near miss cases classification for both the unsafe supervision tier and the 
organizational influence tier can be found in Table 8. 
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Table 6: Accident and Near Miss Cases HFACS Classification – Unsafe Act Tier 
 
 
 6
1
 
Table 7: Accident and Near Miss Cases HFACS Classification – Precondition for Unsafe Act Tier 
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Table 8: Accident and Near Miss Cases HFACS Classification – Unsafe Supervision Tier and Organizational Influence Tier 
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Classification of Only Accident Cases 
In order to examine accident cases only, all those cases that did not have at 
least one unsafe act were removed. While this elimination removed the near miss 
cases, the elimination also removed those cases with ambiguous information at 
the unsafe act level. The remaining accident cases from every data source were 
classified at least to the causal category level, and many of the data sources 
classified errors and latent conditions at the nanocode level. In order to examine 
to what extent each data source examined a particular HFACS tier, the presence 
or absence of each tier was classified for all the accident and near miss cases. The 
results of the accident and near miss cases HFACS classification for at the tier 
level can be found in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Accident Cases HFACS Classification – Tier Level 
 
Although near miss cases or cases that might not be fully investigated 
have been eliminated, each accident case clearly does not include a causal factor 
from each HFACS tier. Field maintenance has the minimum number of 
preconditions for unsafe acts with 41.07% of accident cases, while remotely 
piloted aircraft operations has the highest percentage of cases with a 
precondition for unsafe act with 89.58%. The percentage of cases with at least one 
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unsafe supervision ranges from 0.26% (GA137) to 84.71% (US mining). Finally, 
the range of percentage of cases with at least one organizational influence is also 
vast. As previously mentioned, the GA data sets have little to no causal factors at 
this level. However, the Chinese civil aviation data set has the second highest 
percentage. 
In order to examine each tier in more detail, the causal categories among 
each causal tier were also investigated. The findings of the accident cases 
classification at the unsafe act tier and precondition for unsafe act tier are 
displayed in Table 10 and Table 11, respectively. The findings of the accident 
cases classification for both the unsafe supervision tier and the organizational 
influence tier can be found in Table 12. 
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Table 10: Accident Cases HFACS Classification – Unsafe Act Tier 
 
 
 6
7
 
Table 11: Accident Cases HFACS Classification – Precondition for Unsafe Act Tier 
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Table 12: Accident Cases HFACS Classification – Unsafe Supervision Tier and Organizational Influence Tier 
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BENCHMARKING STANDARDS OF ACCIDENT AND NEAR MISS CASES 
After the HFACS classification results were complied for the various data 
sources, the benchmarking standard for each HFACS causal category was 
determined. In the following sections, the four approaches to the benchmarking 
(as seen in Figure 13) will be explained, the results for each individual approach 
will be detailed, and the best application for each approach will be outlined. 
 
Figure 13: Four Approaches to Benchmarking Standards 
Benchmarking Standards Analysis of Full Data Sets 
In order to examine the general characteristics of the data, all data sources 
were included in the first two analyses; however, the first analysis included both 
accident and near miss cases, and the second analysis included only accident 
cases.  
Accident and Near Miss Cases Benchmarking Standards 
Utilizing all the data sources, accident and near miss cases were examined 
to determine benchmarking standards at the causal category level. First, the 
arithmetic mean and standard deviation were calculated and are shown in Table 
13. While the arithmetic mean at first glance seems like a good fit for determining 
the benchmarking standard, the arithmetic standard deviation shows the 
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dispersion of the data. For example, skill-based errors have an arithmetic mean 
of 49.00% indicating that on average, 49.00% of cases in all data sources have at 
least one skill-based error. However, the standard deviation associated with such 
an analysis is 10.22. In fact, if 99.9% confidence intervals were to be established 
based on the arithmetic mean and standard deviation, the lower confidence 
interval would be 40.84%, and the upper confidence interval would be 57.16%. 
With a range of almost 17%, the confidence intervals based on the arithmetic 
mean are too broad and should be more focused.  
Additionally, the arithmetic mean does not allow for the ability to 
differentiate between data sources. As previously mentioned, the US GA data 
sources typically do not have instances of organizational influence causal 
categories occurring due to the nature of US GA and the lack of a defining 
organization in GA. When examining organizational influences, the arithmetic 
mean and standard deviation do not account for this distinct difference in the 
GA data sources. In an aim to reduce the dispersion of the data and to have the 
ability to identify unique data sources, the FDR methodology was applied to the 
data. 
As can be seen in Table 13, the arithmetic mean and the FDR mean are 
similar for some causal categories (i.e. decision errors and organizational climate) 
and differ greatly for other causal categories (i.e. inadequate supervision and 
violations). While the means may be similar in some cases, a large reduction is 
seen in the FDR standard deviation for all causal categories. In the instances of 
the means differing, the difference can be attributed to data sources that are 
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outliers. For example, the Chinese Civil Aviation data source reported the 
occurrence of a violation in 58.54% of cases. This high violation value differs 
greatly from the majority of the data sources. Utilizing the FDR methodology, the 
Chinese Civil Aviation data source and other similarly natured data sources 
were not included in calculation of the FDR mean, thus reducing the standard 
deviation of the sample.  
 
72 
Table 13: Near Miss and Accident Data Source Means 
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For the reasons previously discussed, the FDR mean was utilized when 
calculating the benchmarking standards found in Table 14. In addition to the 
FDR mean, Table 14 also shows 99.9% confidence intervals and the percentage of 
data sets included in those calculations. The percentage of data sources was 
based on the number of data sources with at least one occurrence of a causal 
factor at that particular causal category. For example, in the skill-based error 
category, eleven of the seventeen data sources were included in the confidence 
interval calculations. However, in the resource management category, only 
fourteen data sources had at least one case with a resource management. Of 
those fourteen data sources, eight data sources were included in the 
benchmarking analysis. Calculations of the means and confidence intervals can 
be found Appendix A. 
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Table 14: Near Miss and Accident Benchmarking Standards and Confidence Intervals  
 
As previously mentioned, the FDR calculations shown in Table 14 were 
based on the initial application of the FDR methodology and are considered the 
main grouping for that particular causal category. An additional FDR analysis 
was applied to those data sources not included in the main grouping. These 
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secondary groupings can be found in the tables below along with the findings of 
the main groupings. 
For the Unsafe Acts tier, the findings for the benchmarking standards for 
both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 15. It is suggested 
that the main grouping be utilized as the benchmarking standard for each causal 
category since the main grouping represents more data sources than the 
secondary grouping. For example, the main grouping for skill-based errors 
represents 64.17% of the data sources while the secondary grouping for skill-
based errors represents only 29.14% of the data sources. For the skill-based error, 
perceptual error, and violations causal categories, the secondary grouping mean 
is greater than the main grouping mean. This could be attributed to a grouping 
of industries that truly do have a higher probability of a certain type of error due 
to the nature of the industry. For example, the perceptual errors secondary group 
includes only aviation industries indicating the possibility of the aviation 
industry having a higher benchmarking standard than other industries. 
However, this conclusion is not fully supported. In the perceptual error main 
grouping, six of the eleven data sources are also a part of the aviation industry. 
This suggests that the groupings do not necessarily represent a valid picture of 
an industry-specific grouping. Therefore, for the three mentioned unsafe act 
causal categories, the higher secondary grouping mean could indicate the quality 
of the data. A higher percentage of a causal category is not necessarily a negative 
characteristic of the data source. The higher percentage could indicate a more 
thorough investigation allowing for more instances of that causal category to be 
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classified. Therefore, it is suggested that when applying the benchmarking 
standards, a company should determine if they fall into a grouping with a higher 
mean or a grouping with a lower mean. If the industry is within the confidence 
intervals of the higher mean grouping, the industry should consult HFACS 
experts to determine if this higher mean is a result of a more thorough 
investigation or if the higher mean is an indicator of area in need of mitigation. 
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Table 15: Near Miss and Accident Benchmarking Standards– Unsafe Acts 
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For the Preconditions for Unsafe Acts tier, the findings for the 
benchmarking standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be 
found in Table 16. For the Adverse Physiological State causal category, only a 
main grouping was found as none of the data sources excluded from the main 
grouping converged to make a secondary grouping. Of particular interest, crew 
resource management is frequently associated with the aviation industry. The US 
aviation industries, however, can be found in both the main and secondary 
groupings for the causal category. The US commercial aviation FAR 121 and the 
remotely piloted aircraft operations data sources were in the secondary 
grouping, which had a higher mean (20.59% of cases) than the main grouping 
(8.33% of cases). This could be attributed to a familiarity with crew resource 
management issues. Individuals within the aviation industry could be more 
likely to recognize crew resource management as a causal factor purely because 
they have the knowledge to make them more likely to identify it. On the other 
hand, the FAR parts representing US GA were in the main grouping, which had 
the lower mean of the two groups. GA pilots are more likely to work singularly 
in comparison to commercial aviation counterparts. 
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Table 16: Near Miss and Accident Benchmarking Standards – Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
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Table 16 (Continued) 
 
For the Unsafe Supervision tier, the findings for the benchmarking 
standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 17. 
For the failed to correct known problems causal category and the supervisory 
violation causal category, only a main grouping was found as none of the data 
sources excluded from the main grouping converged to make a secondary 
grouping. However, for the two causal categories with secondary groupings – 
inadequate supervision and planned inappropriate operations – the mean for the 
secondary grouping is much larger than the mean for main grouping. Again, this 
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could be attributed to the quality of the investigation. For those data sources that 
appear in multiple unsafe supervision causal category main groupings, these 
data sources could be viewed either as ones needing to address supervisory 
issues or ones that properly investigate supervisory issues. It is up to a specific 
data source to determine the reasoning. 
Table 17: Near Miss and Accident Benchmarking Standards– Unsafe Supervision 
 
The Organizational Influences tier findings for the benchmarking 
standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 18. 
Only one of the three causal categories – organizational process – has a 
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secondary grouping. However, this secondary grouping has a mean of only 
0.36% of cases and represents only 23.08% of the data sources. Overall, the means 
from the causal categories making up the organizational influence tier are lower 
than many of the other tiers’ causal categories. This is a testament to the use of 
archival data. None of these data sources or the data sources mentioned in the 
literature review were originally intended for HFACS analysis. Thus, the cases 
typically include information at the organizational level, and the means illustrate 
this lack of information. 
Table 18: Near Miss and Accident Benchmarking Standards – Organizational Influence 
 
The accident and near miss cases benchmarking standards are best 
utilized for assessing a data source that includes both accident and near miss 
cases. When applicable, a company can perform an HFACS analysis on its data 
and compare its findings to the benchmarking standards. Again, it is suggested 
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that companies primarily utilize the main groupings for comparing, unless 
otherwise noted. If a company’s level of a causal category is less than the lower 
confidence interval for that category, two explanations are available: 
1) The company is under-reporting or under-investigating that causal 
category, or 
2) The company is successful at accounting for factors associated with 
that causal category, or the nature of the work performed by the 
company is not associated with factors at that causal category.  
For example, a commercial airline XYZ has in place a crew resource management 
program aimed at improving team communication, coordination, and planning. 
Airline XYZ found its percentage of cases with a crew resource management 
factor was below the lower confidence interval and attributed this finding to its 
success with the crew resource management program. 
On the other hand, if a company’s level of a causal category is greater than 
the main grouping higher confidence interval for that category, similar 
explanations are available. First, the higher causal category level could be an 
indication of an area in need of mitigation as exceeding the upper confidence 
level could signify a trouble area for a company. Alternatively, the company 
could first examine the secondary grouping (if one exists). For those secondary 
groupings with means and confidence intervals higher than those of the main 
grouping, the secondary grouping could represent industries that investigate 
more thoroughly and consistently for that particular causal category. If a 
company exceeds the upper confidence interval but is similar in nature to the 
84 
data sources in the secondary grouping, the company’s high level could 
represent a more thorough investigation, rather than an anomaly.  
Accident Cases Benchmarking Standards 
Utilizing all the data sources, only accident cases with at least one unsafe 
act were examined to determine benchmarking standards at the causal category 
level. First, the arithmetic mean and standard deviation were calculated and are 
shown in Table 19. For most of the accident data source causal categories, the 
arithmetic mean of the accident data sources is higher than the corresponding 
arithmetic mean of the accident and near miss data sources. The technological 
environment accident causal category’s arithmetic mean is lower by 
approximately 1%.  
However, when examining the FDR mean, differences between the 
accident and near miss data sources and the accident only data sources become 
more apparent. The following causal categories had an accident only FDR mean 
that was within 1% intervals of the accident and near miss FDR mean: physical 
environment, adverse mental state, adverse physiological state, personal 
readiness, resource management, and organizational climate. Adversely, the 
accident only FDR means for the technological environment, crew resource 
management, planned inappropriate operations, and organizational process 
causal categories were much lower that the corresponding accident and near 
miss FDR means. Near miss cases investigate incidents that do not result in an 
unsafe act, but do identify pertinent contributing factors. Therefore, the decrease 
of these means signifies the loss of the near miss information. 
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Table 19: Accident Data Source Means 
 
For the reasons discussed, the FDR mean was utilized when calculating 
the benchmarking standards found in Table 20. In addition to the FDR mean, 
Table 14 also shows 99.9% confidence intervals and the percentage of data sets 
included in those calculations. The percentage of data sources was based on the 
number of data sources with at least one occurrence of at that particular causal 
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category. Calculations of the means and confidence intervals can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Table 20: Accident Benchmarking Standards and Confidence Intervals 
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As previously mentioned, the FDR calculations shown in Table 20 were 
based on the initial application of the FDR methodology and are considered the 
main grouping for that particular causal category. An additional FDR analysis 
was applied to those data sources not included in the main grouping. These 
secondary groupings can be found in the tables below along with the findings of 
the main groupings. 
For the Unsafe Acts tier, the findings for the benchmarking standards for 
both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 21. It is suggested 
that the main grouping be utilized as the benchmarking standard for each causal 
category since the main grouping represents more data sources than the 
secondary grouping. For example, the main grouping for perceptual errors 
represents 64.17% of the data sources while the secondary grouping for skill-
based errors represents only 25.53% of the data sources. For the two causal 
categories with secondary groupings, the secondary grouping mean is greater 
than the main grouping mean. Similar to the previous set of benchmarking 
standards, this could be attributed to a grouping of industries that truly do have 
a higher probability of a certain type of error due to the nature of the industry. 
For example, the perceptual errors secondary group includes only aviation 
industries indicating the possibility of the aviation industry having a higher 
benchmarking standard than other industries. However, this conclusion is not 
fully supported. In the perceptual error main grouping, five of the eleven data 
sources are also a part of the aviation industry. This suggests that the groupings 
do not necessarily represent a valid picture of an industry-specific grouping. 
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Therefore, for the two mentioned unsafe act causal categories, the higher 
secondary grouping mean could indicate the quality of the data. A higher 
percentage of a causal category is not necessarily a negative characteristic of the 
data source. The higher percentage could indicate a more thorough investigation 
allowing for more instances of that causal category to be classified; therefore, it is 
suggested that when applying the benchmarking standards, a company should 
determine if they fall into a grouping with a higher mean or a grouping with a 
lower mean. If the industry is within the confidence intervals of the higher mean 
grouping, the industry should consult HFACS experts to determine if this higher 
mean is a result of a more thorough investigation or if the higher mean is an 
indicator of an area in need of mitigation. 
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Table 21: Accident Benchmarking Standards – Unsafe Acts 
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For the Preconditions for Unsafe Act tier, the findings for the 
benchmarking standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be 
found in Table 22. For the Technological Environment and Adverse Physiological 
State causal categories, only a main grouping was found. Of the five remaining 
causal categories, two groups emerge. For Physical Environment and 
Physical/Mental Limitation, the main grouping’s mean was greater than that of 
the secondary grouping. For Adverse Mental State, Crew Resource Management, 
and Personal Readiness, the main grouping’s mean was less than that of the 
secondary grouping. This variation suggests a need to filter data sources based 
on the quality of the investigation, which in this case could be inferred by the 
percentage of cases for each causal category. 
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Table 22: Accident Benchmarking Standards – Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
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Table 22 (continued) 
 
For the Unsafe Supervision tier, the findings for the benchmarking 
standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 23. 
For the failed to correct known problems causal category and the supervisory 
violation causal category, only a main grouping was found as none of the data 
sources excluded from the main grouping converged to make a secondary 
grouping. However, for the two causal categories with secondary groupings—
inadequate supervision and planned inappropriate operations—the mean for the 
secondary grouping is much larger than the mean for main grouping. Again, this 
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could be attributed to the quality of the investigation. For those data sources that 
appear in multiple unsafe supervision causal category main groupings, these 
data sources could be viewed either as ones needing to address supervisory 
issues or ones that properly investigate supervisory issues. 
Table 23: Accident Benchmarking Standards – Unsafe Supervision 
 
The Organizational Influences tier findings for the benchmarking 
standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 24. 
Similar to the accident and near miss findings, only one of the three causal 
categories—organizational process—has a secondary grouping. Unlike the 
previous finding, this secondary grouping has a mean of 52.00% of cases and 
represents only 25.00% of the data sources. These three data sources (US Mining, 
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Chinese Civil Aviation, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations) have 
successfully identified an area in need of mitigation. Other data sources could be 
missing an opportunity to identify a mitigation area due to lack of information. 
Overall, the means from the causal categories making up the organizational 
influence tier are lower than many of the other tiers’ causal categories. This is a 
testament to the use of archival data. None of these data sources or the data 
sources mentioned in the literature review were originally intended for HFACS 
analysis. Thus, the cases typically include information at the organizational level, 
and the means illustrate this lack of information. 
Table 24: Accident Benchmarking Standards – Organizational Influences 
 
The accident benchmarking standards are best utilized for assessing a data 
source that includes only accident cases. When applicable, a company can 
perform an HFACS analysis on its data and compare its findings to the 
benchmarking standards. Again, it is suggested that companies primarily utilize 
the main groupings for comparing, unless otherwise noted. Similar to the 
95 
accident and near miss benchmarking standards, if a company’s level of a causal 
category is less than the lower confidence interval for that category, two 
explanations are available:  
1) The company is under-reporting or under-investigating that causal 
category, or  
2) The company is successful at accounting for factors associated with 
that causal category, or the nature of the work performed by the 
company is not associated with factors at that causal category. 
BENCHMARKING STANDARDS ANALYSIS OF FILTERED DATA SETS 
In order to examine the general characteristics of the data, all data sources 
were included in the first two analyses for benchmarking standards. The first 
analysis included both accident and near miss cases, and the second analysis 
included only accident cases. These analyses brought to light the need to monitor 
for quality of investigation. Since the data in this study is archival and access to 
the industry is limited, the data will be filtered based on the lower confidence 
interval based on the FDR mean. The analysis will be conducted on both the 
accident and near miss cases and the accident only cases. 
Filtered Accident and Near Miss Cases Benchmarking Standards 
Before the benchmarking standards were determined, the data sources for 
near miss and accident cases were filtered using the FDR method. The filtering 
occurred at the tier level and is found in Table 25. The data sources highlighted 
in green were not incorporated in the benchmarking standards for that particular 
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tier since their individual percentage of cases did not exceed the lower 
confidence interval. For example, the Chinese military aviation data set had at 
least one unsafe act in 63.85% of cases, but the lower confidence interval is 
69.85%. Since the Chinese military aviation data set did not exceed the lower 
confidence interval, the data source was excluded from the unsafe acts 
benchmarking standards calculations, but was included in calculations for the 
other three tiers. Details regarding the calculations can be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 25: Accident and Near Miss Cases Filtering 
 
First, the arithmetic mean and standard deviation were calculated for each 
causal category continued and are shown in Table 26. For all of the accident and 
near miss data source causal categories, the arithmetic standard deviation is 
greater than the corresponding FDR-based standard deviation. Calculations of 
the means and confidence intervals can be found Appendix D. 
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Table 26: Filtered Near Miss and Accident Data Source Means 
 
Utilizing eleven of the seventeen data sources, accident and near miss 
cases were examined to determine benchmarking standards at the Unsafe Acts 
tier. For the Unsafe Acts tier, the findings for the benchmarking standards for 
both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 27. Two of the 
four causal categories include a secondary grouping. However, it is suggested 
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that the main grouping be utilized as the benchmarking standard for each causal 
category since the main grouping represents more data sources than the 
secondary grouping. For example, 63.64% of the data sources are included in the 
main skill-based error grouping, while only 27.27% of the data sources are 
included in the secondary skill-based error grouping. Interestingly, the two 
groupings for skill-based error have similar means, and their confidence 
intervals overlap. This suggests that since the groupings are so similar, the main 
grouping should be utilized, instead of the secondary grouping. 
Table 27: Filtered Accident and Near Miss Benchmarking Standards – Unsafe Acts 
 
100 
Utilizing fifteen of the seventeen data sources, accident and near miss 
cases were examined to determine benchmarking standards at the Preconditions 
for Unsafe Acts tier. For the Preconditions for Unsafe Acts tier, the findings for 
the benchmarking standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be 
found in Table 28. Two of the causal categories – technological environment and 
adverse physiological state – do not have a secondary grouping. For the 
remaining five causal categories, a secondary grouping emerged, and for four of 
the five causal categories the secondary grouping’s mean was greater than the 
main grouping’s mean. Thus, these secondary groupings represent data sources 
that investigate these causal categories in more detail. 
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Table 28: Filtered Accident and Near Miss Benchmarking Standards –  
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
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Table 28 (continued) 
 
 Utilizing sixteen of the seventeen data sources, accident and near miss 
cases were examined to determine benchmarking standards at the Unsafe 
Supervision tier. For the Unsafe Supervision tier, the findings for the 
benchmarking standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be 
found in Table 29. For Failed to Correct Known Problem and Supervisory 
Violation, only a main grouping exists. However, for inadequate supervision and 
planned inappropriate operations, a secondary grouping emerged in which the 
mean is greater than that of the main grouping. Again, this is an indication of 
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either an area in need of mitigation or an area thoroughly investigated in 
comparison with other data sources. 
Table 29: Filtered Accident and Near Miss Benchmarking Standards – Unsafe Supervision 
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Table 30: Filtered Accident and Near Miss Benchmarking Standards – Organizational Influence 
 
The filtered accident and near miss benchmarking standards are best 
utilized for assessing a data source that includes both accident and near miss 
cases and when a practitioner wishes to account for investigation thoroughness 
to an initial degree. When applicable, a company can perform an HFACS 
analysis on its data and compare its findings to the benchmarking standards. 
Again, it is suggested that companies primarily utilize the main groupings for 
comparing, unless otherwise noted. Similar to the previous benchmarking 
standards, if a company’s level of a causal category is less than the lower 
confidence interval for that category, two explanations are available: 
 1) The company is under-reporting or under-investigating that causal 
category, or 
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2) The company is successfully at accounting for factors associated with 
that causal category, or the nature of the work performed by the 
company is not associated with factors at that causal category. 
Filtered Accident Cases Benchmarking Standards 
Before the benchmarking standards were determined, the data sources for 
accident cases were filtered using the FDR method. The filtering occurred at the 
tier level and is found in Table 31. The data sources highlighted in green were 
not incorporated in the benchmarking standards for that particular tier since 
their individual percentage of cases did not exceed the lower confidence interval. 
Additionally, filtering was not performed on the unsafe act tier since the accident 
cases included in this analysis all incorporated at least one unsafe act. Hence, 
benchmarking standards results are the same as the unfiltered accident 
benchmarking standards. Details regarding the calculations can be found in 
Appendix C. 
106 
Table 31: Accident Cases Filtering 
 
First, the arithmetic mean and standard deviation were calculated for each 
causal category in the analysis and are shown in Table 32. Like in the previous 
benchmarking standards, the arithmetic standard deviation is greater than the 
FDR standard deviation. Calculations of the means and confidence intervals can 
be found Appendix E.Appendix E:  
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Table 32: Filtered Accident Data Source Means 
 
Utilizing fourteen of the seventeen data sources, accident cases were 
examined to determine benchmarking standards at the Preconditions for Unsafe 
Acts tier. For the Preconditions for Unsafe Acts tier, the findings for the 
benchmarking standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be 
found in Table 33. Two of the causal categories – technological environment and 
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adverse physiological state – do not have a secondary grouping. For the 
remaining five causal categories, a secondary grouping emerged, and for four of 
the five causal categories the secondary grouping’s mean was greater than the 
main grouping’s mean. Thus, these secondary groupings represent data sources 
that investigate these causal categories in more detail. 
Table 33: Filtered Accident Benchmarking Standards – Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
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Table 33 (continued) 
 
Utilizing fifteen of the seventeen data sources, accident cases were 
examined to determine benchmarking standards at the Unsafe Supervision tier. 
For the Unsafe Supervision tier, the findings for the benchmarking standards for 
both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 34. For Failed to 
Correct Known Problem and Supervisory Violation, only a main grouping exists. 
However, for inadequate supervision and planned inappropriate operations, a 
secondary grouping emerged in which the mean is greater than that of the main 
grouping. Again, this is an indication of either an area in need of mitigation or an 
area thoroughly investigated in comparison with other data sources. 
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Table 34: Filtered Accident Benchmarking Standards – Unsafe Supervision 
 
 Utilizing thirteen of the seventeen data sources, accident cases were 
examined to determine benchmarking standards at the Organizational Influence 
tier. For the Organizational Influence tier, the findings for the benchmarking 
standards for both the main and secondary groupings can be found in Table 35. 
Only the organization process causal category produced a secondary grouping. 
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Table 35: Filtered Accident Benchmarking Standards – Organizational Influences 
 
The filtered accident benchmarking standards are best utilized for 
assessing a data source that includes only accident cases and when a practitioner 
wishes to account for investigation thoroughness to an initial degree. When 
applicable, a company can perform an HFACS analysis on its data and compare 
its findings to the benchmarking standards. Again, it is suggested that companies 
primarily utilize the main groupings for comparing, unless otherwise noted. 
Similar to the previous benchmarking standards, if a company’s level of a causal 
category is less than the lower confidence interval for that category, two 
explanations are available:  
 1) The company is under-reporting or under-investigating that causal 
category, or 
2) The company is successfully at accounting for factors associated with 
that causal category, or the nature of the work performed by the 
company is not associated with factors at that causal category. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, four sets of benchmarking standards were established. In 
order to help the practitioner, a decision support tool (Figure 14) was created to 
assist in selecting the correct benchmarking standard set. Utilizing the decision 
support tool above, the practitioner can identify which benchmarking standards 
to apply to his/her HFACS findings. After completing an HFACS analysis, the 
practitioner should first determine if his/her analysis includes near miss cases. 
Then the practitioner should determine if his/her analysis should account for 
investigation quality. The practitioner should make an educated judgment on the 
cases being investigated. Were all four tiers thoroughly investigated and 
accounted for? It is important to make this judgment on all four tiers and not just 
the unsafe acts tier. The practitioner can then apply the basic benchmarking 
standards found in Table 36 and in more detail in the previous section. 
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Figure 14: Benchmarking Standards Decision Support Tool 
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Table 36: Benchmarking Standards Summary 
 
Note: The top values are the mean and the values in the parenthesis are the confidence intervals. 
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Practitioners can utilize the above findings to better assess the health of 
their company’s safety. Before, an HFACS analysis reported results, and 
comparisons were made within a data set (i.e. day vs. night, years of experience, 
etc.), but industries were not compared to one another or to an industry 
standard. For example, a company might report a level of 20% of technological 
environment in an accident only data set. Now the company can apply the 
accident benchmarking standards and would find that the company exceeds 
both the non-filtered and filtered standards. However, the practitioner should 
determine if this finding is a result of an area in need of mitigation or if the 
company successfully investigated that area. For further support, the practitioner 
should examine the secondary grouping, when one is present. Similarly, if a 
company does not meet the lower confidence interval, this finding should also be 
further examined to determine if the company’s investigation skills and practices 
should be improved. 
In summary, four set of benchmarking standards were established – near 
miss and accidents, near miss and accidents filtered, accidents, and accidents 
filtered. The benchmarking standards also produced confidence intervals to be 
used by a company to assess its HFACS findings. The benchmarking standards 
supply the practitioner with an aid to identifying areas in need of mitigation. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXAMINING ERROR PATHWAYS 
 
After the HFACS classification results were complied for the various data 
sources and benchmarking standards were established, the connections between 
active errors and latent failures were examined. In the following sections, results 
from the data organization/sampling and the HFACS causal category 
associations are presented. 
DATA ORGANIZATION AND SAMPLING 
Before the associations could be calculated, the data had to be organized 
and sampled. The associations were determined in an upward manner in relation 
to the HFACS model. Unsafe Acts causal categories were investigated for 
associations with Precondition for Unsafe Acts, Unsafe Supervision, and 
Organizational Influence causal categories. Precondition for Unsafe Acts causal 
categories were examined for associations with Unsafe Supervision, and 
Organizational Influence causal categories and Unsafe Supervision causal 
categories were examined for associations with Organizational Influence causal 
categories. For those three associations analyses, the data was first organized so 
that all cases included in the analysis had at least the presence of one causal 
category from the lower tier. Then the data was filtered in a similar manner in 
the previous chapter to account for an investigation minimum. Following the 
filtering, certain data sources were sampled due to their large number of cases. 
For the Unsafe Acts tier association analysis, results from the data 
organization and sampling can be found in Table 37. When examining 
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associations between the unsafe acts tier and the preconditions for unsafe acts 
tier, three data sets were excluded from the analysis, and seven data sets were 
sampled (sample size was 142). When examining associations between the unsafe 
acts tier and the unsafe supervision tier, two data sets were excluded from the 
analysis and five data sets were sampled. When examining associations between 
the unsafe acts tier and the organizational influence tier, four data sets were 
excluded from the analysis and two data sets were sampled. 
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Table 37: Unsafe Acts Tier Data Organization and Sampling 
 
Note: Red indicates data sources not included in analysis, and  
yellow indicates data sources sampled. 
 
For the Preconditions for Unsafe Acts tier association analysis, results 
from the data organization and sampling can be found in Table 38. When 
examining associations between the preconditions for unsafe acts tier and the 
unsafe supervision tier, six data sets were excluded from the analysis, and five 
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data sets were sampled. When examining associations between the preconditions 
for unsafe acts tier and the organizational influence tier, six data sets were 
excluded from the analysis and three data sets were sampled.  
Table 38: Preconditions for Unsafe Acts Tier Data Organization and Sampling 
 
Note: Red indicates data sources not included in analysis, and  
yellow indicates data sources sampled. 
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For the Unsafe Supervision tier association analysis, results from the data 
organization and sampling can be found in Table 39. When examining 
associations between the unsafe supervision tier and the organizational influence 
tier, no data sets were excluded from the analysis due to the nature of the 
organization method, but five data sets were sampled.  
Table 39: Unsafe Supervision Tier Data Organization and Sampling 
 
Note: Yellow indicates data sources sampled. 
For more information regarding the associations sampling and contingency table, 
please reference Appendix F. 
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HFACS CAUSAL CATEGORY ASSOCIATIONS  
Once the data was organized and sampled, the associations among the 
various HFACS causal categories were examined. First, only the associations 
among adjacent HFACS tiers (e.g. Unsafe Act – Preconditions for Unsafe Act) 
were identified. Finally, the associations analysis was extended to non-adjacent 
HFACS tiers (e.g. Unsafe Act – Unsafe Supervision). The results from both of the 
analyses will be presented in the following sections. 
Adjacent Tier Analysis 
In the traditional HFACS model, interactions only occur between adjacent 
HFACS tiers, and to investigate those interactions, the associations among 
HFACS causal categories at adjacent tiers were assessed. First, the various causal 
category pairings were first assessed with a Pearson’s Chi-Square test. The full 
results from the Pearson’s Chi-Square tests can be found in Appendix G. Those 
pairings found significant (p!0.001) were moved forward in the assessment, and 
odds ratios and relative risk values were determined. Additionally, the odds 
ratio and relative risk values were tested for significance where the null 
hypothesis was the values equal to one. While the results will be presented 
below, the calculations can be found in Appendix H. 
The results from the adjacent tier association analysis can be found in 
Figure 15 and Table 40. Only those results where the Pearson’s Chi-Square value 
was found to be significant (p!0.001) are reported here. Table 40 is organized in 
an upper tier X lower tier manner. 
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Figure 15: Pictorial Associations – Adjacent Tiers 
Note: Solid blue lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square, Odds ratio, and lower 
relative risk results. Dashed blue lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square and Odds 
ratio results. Dashed orange lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square results. 
123 
Table 40: Adjacent Tier Associations Results – Adjacent Tiers – Given Higher Tier Occurs 
 
As can be seen above, twelve causal category pairs were found to be 
significant. Of those twelve pairings, no associations were found among the 
Organizational Influence tier causal categories and the Unsafe Supervision tier 
causal categories. Four associations were found among the Unsafe Supervision 
tier causal categories and the Preconditions for Unsafe Acts tier causal categories, 
and the remaining eight associations were found among the Preconditions for 
Unsafe Acts tier causal categories and the Unsafe Acts tier causal categories. Ten 
of the twelve findings also had a significant odds ratio with eight of the ten 
pairings having an odds ratio greater than one. Seven of the twelve findings had 
a significant relative risk value with six of the seven pairings having a relative 
risk value greater than one. Lower tier relative risk values (given the higher tier 
occurs) can be interpreted in the following manner: an accident case with a crew 
resource management causal factor is 2.164 times more likely to have a violation 
causal factor than an accident that does not have a crew resource management 
causal factor.  
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Table 41: Adjacent Tier Associations Results – Adjacent Tiers – Given Lower Tier Occurs 
 
Table 41 presents the same twelve pairings in a different manner. Table 41 
is organized in a lower tier X upper tier manner. The Chi-Square statistic and the 
Odds Ratio statistic are the same due to the symmetry of the statistics. The higher 
tier relative risk values (given the lower tier occurs) can be interpreted in the 
following manner: an accident case with a technological environment causal 
factor is 3.048 times more likely to have a failure to correct problem causal factor 
than an accident that does not have a technological environment causal factor. In 
order to better understand the above twelve pairings, each pairing will be 
discussed individually. 
The analysis found a significant association between the planned 
inappropriate operations causal category and the adverse physiological state 
causal category. This pairing resulted in a significant Chi-Square value 
(!2=12.736, p!0.001) and odds ratio (OR=3.463, p!0.01). The odds ratio indicates 
that the odds of an accident case with a planned inappropriate operations causal 
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category are 3.463 times greater if an accident case has an adverse physiological 
state causal category and vice versa. The lack of a significant relative risk value 
indicated that while the data could show an increase in odds, the data did not 
indicate a significant increase or decrease in likelihood.  
One example of an accident with both a planned inappropriate operation 
and adverse physiological state causal categories can be seen in a case from the 
Australian mining data source (Patterson, 2009). In this particular case, a miner 
was injured from an electronic shock from a pump motor during a shutdown 
operation. The miner was operating on his tenth straight night shift and was 
feeling the effects of fatigue – especially since the previous two night shifts were 
very strenuous (adverse physiological state). The miner was not given the 
adequate rest period between the shifts (planned inappropriate operations) and 
was feeling pressured from his supervisor to complete the work in a hasty 
manner (planned inappropriate operations). Not only did the supervisor-created 
work schedule add to the fatigue of the miner, but also the supervisor-induced 
pressure made the miner work faster and harder, adding to the fatigue.  
Another association found significant was between the failure to correct 
problem causal category and the physical environment causal category. This 
pairing resulted in only a significant Chi-Square value (!2=10.345, p!0.001). The 
lack of a significant odds ratio value and relative risk value indicate that the data 
does not show the increase or decrease of either the odds or likelihood of the 
causal categories. However, the association should still be taken into 
consideration.  
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One example of an accident with both a failure to correct problem and 
physical environment causal categories can be seen in a case from the US mining 
data source (Patterson, 2009). In this particular case, a miner was fatally injured 
when hauling a load. The miner’s trucks had a defective parking brake switch. 
This defect was known to the supervisor, but the supervisor failed to initiate a 
corrective action (failure to correct problem). Additionally, the road on which the 
accident occurred had a very steep grade (physical environment).  
A third association found significant was between the failure to correct 
problem causal category and the technological environment causal category. The 
pairing resulted in significant Chi-Square value (!2=53.444, p!0.001), odds ratio 
(OR=5.993, p!0.01), lower tier relative risk value (RRL=4.126, p!0.01), and higher 
tier relative risk value (RRH=3.048, p!0.01). The lower tier relative risk value 
indicates that an accident with a failure to correct problem causal factor is 4.126 
times more likely to have a technological environment causal factor than an 
accident case that does not have a failure to correct problem causal factor. The 
higher tier relative risk value indicates that an accident with a technological 
environment causal factor is 3.048 times more likely to have a failure to correct 
problem causal factor than an accident that does not have a technological causal 
factor. Since this association resulted in all four statistics being found significant, 
this association should be taken into strong consideration when applying these 
findings.  
One example of an accident with both a failure to correct problem and 
technological environment causal categories can be seen in a case from the 
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entertainment data source (Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2009). In this 
particular case, a worker’s left shoulder was injured when performing with a 
puppet. This particular puppet had been defective for many months, and 
management did not take the steps towards correcting the puppet (failure to 
correct problem and technological environment). Building on the defective 
puppet, this particular puppet was not designed to be operated in the manner it 
was being utilized (technological environment). 
In the final association involving the Unsafe Supervision tier, the 
association between failure to correct problem and physical/mental limitation 
was found to be significant. This pairing resulted in a significant Chi-Square 
value (!2=15,515, p!0.001) and Odds Ratio (OR=0.223, p!0.01). The odds ratio 
indicate that the odds of an accident case with a failure to correct problem causal 
category are 0.223 times less if an accident case has a physical/mental limitation 
causal category and vice versa. This decreasing value does not directly indicate a 
decrease in likelihood of a causal category occurring, but should be taken into 
consideration with the other association pairings with similar causal categories. 
For example, in a safety case that a weakness in a failure to correct problem 
causal category is identified, the odds of a technological environment causal 
factor is greater, but the physical environment and physical/mental limitation 
causal factors should also be taken into consideration.  
One example of an accident with both a failure to correct problem and 
physical/mental limitation causal categories can be seen in a case from the US 
mining data source (Patterson, 2009). In this particular case, a minor was fatally 
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injured when he lost control of this truck while descending a steep mine access 
road. The service brakes of the vehicle were not properly maintained, and the 
engine break was inoperative. In fact, management did not have an effective 
procedure in place to ensure the equipment was properly maintained (failure to 
correct problem). Also, management failed to train the miner on the task and 
thus, the miner lack the mental knowledge and skill to safely complete the task 
(physical/mental limitation). 
Another association found significant was between the technological 
environment causal category and the violation causal category. This pairing 
resulted in only a significant Chi-Square value (!2=10.679, p!0.001). The lack of a 
significant odds ratio value and relative risk value indicate that the data does not 
show the increase or decrease of either the odds or likelihood of the causal 
categories. However, the association should still be taken into consideration.  
One example of an accident with both a technological environment and 
violation causal categories can be seen in a case from the site maintenance data 
source (unpublished data source). In this particular case, an employee hurt his 
back while lifting thirty twenty-five-pound bags. The bags were similar to sacks 
and were not designed to have handles or any other lifting assistance 
(technological environment). Additionally, the employee had permanent lifting 
restrictions and was not allowed to lift the sacks. The employee was aware of 
these restrictions and knowingly broke this restriction (violation). 
A sixth association found significant was between the adverse mental 
state causal category and the decision error causal category. This pairing resulted 
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in a significant Chi-Square value (!2=12.212, p!0.001) and Odds Ratio (OR=1.579, 
p!0.01). The odds ratio indicates that the odds of an accident case with a adverse 
mental state causal category are 1.579 times greater if an accident case has a 
decision error causal category and vice versa. The lack of a significant relative 
risk value indicated that while the data could show an increase in odds, the data 
did not indicate a significant increase or decrease in likelihood.  
One example of an accident with both adverse mental state and decision 
error causal categories can be seen in a case from the entertainment data source 
(Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2009). In this particular case, the employee hurt 
both her shins while performing a routine. Before the performance, the employee 
was rushing due to a perceived haste (adverse mental state). In the rush, the 
employee did not put on the correct shoes and chose not to stretch (decision 
error). 
Another association found significant was between the adverse mental 
state causal category and the perceptual error causal category. The pairing 
resulted in significant Chi-Square value (!2=43.499, p!0.001), odds ratio 
(OR=3.102, p!0.01), lower tier relative risk value (RRL=2.240, p!0.01), and higher 
tier relative risk value (RRH=2.649, p!0.01). The lower tier relative risk value 
indicates that an accident with an adverse mental state causal factor is 2.240 
times more likely to have a perceptual error causal factor than an accident case 
that does not have an adverse mental state causal factor. The higher tier relative 
risk value indicates that an accident with a perceptual error causal factor is 2.649 
times more likely to have an adverse mental state causal factor than an accident 
130 
that does not have a perceptual error factor. Since this association resulted in all 
four statistics being found significant, this association should be taken into 
strong consideration when applying these findings.  
One example of an accident with both an adverse mental state and 
perceptual error causal categories can be seen in a case from the Australian 
mining data source (Patterson, 2009). In this particular case, a miner drove his 
vehicle onto a topsoil stockpile causing the vehicle to tip onto its side. The 
accident occurred at dawn, and the rising sun was directly in the miner’s line of 
sight and was distracting the miner from focusing on the job (adverse mental 
state). In addition to the sun, the environment was especially dusty. The dust 
combined with the sun did not permit for the miner to have good vision, and the 
miner misjudged the surroundings due to the visual illusions (perceptual error). 
In the final association including adverse mental state, a significant 
pairing was found between the adverse mental state causal category and the 
violation causal category. The pairing resulted in significant Chi-Square value 
(!2=23.951, p!0.001), odds ratio (OR=2.122, p!0.01), lower tier relative risk value 
(RRL=1.758, p!0.01), and higher tier relative risk value (RRH=1.823, p!0.01). The 
lower tier relative risk value indicates that an accident with an adverse mental 
state causal factor is 1.758 times more likely to have a violation causal factor than 
an accident case that does not have an adverse mental state causal factor. The 
higher tier relative risk value indicates that an accident with a violation causal 
factor is 1.823 times more likely to have an adverse mental state causal factor 
than an accident that does not have a violation factor. Since this association 
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resulted in all four statistics being found significant, this association should be 
taken into strong consideration when applying these findings.  
One example of an accident with both adverse mental state and violation 
causal categories can be seen in a case from the foods data source (Berry, 
Stringfellow, and Shappell, 2009). In this particular case, an employee pulled a 
muscle in her right shoulder while lifting a stack of plates. The accident occurred 
during the peak rush period of the restaurant operations and the employee was 
stressed because of the peak rush period (adverse mental state). While lifting the 
stack of plates, the employee reached above her head into a zone clearly marked 
as “unsafe.” During interviews, the employees stated that she knew she was 
lifting into a restricted lifting zone, but chose not to follow the procedure 
(violation). 
Another association found significant was between the adverse 
physiological state causal category and the skill-based error causal category. The 
pairing resulted in significant Chi-Square value (!2=37.824, p!0.001), odds ratio 
(OR=0.254, p!0.01), and lower tier relative risk value (RRL=0.277, p!0.01),). The 
lower tier relative risk value indicates that an accident with an adverse 
physiological state causal factor is 0.277 times less likely to have a skill-based 
error causal factor than an accident case that does not have an adverse 
physiological state causal factor. This decreasing value should be taken into 
consideration with the other association pairings with similar causal categories. 
Additionally, the pairing did not result in a significantly higher tier relative risk 
value.  
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One example of an accident with both adverse physiological state and 
skill-based error causal categories can be seen in a case from the site maintenance 
data source (unpublished data source). In this particular case, the employee 
injured his left shoulder while picking up heavy concrete sacks. The employee 
was suffering from physical fatigue due to the physical stress of the job (adverse 
physiological state). Due to this fatigue, the employee stated he was on “auto-
pilot” when lifting the sacks and was not paying attention to his poor lifting 
techniques (skill-based error). 
A tenth association found significant was between the crew resource 
management causal category and the decision error causal category. The pairing 
resulted in significant Chi-Square value (!2=42.719, p!0.001), odds ratio 
(OR=2.347, p!0.01), and lower tier relative risk value (RRL=1.953, p!0.01),). The 
lower tier relative risk value indicates that an accident with a crew resource 
management causal factor is 1.953 times more likely to have a decision error 
causal factor than an accident case that does not have a crew resource 
management causal factor. However, the pairing did not result in a significant 
higher tier relative risk value.  
One example of an accident with both crew resource management and 
decision error causal categories can be seen in a case from the Australian mining 
data source (Patterson, 2009). In this particular case, a miner was injured when a 
hose slipped out of his hands, crushing his fingers. Before the work commenced, 
the worker and his team failed to prepare for the job by performing a risk 
assessment (crew resource management) and hence, failed to identify the 
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requirement for gloves, which would have improved gripping. The worker knew 
gloves were available, but chose to proceed without wearing the gloves (decision 
error). 
Another association found significant was between the crew resource 
management causal category and the perceptual error causal category. The 
pairing resulted in a significant Chi-Square value (!2=29.544, p!0.001), odds ratio 
(OR=2.581, p!0.01), lower tier relative risk value (RRL=1.973, p!0.01), and higher 
tier relative risk value (RRH=2.273, p!0.01). The lower tier relative risk value 
indicates that an accident with a crew resource management causal factor is 1.973 
times more likely to have a perceptual error causal factor than an accident case 
that does not have a crew resource management causal factor. The higher tier 
relative risk value indicates that an accident with a perceptual error causal factor 
is 2.273 times more likely to have a crew resource management causal factor than 
an accident that does not have a perceptual error factor. Since this association 
resulted in all four statistics being found significant, this association should be 
taken into strong consideration when applying these findings.  
One example of an accident with both a crew resource management and 
perceptual error causal categories can be seen in a case from the foods data 
source (Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2009). In this particular case, an 
employee, who was bussing tables, slipped and fell on a wet floor, injuring his 
head, left arm, and hip. Right before the time of the accident, another employee 
was mopping the floors, but failed to inform the remainder of the team of the 
hazard of the wet floors (crew resource management). The injured employee 
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noticed the floors were wet, but did not perceive the floors to be as wet at they 
actually were (perceptual error). 
The final association found significant was between the crew resource 
management causal category and the violation causal category. The pairing 
resulted in significant Chi-Square value (!2=52.462, p!0.001), odds ratio 
(OR=2.907, p!0.01), lower tier relative risk value (RRL=2.164, p!0.01), and higher 
tier relative risk value (RRH=2.318, p!0.01). The lower tier relative risk value 
indicates that an accident with a crew resource management causal factor is 2.164 
times more likely to have a violation causal factor than an accident case that does 
not have a crew resource management causal factor. The higher tier relative risk 
value indicates that an accident with a violation causal factor is 2.318 times more 
likely to have a crew resource management causal factor than an accident that 
does not have a violation factor. Since this association resulted in all four 
statistics being found significant, this association should be taken into strong 
consideration when applying these findings.  
One example of an accident with both crew resource management and 
violation causal categories can be seen in a case from the US mining data source 
(Patterson, 2009). In this particular case, a miner was fatally injured when he fell 
from an elevated crossbeam to the concrete floor below. The three-man team 
performing the job failed to perform a risk assessment before the task; therefore, 
the team did not adequately prepare for the job by identifying all the potential 
hazards (crew resource management). Fall protection was available to the 
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employees, but all three employees chose to not utilize the fall protection in 
order to perform the task more easily and quickly (violation). 
Non-Adjacent Tier Analysis 
All of the data sets included in this analysis were classified with HFACS 
post-hoc and were not initially investigated utilizing the HFACS taxonomy. 
Because of this, many of the data sources are limited in the information provided 
in the less investigated, upper HFACS tiers, but the association analysis was 
expanded to incorporate non-adjacent tiers (i.e. unsafe acts tier and unsafe 
supervision tier). First, the new, non-adjacent causal category pairings were first 
assessed with a Pearson’s Chi-Square test. The full results from the Pearson’s 
Chi-Square tests can be found in Appendix I. Those pairings found significant 
(p!0.001) were moved forward in the assessment, and odds ratios and relative 
risk values were determined. Additionally, the odds ratio and relative risk values 
were tested for significance, where the null hypothesis was the values equal to 
one. While the results will be presented below, the calculations can be found in 
Appendix J. 
The results from the adjacent tier association analysis can be found in 
Table 42 and Figure 16. Only those results where the Pearson’s Chi-Square value 
was found to be significant (p!0.001) are reported here. Table 42 is organized in 
an upper tier X lower tier manner. 
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Table 42: Non-Adjacent Tier Associations Results – Adjacent Tiers – Given Higher Tier Occurs 
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Figure 16: Pictorial Associations – Non-Adjacent Tiers 
Note: Solid blue lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square, Odds ratio, and lower 
relative risk results. Dashed blue lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square and Odds 
ratio results. Dashed orange lines indicate associations with significant Chi-Square results. 
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As can be seen above, fifteen causal category pairs were found to be 
significant. Of those fifteen pairings, twelve of the pairings were identified in the 
adjacent tier analysis, but three new association pairings were found significant 
in the non-adjacent tier analysis. An association pairing from the Organizational 
Influence tier is now included in the significant pairings. The three new pairings 
are resource management X perceptual error, failure to correct problem X 
decision error, and supervisory violation X violation. All three pairings had a 
significant odds ratio with eight of the ten pairings having an odds ratio greater 
than one.  
Table 43: Non-Adjacent Tier Associations Results – Adjacent Tiers – Given Lower Tier Occurs 
 
Table 43 presents the same fifteen pairings in a different manner. Table 43 
is organized in a lower tier X upper tier manner. The Chi-Square statistic and the 
Odds Ratio statistic are the same due to the symmetry of the statistics. In order to 
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better understand the three additional pairings, each pairing will be discussed 
individually. 
The analysis found a significant association between the resource 
management causal category and the perceptual error causal category. This 
pairing resulted in a significant Chi-Square value (!2=13.054, p!0.001) and Odds 
Ratio (OR=3.729, p!0.01). The odds ratio indicate that the odds of an accident 
case with a resource management causal category are 3.463 times greater if an 
accident case has a perceptual error causal category and vice versa. The lack of a 
significant relative risk value indicated that while the data could show an 
increase in odds, the data did not indicate a significant increase or decrease in 
likelihood.  
One example of an accident with both a resource management and 
perceptual error causal categories can be seen in a case from the site maintenance 
data source (unpublished data source). In this particular case, an employee 
smashed his finger between a sledgehammer and a wrench. The employee 
misjudged the distance between where the sledgehammer handle and platform 
came together; he did not believe the two would make contact (perceptual error). 
Also, the blueprint drawings of the machinery did not incorporate all elements of 
the machinery, and in this case, screws were missing from the drawing. Because 
of this design/resource deficiency, adequate tools were not supplied to the 
workers (resource management). 
The analysis found a significant association between the failure to correct 
problem causal category and the decision error causal category. This pairing 
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resulted in a significant Chi-Square value (!2=13.994, p!0.001) and Odds Ratio 
(OR=2.596, p!0.01). The odds ratio indicate that the odds of an accident case with 
a failure to correct problem causal category are 2.596 times greater if an accident 
case has a decision error causal category and vice versa. The lack of a significant 
relative risk value indicated that while the data could show an increase in odds, 
the data did not indicate a significant increase or decrease in likelihood.  
One example of an accident with both failure to correct problem and 
decision error causal categories can be seen in a case from the entertainment data 
source (Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2009) already described above (see 
failure to correct problem X technological environment). In this particular case, a 
worker’s left shoulder was injured when performing with a puppet. This 
particular puppet had been defective for many months, and management did not 
take the steps towards correcting the puppet (failure to correct problem and 
technological environment). Building on the defective puppet, the worker 
noticed the puppet was broken but did not properly assess the severity of the 
puppet defectiveness, choosing to utilize the puppet (decision error). 
The final non-adjacent tier association found significant was between the 
supervisory violation causal category and the violation causal category. The 
pairing resulted in significant Chi-Square value (!2=32.260, p!0.001), odds ratio 
(OR=6.452, p!0.01), lower tier relative risk value (RRL=5.180, p!0.01), and higher 
tier relative risk value (RRH=5.180, p!0.01). The lower tier relative risk value 
indicates that an accident with a supervisory violation causal factor is 5.180 times 
more likely to have a violation causal factor than an accident case that does not 
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have a supervisory violation causal factor. The higher tier relative risk value 
indicates that an accident with a violation causal factor is 5.180 times more likely 
to have a supervisory violation causal factor than an accident that does not have 
a violation factor. Since this association resulted in all four statistics being found 
significant, this association should be taken into strong consideration when 
applying these findings.  
One example of an accident with both supervisory violation and violation 
causal categories can be seen in a case from the US mining data source 
(Patterson, 2009). In this particular case, a miner was fatally injured from an 
electric shock. The miner did not follow proper procedures while disconnecting, 
locking out, tagging out, and de-energizing. He knowingly was working on live 
electric equipment and lines (violation). In addition, when being investigated, the 
company could not produce training documentation for the worker. The 
supervisor stated that he authorized the employee to perform the task knowing 
the employee did not have the proper training documentation (supervisory 
violation).  
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APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 
As previously mentioned in Chapter two, other studies have examined the 
relationship between causal factors and human error. However, the examination 
has only been initially extended to the HFACS taxonomy. In particular, four 
studies – primarily in the aviation industry – have examined HFACS causal 
factor associations and are as follows 
• ElBardissi et al., 2007 – Cardiovascular Surgery 
• Lenné, Ashby, & Fitzharris, 2008 – Australian GA 
• Li & Harris, 2007 – Chinese Air Military Aviation 
• Li, Harris, & Yu, 2008 – Chinese Civil Aviation 
 
The two Chinese aviation studies were included in the present analysis. 
Additionally, the present study and findings confirmed many of the findings 
from the previous studies. The present study introduced the concept of non-
adjacent tier associations, or tier jumping. 
Seven of the twelve adjacent tier causal factor associations found in this 
study support those previous findings. Table 44 outlines the comparison of the 
present findings to the four previous studies listed above. The Adverse Mental 
State X Decision Error association was the most supported association with the 
association being identified in all four previous studies. On the other hand, the 
Adverse Mental State X Perceptual Error, Adverse Physiological State X Skill-
Based Error, and Crew Resource Management X Perceptual Error associations 
were the least supported with only one of the four previous studies supporting 
the finding. Only association findings incorporating causal factors from both the 
precondition for unsafe act tier and the unsafe act tier were supported by 
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previous studies. The lack of upper tier associations confirms the current 
difficulty in identifying associations for these tiers.  
Table 44: Comparison to Previous Studies 
HFACS Casual Factor Association
Current Study
Berry, 2010
ElBardissi et al., 
2007
Lenné, Ashby, & 
Fitzharris, 2008
Li & Harris, 
2006
Li, Harris, & 
Yu, 2008
Resource Management X Inadequate Supervision X X
Resource Management X Plan Inappropriate Activities X
Resource Management X Fail to Correct Problem X
Resource Management X Perceptual Errors X
Organizational Climate X Inadequate Supervision X X
Organizational Process X Inadequate Supervision X X
Organizational Process X Plan Inappropriate Activities X X
Organizational Process X Fail to Correct Problem X X
Organizational Process X Supervisory Violation X
Inadequate Supervision X Adverse Mental State X
Inadequate Supervision X Physical/Mental Limitation X
Inadequate Supervision X Crew Resource Management X X
Plan Inappropriate Activities X Physical Environment X
Plan Inappropriate Activities X Adverse Mental State X
Plan Inappropriate Activities X Adverse Physiological State X
Plan Inappropriate Activities X Crew Resource Management X
Plan Inappropriate Activities X Fitness for Duty X
Fail to Correct Problem X Decision Error X
Fail to Correct Problem X Physical Environment X
Fail to Correct Problem X Technological Environment X
Fail to Correct Problem X Adverse Mental State X
Fail to Correct Problem X Physical/Mental Limitation X
Fail to Correct Problem X Crew Resource Management X
Supervisory Violation X Fitness for Duty X
Supervisory Violation X Violation X
Physical Environment X Decision Error X
Physical Environment X Perceptual Error X
Technological Environment X Violation X X
Adverse Mental State X Skill-Based Error X X X X
Adverse Mental State X Decision Error X X X X X
Adverse Mental State X Perceptual Error X X
Adverse Mental State X Violation X X X
Adverse Physiological State X Skill-Based Error X X
Adverse Physiological State X Decision Error X
Physical Mental Limitation X Skill-Based Error X X
Physical Mental Limitation X Decision Error X X
Physical Mental Limitation X Perceptual Error X
Physical Mental Limitation X Violation X
Crew Resource Management X Skill-Based Error X X X
Crew Resource Management X Decision Error X X X X
Crew Resource Management X Perceptual Error X X
Crew Resource Management X Violation X X X X
Fitness for Duty X Skill-Based Error X X X
Fitness for Duty X Decision Error X X
Study
Organizational Factors
Unsafe Supervision
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
 
The association findings can be used to help the safety manager to direct 
monetary and human effort towards areas in need of mitigation. The association 
findings have the possibility to impact mitigations in two ways. First, the 
association findings identify other causal factors that have the potential to be 
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affected by mitigations applied to an associated causal factor. For example, if an 
intervention is applied to crew resource management, the potential exists for the 
violation causal category to be impacted as well. Secondly, a ‘bigger bang for 
buck’ mentality could be applied to the association findings. If a company has 
identified both adverse mental state and adverse physiological state as areas in 
need of mitigation, association findings can assist in determining how to apply 
monetary and human efforts. In this case, the adverse mental state causal 
category is incorporated into more associations than the adverse physiological 
state causal category. 
The association findings can be applied in either a reactive or proactive 
manner. In one manner, the typical company has an accident and near miss 
database where unsafe act causal categories can be, or already are, accurately and 
frequently identified. In this case, the safety manager can use the association 
findings to assist in identifying other possible causal factors and latent failures. 
To do so, the safety manager should utilize both Table 41 and Table 43. For 
example, if a company has identified perceptual errors as an intervention area, 
the company could also direct mitigations towards adverse mental state, crew 
resource management, and supervisory violation. The association findings can 
also be utilized in a proactive manner. Many companies and safety managers 
conduct safety audits or surveys (i.e. Aviation’s Line Operations Safety Audit) to 
identify system weaknesses or latent failures before an accident or incident 
occurs. The results of those surveys and audits can be applied to the association 
findings to identify other latent failures and even active errors. To do so, the 
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safety manager should utilize Table 40 through Table 43. For example, if an audit 
identified latent failures associated with the causal category adverse 
physiological state, the company can also direct mitigations towards planned 
inappropriate operation and skill-based error causal factors. 
The association findings can also be utilized to guide accident 
investigation. If an accident investigator identifies a HFACS causal category as a 
factor in an accident, the accident investigator can use the association findings to 
help guide or assist further investigation into the accident. For example, if an 
accident investigator identifies the unsafe supervision tier’s failed to correct 
problem causal category as a factor, the investigator can then be instructed to 
also examine physical environment, technological environment, and 
physical/mental limitation. The association findings should not be the sole guide 
to accident investigation, but should serve as a reminder to investigate those 
other associated causal categories. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the association findings have been presented and their 
implications discussed. Twelve adjacent tier associations and three additional 
non-adjacent tier associations were found to be significant. Due to the tiers’ ease 
of investigation and classification, most associations were between the 
preconditions for unsafe act tier and unsafe act tier. Of the fifteen associations, 
thirteen resulted in a significant odds ratio, and eight resulted in a significant 
lower tier relative risk value. Also, the potential applications of the association 
findings have been outlined. The findings can be applied in a reactive manner 
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(via application to current unsafe act and accident databases) and a proactive 
manner (via safety audits and surveys).  
While this work furthers the field of causal factor associations, future 
work in the area is always needed. Ideally, an accident database that thoroughly 
investigates all four tiers of the HFACS taxonomy would be included to expand 
the associations among the upper tiers. Also, as more companies apply the 
HFACS taxonomy, the data should be incorporated into the larger database used 
in this analysis. With each addition, the larger HFACS database should be 
reexamined for association findings. 
Overall, this dissertation furthers the research field of HFACS and its 
application. Originating in Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese Model, the HFACS 
taxonomy aims to identify the holes of the Swiss cheese. This dissertation 
furthered progress in determining the size of the holes and the interactions 
among the holes. A company that has adopted the HFACS taxonomy should first 
classify its accident and near miss cases using the HFACS taxonomy. The 
company can then judge its findings against the benchmarking standards 
determined in Chapter Four. In order to enhance mitigations, association 
findings can help to identify other areas for mitigation or other areas, which may 
be affected by mitigation efforts. 
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APPENDIX A: ACCIDENT AND NEAR MISS BENCHMARKING 
CALCULATIONS
Skill-Based Errors Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SBE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 33 0.266129032 
2 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 35 0.368421053 
3 Entertainment 336 126 0.375 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 77 0.425414365 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 509 226 0.444007859 
6 Maintenance - Site 129 59 0.457364341 
7 Food Services 384 179 0.466145833 
8 Critical Cases 216 101 0.467592593 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 613 0.475931677 
10 Maintenance - Field 486 232 0.477366255 
11 Middle East Aviation 40 21 0.525 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 22 0.536585366 
13 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 9554 0.57864454 
14 Mining - Australian 508 296 0.582677165 
15 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 499 0.594755662 
16 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 137 0.614349776 
17 Mining - US 255 172 0.674509804 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p-value Rank FDR 
3 9 0.00094 1 0.00018 
3 10 0.00362 2 0.00036 
3 7 0.01354 3 0.00055 
3 8 0.03095 4 0.00073 
2 9 0.04271 5 0.00091 
3 12 0.04547 6 0.00109 
3 5 0.04644 7 0.00127 
2 10 0.05133 8 0.00145 
3 11 0.06609 9 0.00164 
2 12 0.06816 10 0.00182 
2 7 0.08627 11 0.00200 
2 11 0.09178 12 0.00218 
3 6 0.10423 13 0.00236 
2 8 0.10439 14 0.00255 
2 5 0.17217 15 0.00273 
2 6 0.18250 16 0.00291 
4 12 0.19598 17 0.00309 
4 9 0.20226 18 0.00327 
5 9 0.22163 19 0.00345 
4 10 0.23151 20 0.00364 
4 11 0.25124 21 0.00382 
5 12 0.25177 22 0.00400 
3 4 0.26285 23 0.00418 
5 10 0.29129 24 0.00436 
5 11 0.32147 25 0.00455 
2 4 0.35961 26 0.00473 
4 7 0.36413 27 0.00491 
6 12 0.37630 28 0.00509 
7 12 0.39050 29 0.00527 
4 8 0.40000 30 0.00545 
8 12 0.41751 31 0.00564 
9 12 0.44402 32 0.00582 
6 11 0.45415 33 0.00600 
10 12 0.46615 34 0.00618 
7 11 0.47795 35 0.00636 
8 11 0.50429 36 0.00655 
5 7 0.51061 37 0.00673 
9 11 0.54062 38 0.00691 
5 8 0.55944 39 0.00709 
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10 11 0.56220 40 0.00727 
4 6 0.57631 41 0.00745 
4 5 0.66507 42 0.00764 
6 10 0.68586 43 0.00782 
6 9 0.68721 44 0.00800 
7 9 0.73605 45 0.00818 
7 10 0.74202 46 0.00836 
5 6 0.78520 47 0.00855 
8 10 0.81083 48 0.00873 
8 9 0.82033 49 0.00891 
6 8 0.85376 50 0.00909 
6 7 0.86262 51 0.00927 
2 3 0.90683 52 0.00945 
11 12 0.91680 53 0.00964 
9 10 0.95697 54 0.00982 
7 8 0.97280 55 0.01000 
 
Skill-Based Errors Secondary Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SBE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 33 0.26613 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 9554 0.57864 
3 Mining - Australian 508 296 0.58268 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 499 0.59476 
5 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 137 0.61435 
6 Mining - US 255 172 0.67451 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 6 0.00208 1 0.00100 
3 6 0.01401 2 0.00200 
4 6 0.02201 3 0.00300 
5 6 0.16990 4 0.00400 
2 5 0.28337 5 0.00500 
2 4 0.35643 6 0.00600 
3 5 0.42234 7 0.00700 
4 5 0.59568 8 0.00800 
3 4 0.66220 9 0.00900 
2 3 0.85612 10 0.01000 
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Decision Errors Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases DE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 149 0.11568 
2 Entertainment 336 45 0.13393 
3 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 32 0.14350 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 19 0.15323 
5 Maintenance - Site 129 26 0.20155 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 3771 0.22839 
7 Critical Cases 216 60 0.27778 
8 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 27 0.28421 
9 Maintenance - Field 486 144 0.29630 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 303 0.36114 
11 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 71 0.39227 
12 Food Services 384 164 0.42708 
13 Chinese Military Aviation 509 223 0.43811 
14 Middle East Aviation 40 18 0.45000 
15 Mining - Australian 508 248 0.48819 
16 Mining - US 255 160 0.62745 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 28 0.68293 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 11 0.01568 1 0.00067 
9 10 0.01613 2 0.00133 
9 11 0.01837 3 0.00200 
7 10 0.02145 4 0.00267 
7 14 0.02972 5 0.00333 
9 14 0.04297 6 0.00400 
8 14 0.06206 7 0.00467 
8 11 0.07470 8 0.00533 
8 10 0.13706 9 0.00600 
10 14 0.25416 10 0.00667 
10 11 0.43070 11 0.00733 
11 14 0.50045 12 0.00800 
7 9 0.61795 13 0.00867 
8 9 0.81312 14 0.00933 
7 8 0.90733 15 0.01000 
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Decision Errors Secondary Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases DE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 149 0.11568 
2 Entertainment 336 45 0.13393 
3 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 32 0.14350 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 19 0.15323 
5 Maintenance - Site 129 26 0.20155 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 3771 0.22839 
7 Food Services 384 164 0.42708 
8 Chinese Military Aviation 509 223 0.43811 
9 Mining - Australian 508 248 0.48819 
10 Mining - US 255 160 0.62745 
11 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 28 0.68293 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 5 0.00471 1 0.00100 
2 5 0.06951 2 0.00200 
3 5 0.15717 3 0.00300 
1 4 0.21749 4 0.00400 
1 3 0.23760 5 0.00500 
4 5 0.31497 6 0.00600 
1 2 0.35844 7 0.00700 
2 4 0.59565 8 0.00800 
2 3 0.74786 9 0.00900 
3 4 0.80626 10 0.01000 
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Perceptual Errors Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PE p 
1 Mining - US 255 2 0.00784 
2 Entertainment 336 3 0.00893 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 2 0.01550 
4 Critical Cases 216 6 0.02778 
5 Maintenance - Field 486 14 0.02881 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 4 0.03226 
7 Food Services 384 14 0.03646 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 55 0.04270 
9 Mining - Australian 508 26 0.05118 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 10 0.05525 
11 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 946 0.05730 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 56 0.06675 
13 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 19 0.08520 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 12 0.12632 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 509 116 0.22790 
16 Middle East Aviation 40 10 0.25000 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 13 0.31707 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 13 0.00093 1 0.00018 
5 12 0.00293 2 0.00036 
8 13 0.00663 3 0.00055 
5 11 0.00733 4 0.00073 
3 13 0.00781 5 0.00091 
4 13 0.00944 6 0.00109 
7 13 0.01067 7 0.00127 
8 12 0.01482 8 0.00145 
3 12 0.02243 9 0.00164 
8 11 0.02856 10 0.00182 
4 12 0.02989 11 0.00200 
7 12 0.03432 12 0.00218 
3 11 0.04136 13 0.00236 
6 13 0.05746 14 0.00255 
4 11 0.06283 15 0.00273 
5 9 0.07277 16 0.00291 
3 10 0.07376 17 0.00309 
11 13 0.07577 18 0.00327 
3 9 0.07753 19 0.00345 
9 13 0.07806 20 0.00364 
7 11 0.08123 21 0.00382 
5 10 0.10301 22 0.00400 
3 8 0.13390 23 0.00418 
6 12 0.13806 24 0.00436 
4 9 0.16098 25 0.00455 
4 10 0.16570 26 0.00473 
5 8 0.17702 27 0.00491 
6 11 0.23131 28 0.00509 
3 7 0.23619 29 0.00527 
10 13 0.24610 30 0.00545 
9 12 0.24688 31 0.00564 
11 12 0.25229 32 0.00582 
7 9 0.29280 33 0.00600 
7 10 0.30143 34 0.00618 
4 8 0.30350 35 0.00636 
12 13 0.33899 36 0.00655 
6 10 0.34598 37 0.00673 
6 9 0.37430 38 0.00691 
3 6 0.38129 39 0.00709 
3 5 0.39881 40 0.00727 
8 9 0.43546 41 0.00745 
8 10 0.44213 42 0.00764 
3 4 0.46361 43 0.00782 
5 7 0.52543 44 0.00800 
9 11 0.55861 45 0.00818 
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10 12 0.56850 46 0.00836 
4 7 0.56965 47 0.00855 
6 8 0.57883 48 0.00873 
7 8 0.58929 49 0.00891 
4 6 0.81393 50 0.00909 
6 7 0.82590 51 0.00927 
9 10 0.83277 52 0.00945 
5 6 0.83935 53 0.00964 
10 11 0.90619 54 0.00982 
4 5 0.93972 55 0.01000 
 
Perceptual Errors Secondary Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PE p 
1 Mining - US 255 2 0.00784 
2 Entertainment 336 3 0.00893 
3 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 12 0.12632 
4 Chinese Military Aviation 509 116 0.22790 
5 Middle East Aviation 40 10 0.25000 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 13 0.31707 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.00840 1 0.00091 
3 4 0.02614 2 0.00182 
3 5 0.07561 3 0.00273 
4 6 0.19484 4 0.00364 
4 10 0.19484 5 0.00455 
4 11 0.19484 6 0.00545 
4 12 0.19484 7 0.00636 
4 13 0.19484 8 0.00727 
5 6 0.50329 9 0.00818 
5 6 0.50329 10 0.00909 
4 5 0.74891 11 0.01000 
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Violations Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases V p 
1 Maintenance - Site 129 4 0.03101 
2 Entertainment 336 11 0.03274 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 49 0.03804 
4 Mining - Australian 508 21 0.04134 
5 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 10 0.04484 
6 Maintenance - Field 486 29 0.05967 
7 Critical Cases 216 17 0.07870 
8 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 9 0.09474 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1774 0.10744 
10 Mining - US 255 29 0.11373 
11 Food Services 384 47 0.12240 
12 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 16 0.12903 
13 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 31 0.17127 
14 Middle East Aviation 40 8 0.20000 
15 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 205 0.24434 
16 Chinese Military Aviation 509 160 0.31434 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 24 0.58537 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 7 0.00694 1 0.00036 
3 8 0.00781 2 0.00071 
2 8 0.01120 3 0.00107 
2 7 0.01631 4 0.00143 
4 8 0.02802 5 0.00179 
4 7 0.03914 6 0.00214 
1 8 0.04379 7 0.00250 
3 6 0.04753 8 0.00286 
1 7 0.07301 9 0.00321 
2 6 0.07768 10 0.00357 
5 8 0.08577 11 0.00393 
5 7 0.13986 12 0.00429 
4 6 0.18621 13 0.00464 
1 6 0.19905 14 0.00500 
6 8 0.20611 15 0.00536 
6 7 0.34693 16 0.00571 
5 6 0.42135 17 0.00607 
2 5 0.46110 18 0.00643 
2 4 0.52192 19 0.00679 
1 5 0.52217 20 0.00714 
1 4 0.58946 21 0.00750 
3 5 0.62841 22 0.00786 
7 8 0.63798 23 0.00821 
2 3 0.64614 24 0.00857 
1 3 0.68804 25 0.00893 
3 4 0.74520 26 0.00929 
4 5 0.82861 27 0.00964 
1 2 0.92467 28 0.01000 
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Violations Secondary Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases V p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1774 0.10744 
2 Mining - US 255 29 0.11373 
3 Food Services 384 47 0.12240 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 16 0.12903 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 31 0.17127 
6 Middle East Aviation 40 8 0.20000 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 205 0.24434 
8 Chinese Military Aviation 509 160 0.31434 
9 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 24 0.58537 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 5 0.00596 1 0.00067 
1 6 0.05926 2 0.00133 
2 5 0.08567 3 0.00200 
3 5 0.11608 4 0.00267 
2 6 0.12559 5 0.00333 
3 6 0.16448 6 0.00400 
4 6 0.26950 7 0.00467 
4 5 0.31558 8 0.00533 
1 3 0.35028 9 0.00600 
1 4 0.43959 10 0.00667 
5 6 0.66622 11 0.00733 
2 3 0.74022 12 0.00800 
1 2 0.74796 13 0.00867 
3 4 0.84544 14 0.00933 
4 4 1.00000 15 0.01000 
 
Physical Environment Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 5 0.05263 
2 Middle East Aviation 40 4 0.10000 
3 Chinese Military Aviation 509 74 0.14538 
4 Critical Cases 216 32 0.14815 
5 Maintenance - Field 486 74 0.15226 
6 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 46 0.20628 
7 Entertainment 336 115 0.34226 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 67 0.37017 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 46 0.37097 
10 Maintenance - Site 129 48 0.37209 
11 Mining - Australian 508 196 0.38583 
12 Food Services 384 161 0.41927 
13 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 7154 0.43329 
14 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 597 0.46351 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
16 Mining - US 255 142 0.55686 
17 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 525 0.62574 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
11 14 0.00283 1 0.00036 
8 14 0.01814 2 0.00071 
11 13 0.03341 3 0.00107 
13 14 0.03512 4 0.00143 
10 14 0.04683 5 0.00179 
9 14 0.04812 6 0.00214 
8 13 0.08824 7 0.00250 
8 15 0.09320 8 0.00286 
9 15 0.11042 9 0.00321 
11 15 0.11138 10 0.00357 
10 15 0.11153 11 0.00393 
12 14 0.12642 12 0.00429 
10 13 0.16231 13 0.00464 
9 13 0.16290 14 0.00500 
12 15 0.25304 15 0.00536 
8 12 0.26694 16 0.00571 
13 15 0.30853 17 0.00607 
11 12 0.31276 18 0.00643 
9 12 0.34123 19 0.00679 
10 12 0.34542 20 0.00714 
14 15 0.53836 21 0.00750 
12 13 0.58370 22 0.00786 
8 11 0.70959 23 0.00821 
9 11 0.76023 24 0.00857 
10 11 0.77446 25 0.00893 
8 10 0.97238 26 0.00929 
9 10 0.98523 27 0.00964 
8 9 0.98863 28 0.01000 
 
Physical Environment Secondary Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 5 0.05263 
2 Middle East Aviation 40 4 0.10000 
3 Chinese Military Aviation 509 74 0.14538 
4 Critical Cases 216 32 0.14815 
5 Maintenance - Field 486 74 0.15226 
6 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 46 0.20628 
7 Entertainment 336 115 0.34226 
8 Mining - US 255 142 0.55686 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 525 0.62574 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.04054 1 0.00100 
5 6 0.07492 2 0.00200 
4 6 0.11116 3 0.00300 
2 6 0.11471 4 0.00400 
2 5 0.37131 5 0.00500 
2 4 0.42104 6 0.00600 
2 3 0.42859 7 0.00700 
3 5 0.76046 8 0.00800 
4 5 0.88823 9 0.00900 
3 4 0.92322 10 0.01000 
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Technological Environment Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases TE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 9 0.00055 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 1 0.00078 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 4 0.00477 
5 Middle East Aviation 40 2 0.05000 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 11 0.06077 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 509 44 0.08644 
8 Maintenance - Site 129 14 0.10853 
9 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 7 0.17073 
10 Food Services 384 73 0.19010 
11 Entertainment 336 64 0.19048 
12 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 54 0.24215 
13 Maintenance - Field 486 141 0.29012 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 32 0.33684 
15 Critical Cases 216 74 0.34259 
16 Mining - Australian 508 181 0.35630 
17 Mining - US 255 149 0.58431 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 12 0.00627 1 0.00083 
5 10 0.02711 2 0.00167 
5 11 0.02726 3 0.00250 
5 9 0.08388 4 0.00333 
10 12 0.12855 5 0.00417 
11 12 0.14263 6 0.00500 
9 12 0.31869 7 0.00583 
5 7 0.42313 8 0.00667 
9 11 0.76016 9 0.00750 
9 10 0.76293 10 0.00833 
5 6 0.79327 11 0.00917 
10 11 0.98988 12 0.01000 
 
Technological Environment Secondary Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases TE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 9 0.00055 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 1 0.00078 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 4 0.00477 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 11 0.06077 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 509 44 0.08644 
7 Maintenance - Site 129 14 0.10853 
8 Maintenance - Field 486 141 0.29012 
9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 32 0.33684 
10 Critical Cases 216 74 0.34259 
11 Mining - Australian 508 181 0.35630 
12 Mining - US 255 149 0.58431 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
8 11 0.02584 1 0.00167 
8 10 0.16393 2 0.00333 
8 9 0.36242 3 0.00500 
9 11 0.71573 4 0.00667 
10 11 0.72389 5 0.00833 
9 10 0.92150 6 0.01000 
 
Adverse Mental State Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 Critical Cases 216 2 0.00926 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 5 0.02242 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 31 0.02407 
4 Mining - US 255 8 0.03137 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
6 Entertainment 336 13 0.03869 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 5 0.04032 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 859 0.05203 
9 Maintenance - Field 486 30 0.06173 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 60 0.07151 
11 Maintenance - Site 129 11 0.08527 
12 Mining - Australian 508 57 0.11220 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 9 0.21951 
14 Food Services 384 97 0.25260 
15 Middle East Aviation 40 11 0.27500 
16 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 27 0.28421 
17 Chinese Military Aviation 509 184 0.36149 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 11 0.00033 1 0.00022 
1 10 0.00052 2 0.00044 
1 9 0.00210 3 0.00067 
1 8 0.00471 4 0.00089 
2 11 0.00638 5 0.00111 
2 10 0.00656 6 0.00133 
8 10 0.01395 7 0.00156 
4 10 0.02007 8 0.00178 
4 11 0.02143 9 0.00200 
2 9 0.02487 10 0.00222 
6 10 0.03519 11 0.00244 
1 6 0.03793 12 0.00267 
6 11 0.04208 13 0.00289 
5 11 0.04693 14 0.00311 
2 8 0.04720 15 0.00333 
1 7 0.05219 16 0.00356 
5 10 0.05706 17 0.00378 
4 9 0.07511 18 0.00400 
8 11 0.09108 19 0.00422 
1 5 0.09157 20 0.00444 
1 4 0.09714 21 0.00467 
4 8 0.13941 22 0.00489 
7 11 0.14199 23 0.00511 
6 9 0.14474 24 0.00533 
5 9 0.14637 25 0.00556 
7 10 0.19628 26 0.00578 
5 8 0.25451 27 0.00600 
1 2 0.27105 28 0.00622 
6 8 0.27470 29 0.00644 
2 6 0.28598 30 0.00667 
2 7 0.33948 31 0.00689 
9 11 0.34062 32 0.00711 
8 9 0.34369 33 0.00733 
7 9 0.36026 34 0.00756 
9 10 0.49510 35 0.00778 
2 5 0.50998 36 0.00800 
2 4 0.54836 37 0.00822 
7 8 0.55848 38 0.00844 
10 11 0.57685 39 0.00867 
4 6 0.63410 40 0.00889 
4 7 0.65331 41 0.00911 
5 7 0.74138 42 0.00933 
5 6 0.74940 43 0.00956 
4 5 0.91742 44 0.00978 
6 7 0.93615 45 0.01000 
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Adverse Mental State Secondary Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 31 0.02407 
2 Mining - Australian 508 57 0.11220 
3 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 9 0.21951 
4 Food Services 384 97 0.25260 
5 Middle East Aviation 40 11 0.27500 
6 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 27 0.28421 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 509 184 0.36149 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.43256 1 0.00167 
4 6 0.52888 2 0.00333 
3 5 0.56259 3 0.00500 
3 4 0.64157 4 0.00667 
4 5 0.75703 5 0.00833 
5 6 0.91347 6 0.01000 
 
Adverse Physiological State Main Grouping – Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases APS p 
1 Chinese Military Aviation 509 2 0.00393 
2 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
3 Mining - US 255 2 0.00784 
4 Maintenance - Field 486 4 0.00823 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 11 0.00854 
6 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 2 0.00897 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 2 0.01613 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 18 0.02145 
9 Maintenance - Site 129 3 0.02326 
10 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 400 0.02423 
11 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 1 0.02439 
12 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
13 Entertainment 336 11 0.03274 
14 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
15 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 5 0.05263 
16 Mining - Australian 508 30 0.05906 
17 Food Services 384 60 0.15625 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 10 0.00031 1 0.00011 
5 13 0.00063 2 0.00022 
1 13 0.00087 3 0.00033 
1 14 0.00161 4 0.00044 
1 10 0.00298 5 0.00055 
5 14 0.00375 6 0.00066 
4 13 0.00986 7 0.00077 
1 8 0.00988 8 0.00088 
5 8 0.01207 9 0.00099 
4 14 0.01853 10 0.00110 
4 10 0.02251 11 0.00121 
1 9 0.02618 12 0.00132 
2 13 0.02710 13 0.00143 
2 14 0.03152 14 0.00154 
3 13 0.04099 15 0.00165 
3 14 0.05238 16 0.00176 
2 10 0.06139 17 0.00187 
6 13 0.06786 18 0.00198 
4 8 0.06946 19 0.00209 
1 12 0.08175 20 0.00220 
6 14 0.08277 21 0.00231 
1 11 0.08704 22 0.00242 
3 10 0.08968 23 0.00253 
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2 8 0.09729 24 0.00264 
5 9 0.10716 25 0.00275 
2 9 0.11789 26 0.00286 
1 7 0.12421 27 0.00297 
6 10 0.13939 28 0.00308 
4 9 0.15268 29 0.00319 
3 8 0.15538 30 0.00330 
2 12 0.17890 31 0.00341 
2 11 0.18681 32 0.00352 
3 9 0.20826 33 0.00363 
6 8 0.22279 34 0.00374 
8 13 0.25994 35 0.00385 
6 9 0.27506 36 0.00396 
2 7 0.27510 37 0.00407 
5 12 0.27863 38 0.00418 
5 11 0.29087 39 0.00429 
4 12 0.29342 40 0.00440 
1 5 0.29868 41 0.00451 
4 11 0.30536 42 0.00462 
3 12 0.31464 43 0.00473 
10 13 0.31673 44 0.00484 
3 11 0.32618 45 0.00495 
7 13 0.34016 46 0.00505 
8 14 0.34649 47 0.00516 
7 14 0.36094 48 0.00527 
6 12 0.37930 49 0.00538 
1 4 0.38103 50 0.00549 
6 11 0.39186 51 0.00560 
1 6 0.39464 52 0.00571 
5 7 0.39810 53 0.00582 
4 7 0.42631 54 0.00593 
10 14 0.43832 55 0.00604 
3 7 0.45893 56 0.00615 
1 3 0.47964 57 0.00626 
6 7 0.54930 58 0.00637 
2 5 0.54994 59 0.00648 
7 10 0.55857 60 0.00659 
2 6 0.58116 61 0.00670 
9 13 0.59214 62 0.00681 
2 4 0.60054 63 0.00692 
9 14 0.60908 64 0.00703 
8 10 0.60946 65 0.00714 
2 3 0.66224 66 0.00725 
7 9 0.68390 67 0.00736 
7 8 0.69793 68 0.00747 
7 12 0.71582 69 0.00758 
7 11 0.73143 70 0.00769 
11 14 0.77197 71 0.00780 
11 13 0.77376 72 0.00791 
12 14 0.78998 73 0.00802 
12 13 0.79240 74 0.00813 
8 12 0.88024 75 0.00824 
3 6 0.89280 76 0.00835 
1 2 0.89312 77 0.00846 
8 9 0.89596 78 0.00857 
8 11 0.89949 79 0.00868 
3 5 0.91138 80 0.00879 
4 6 0.92064 81 0.00890 
9 10 0.94306 82 0.00901 
5 6 0.94903 83 0.00912 
4 5 0.94930 84 0.00923 
9 12 0.94945 85 0.00934 
3 4 0.95543 86 0.00945 
9 11 0.96670 87 0.00956 
10 12 0.97464 88 0.00967 
13 14 0.98005 89 0.00978 
11 12 0.98589 90 0.00989 
10 11 0.99456 91 0.01000 
 
Physical/Mental Limitation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 Maintenance - Field 486 1 0.00206 
2 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 2 0.01613 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 25 0.01941 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 39 0.04648 
7 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 3 0.07317 
8 Mining - US 255 24 0.09412 
9 Mining - Australian 508 54 0.10630 
10 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1757 0.10641 
11 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 11 0.11579 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 509 73 0.14342 
13 Middle East Aviation 40 6 0.15000 
14 Maintenance - Site 129 26 0.20155 
15 Food Services 384 91 0.23698 
16 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 61 0.27354 
17 Entertainment 336 109 0.32440 
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Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
10 14 0.00050 1 0.00036 
8 14 0.00313 2 0.00071 
9 14 0.00355 3 0.00107 
10 12 0.00794 4 0.00143 
8 12 0.05359 5 0.00179 
7 14 0.05695 6 0.00214 
9 12 0.07339 7 0.00250 
11 14 0.08759 8 0.00286 
12 14 0.10336 9 0.00321 
7 12 0.20987 10 0.00357 
7 13 0.27132 11 0.00393 
8 13 0.27696 12 0.00429 
10 13 0.37214 13 0.00464 
9 13 0.39409 14 0.00500 
7 11 0.45292 15 0.00536 
13 14 0.46719 16 0.00571 
11 12 0.47496 17 0.00607 
7 10 0.49041 18 0.00643 
7 9 0.50353 19 0.00679 
8 10 0.52713 20 0.00714 
8 11 0.54784 21 0.00750 
11 13 0.58432 22 0.00786 
8 9 0.60033 23 0.00821 
7 8 0.66546 24 0.00857 
10 11 0.76767 25 0.00893 
9 11 0.78426 26 0.00929 
12 13 0.90908 27 0.00964 
9 10 0.99341 28 0.01000 
 
Physical/Mental Limitation Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 Maintenance - Field 486 1 0.00206 
2 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 2 0.01613 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 25 0.01941 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 39 0.04648 
7 Food Services 384 91 0.23698 
8 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 61 0.27354 
9 Entertainment 336 109 0.32440 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 5 0.03152 1 0.00167 
2 4 0.12300 2 0.00333 
4 5 0.22850 3 0.00500 
2 3 0.27510 4 0.00667 
3 5 0.36094 5 0.00833 
3 4 0.79889 6 0.01000 
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Crew Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0 
2 Entertainment 336 16 0.047619048 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 9 0.069767442 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 9 0.072580645 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 95 0.073757764 
6 Maintenance - Field 486 38 0.0781893 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1403 0.084973654 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 75 0.089392133 
9 Critical Cases 216 21 0.097222222 
10 Food Services 384 46 0.119791667 
11 Middle East Aviation 40 6 0.15 
12 Mining - US 255 44 0.17254902 
13 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 34 0.187845304 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 21 0.221052632 
15 Mining - Australian 508 123 0.242125984 
16 Chinese Military Aviation 509 146 0.286836935 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.512195122 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 10 0.00057 1 0.00022 
5 10 0.00438 2 0.00044 
2 11 0.00911 3 0.00067 
2 7 0.01466 4 0.00089 
2 8 0.01549 5 0.00111 
7 10 0.01601 6 0.00133 
2 9 0.02294 7 0.00156 
6 10 0.03911 8 0.00178 
5 11 0.07322 9 0.00200 
2 6 0.08200 10 0.00222 
2 5 0.09085 11 0.00244 
8 10 0.09843 12 0.00267 
3 10 0.11209 13 0.00289 
6 11 0.11484 14 0.00311 
3 11 0.11902 15 0.00333 
4 11 0.13968 16 0.00356 
7 11 0.14105 17 0.00378 
4 10 0.14128 18 0.00400 
5 7 0.16259 19 0.00422 
5 8 0.19377 20 0.00444 
8 11 0.19540 21 0.00467 
5 9 0.23163 22 0.00489 
2 4 0.29469 23 0.00511 
9 11 0.31817 24 0.00533 
2 3 0.34310 25 0.00556 
3 9 0.38122 26 0.00578 
9 10 0.39949 27 0.00600 
6 9 0.40155 28 0.00622 
4 9 0.44065 29 0.00644 
3 8 0.46104 30 0.00667 
6 8 0.48166 31 0.00689 
7 9 0.52161 32 0.00711 
4 8 0.53574 33 0.00733 
3 7 0.53700 34 0.00756 
10 11 0.57938 35 0.00778 
6 7 0.59667 36 0.00800 
4 7 0.62179 37 0.00822 
7 8 0.65470 38 0.00844 
8 9 0.72122 39 0.00867 
3 6 0.74892 40 0.00889 
5 6 0.75193 41 0.00911 
4 6 0.83441 42 0.00933 
3 5 0.86840 43 0.00956 
3 4 0.93066 44 0.00978 
4 5 0.96177 45 0.01000 
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Crew Resource Management Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
2 Mining - US 255 44 0.17255 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 34 0.18785 
4 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 21 0.22105 
5 Mining - Australian 508 123 0.24213 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 509 146 0.28684 
7 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 5 0.02834 1 0.00167 
3 5 0.13493 2 0.00333 
2 4 0.29942 3 0.00500 
3 4 0.51172 4 0.00667 
4 5 0.65836 5 0.00833 
2 3 0.68134 6 0.01000 
 
Personal Readiness Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 50 0.00303 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 3 0.00358 
5 Mining - Australian 508 2 0.00394 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 6 0.00466 
7 Maintenance - Field 486 4 0.00823 
8 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 2 0.00897 
9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 1 0.01053 
10 Maintenance - Site 129 2 0.01550 
11 Critical Cases 216 5 0.02315 
12 Entertainment 336 10 0.02976 
13 Mining - US 255 8 0.03137 
14 Food Services 384 18 0.04688 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 509 29 0.05697 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 5 0.12195 
17 Middle East Aviation 40 8 0.20000 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 13 0.00167 1 0.00036 
5 12 0.00192 2 0.00071 
5 11 0.01565 3 0.00107 
7 13 0.01774 4 0.00143 
7 12 0.01900 5 0.00179 
8 13 0.08775 6 0.00214 
8 12 0.09672 7 0.00250 
7 11 0.10490 8 0.00286 
5 10 0.13750 9 0.00321 
8 11 0.23573 10 0.00357 
9 13 0.27321 11 0.00393 
9 12 0.29387 12 0.00429 
10 13 0.35641 13 0.00464 
5 7 0.38236 14 0.00500 
10 12 0.38529 15 0.00536 
5 8 0.39583 16 0.00571 
5 9 0.40213 17 0.00607 
7 10 0.45498 18 0.00643 
9 11 0.45605 19 0.00679 
8 10 0.57726 20 0.00714 
11 13 0.58721 21 0.00750 
10 11 0.62607 22 0.00786 
11 12 0.64091 23 0.00821 
9 10 0.74875 24 0.00857 
7 9 0.82465 25 0.00893 
8 9 0.89536 26 0.00929 
12 13 0.91015 27 0.00964 
7 8 0.92064 28 0.01000 
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Personal Readiness Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 50 0.00303 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 3 0.00358 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 6 0.00466 
6 Food Services 384 18 0.04688 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 509 29 0.05697 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 5 0.12195 
9 Middle East Aviation 40 8 0.20000 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 8 0.04342 1 0.00333 
7 8 0.09652 2 0.00667 
6 7 0.50341 3 0.01000 
 
Inadequate Supervision Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 2 0.00155 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 1 0.00448 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 2 0.01613 
4 Maintenance - Field 486 8 0.01646 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 21 0.02503 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 516 0.03125 
7 Critical Cases 216 8 0.03704 
8 Maintenance - Site 129 7 0.05426 
9 Entertainment 336 22 0.06548 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 15 0.08287 
11 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 11 0.11579 
12 Food Services 384 78 0.20313 
13 Mining - Australian 508 140 0.27559 
14 Middle East Aviation 40 12 0.30000 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 509 177 0.34774 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 26 0.63415 
17 Mining - US 255 173 0.67843 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 8 0.00253 1 0.00048 
4 8 0.01335 2 0.00095 
2 7 0.01612 3 0.00143 
2 6 0.02175 4 0.00190 
2 5 0.05554 5 0.00238 
4 6 0.06299 6 0.00286 
5 8 0.06512 7 0.00333 
4 7 0.09180 8 0.00381 
3 8 0.10162 9 0.00429 
6 8 0.13566 10 0.00476 
2 4 0.18594 11 0.00524 
2 3 0.26151 12 0.00571 
3 7 0.27206 13 0.00619 
4 5 0.30424 14 0.00667 
5 6 0.31002 15 0.00714 
3 6 0.33409 16 0.00762 
5 7 0.33579 17 0.00810 
7 8 0.44776 18 0.00857 
3 5 0.54458 19 0.00905 
6 7 0.62773 20 0.00952 
3 4 0.97928 21 0.01000 
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Inadequate Supervision Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 2 0.00155 
2 Entertainment 336 22 0.06548 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 15 0.08287 
4 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 11 0.11579 
5 Food Services 384 78 0.20313 
6 Mining - Australian 508 140 0.27559 
7 Middle East Aviation 40 12 0.30000 
8 Chinese Military Aviation 509 177 0.34774 
9 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 26 0.63415 
10 Mining - US 255 173 0.67843 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 6 0.01264 1 0.00333 
5 7 0.15389 2 0.00667 
6 7 0.73989 3 0.01000 
 
Planned Inappropriate Operations Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.0000 
2 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.0000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.0000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 0 0.0000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 8 0.0005 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 5 0.0060 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 3 0.0166 
8 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.0250 
9 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 6 0.0269 
10 Entertainment 336 14 0.0417 
11 Chinese Military Aviation 509 24 0.0472 
12 Maintenance - Site 129 10 0.0775 
13 Mining - Australian 508 56 0.1102 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 13 0.1368 
15 Food Services 384 58 0.1510 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 7 0.1707 
17 Mining - US 255 63 0.2471 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 12 0.0083 1 0.0007 
9 12 0.0280 2 0.0013 
7 11 0.0684 3 0.0020 
10 12 0.1177 4 0.0027 
7 10 0.1270 5 0.0033 
11 12 0.1702 6 0.0040 
9 11 0.2035 7 0.0047 
8 12 0.2394 8 0.0053 
9 10 0.3575 9 0.0060 
7 9 0.4841 10 0.0067 
8 11 0.5176 11 0.0073 
8 10 0.6106 12 0.0080 
10 11 0.7065 13 0.0087 
7 8 0.7175 14 0.0093 
8 9 0.9450 15 0.0100 
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Planned Inappropriate Operations Secondary Grouping– Final False 
Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 8 0.00048 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 5 0.00596 
7 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 13 0.13684 
8 Food Services 384 58 0.15104 
9 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 7 0.17073 
10 Mining - US 255 63 0.24706 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
8 10 0.00242 1 0.00167 
7 10 0.02615 2 0.00333 
9 10 0.28573 3 0.00500 
7 9 0.60859 4 0.00667 
7 8 0.72728 5 0.00833 
8 9 0.73917 6 0.01000 
 
Failed to Correct Known Problem Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases FCP p 
1 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 0 0.00000 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 2 0.00012 
9 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
10 Entertainment 336 5 0.01488 
11 Chinese Military Aviation 509 12 0.02358 
12 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
13 Mining - Australian 508 17 0.03346 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 4 0.04211 
15 Food Services 384 26 0.06771 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 8 0.19512 
17 Mining - US 255 101 0.39608 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
9 14 0.01551 1 0.00067 
9 13 0.02262 2 0.00133 
9 11 0.07872 3 0.00200 
10 13 0.09719 4 0.00267 
10 14 0.10132 5 0.00333 
9 12 0.17890 6 0.00400 
9 10 0.25695 7 0.00467 
11 14 0.30187 8 0.00533 
11 13 0.34345 9 0.00600 
10 11 0.37832 10 0.00667 
10 12 0.62925 11 0.00733 
12 14 0.63084 12 0.00800 
13 14 0.67330 13 0.00867 
12 13 0.77244 14 0.00933 
11 12 0.95451 15 0.01000 
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Supervisory Violation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SV p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
4 Mining - Australian 508 0 0.00000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 0 0.00000 
8 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1 0.00006 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 2 0.00238 
11 Entertainment 336 1 0.00298 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 509 8 0.01572 
13 Food Services 384 8 0.02083 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 2 0.02105 
15 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
16 Mining - US 255 26 0.10196 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 22 0.53659 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
10 13 0.00088 1 0.00067 
10 12 0.00568 2 0.00133 
10 14 0.00827 3 0.00200 
10 15 0.01657 4 0.00267 
11 13 0.03143 5 0.00333 
11 14 0.06133 6 0.00400 
11 15 0.07026 7 0.00467 
11 12 0.07744 8 0.00533 
12 13 0.56826 9 0.00600 
12 15 0.65619 10 0.00667 
12 14 0.70831 11 0.00733 
10 11 0.85572 12 0.00800 
13 15 0.86187 13 0.00867 
14 15 0.88702 14 0.00933 
13 14 0.98932 15 0.01000 
 
Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases RM p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 0 0.00000 
3 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 6 0.00036 
5 Mining - Australian 508 3 0.00591 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 1 0.00806 
7 Food Services 384 8 0.02083 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 4 0.02210 
9 Entertainment 336 8 0.02381 
10 Maintenance - Field 486 13 0.02675 
11 Maintenance - Site 129 4 0.03101 
12 Critical Cases 216 7 0.03241 
13 Middle East Aviation 40 5 0.12500 
14 Mining - US 255 33 0.12941 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 509 184 0.36149 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 22 0.53659 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 53 0.55789 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 12 0.00518 1 0.00036 
5 10 0.00905 2 0.00071 
5 11 0.01460 3 0.00107 
5 9 0.02477 4 0.00143 
5 7 0.04547 5 0.00179 
5 8 0.06211 6 0.00214 
6 12 0.15404 7 0.00250 
6 11 0.18995 8 0.00286 
6 10 0.21491 9 0.00321 
6 9 0.27929 10 0.00357 
6 8 0.34307 11 0.00393 
6 7 0.34871 12 0.00429 
7 12 0.38341 13 0.00464 
7 11 0.50830 14 0.00500 
8 12 0.53314 15 0.00536 
9 12 0.54428 16 0.00571 
7 10 0.57240 17 0.00607 
8 11 0.62583 18 0.00643 
9 11 0.66116 19 0.00679 
10 12 0.67747 20 0.00714 
8 10 0.73476 21 0.00750 
5 6 0.78578 22 0.00786 
7 9 0.78694 23 0.00821 
9 10 0.79287 24 0.00857 
10 11 0.79311 25 0.00893 
8 9 0.90197 26 0.00929 
7 8 0.92241 27 0.00964 
11 12 0.94292 28 0.01000 
 
Organizational Climate Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OC p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 384 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
4 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 0 0.00000 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 0 0.00000 
9 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
10 Entertainment 336 1 0.00298 
11 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 4 0.00477 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 509 4 0.00786 
13 Mining - Australian 508 7 0.01378 
14 Mining - US 255 4 0.01569 
15 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
16 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 10 0.10526 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 5 0.12195 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
10 15 0.07026 1 0.00067 
11 14 0.07311 2 0.00133 
11 13 0.07488 3 0.00200 
10 14 0.09474 4 0.00267 
11 15 0.09645 5 0.00333 
10 13 0.11284 6 0.00400 
12 15 0.27183 7 0.00467 
12 14 0.31619 8 0.00533 
12 13 0.36138 9 0.00600 
10 12 0.36512 10 0.00667 
11 12 0.47382 11 0.00733 
13 15 0.56890 12 0.00800 
10 11 0.66991 13 0.00867 
14 15 0.67136 14 0.00933 
13 14 0.83490 15 0.01000 
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 Organizational Process Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 336 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 384 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
4 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 20 0.00121 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 2 0.00155 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 1 0.00806 
8 Maintenance - Field 486 7 0.01440 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 29 0.03456 
10 Critical Cases 216 17 0.07870 
11 Mining - Australian 508 40 0.07874 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 21 0.11602 
13 Chinese Military Aviation 509 76 0.14931 
14 Middle East Aviation 40 6 0.15000 
15 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 33 0.34737 
16 Mining - US 255 119 0.46667 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
11 13 0.00040 1 0.00100 
10 13 0.00932 2 0.00200 
11 14 0.11762 3 0.00300 
11 12 0.12949 4 0.00400 
10 14 0.14749 5 0.00500 
10 12 0.20811 6 0.00600 
12 13 0.26843 7 0.00700 
12 14 0.55261 8 0.00800 
13 14 0.99063 9 0.00900 
10 11 0.99867 10 0.01000 
 
Organizational Process Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 336 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 384 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
4 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 20 0.00121 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 2 0.00155 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 1 0.00806 
8 Maintenance - Field 486 7 0.01440 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 29 0.03456 
10 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 33 0.34737 
11 Mining - US 255 119 0.46667 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 7 0.03226 1 0.00333 
6 7 0.13257 2 0.00667 
5 6 0.73691 3 0.01000 
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APPENDIX B: ACCIDENT BENCHMARKING CALCULATIONS 
Skill-Based Errors Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SBE p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 77 0.53846 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 33 0.54098 
3 Food Services 328 179 0.54573 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 232 0.59184 
5 Mining - Australian 475 296 0.62316 
6 Critical Cases 161 101 0.62733 
7 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 22 0.62857 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 499 0.64056 
9 Middle East Aviation 31 21 0.67742 
10 Maintenance - Site 87 59 0.67816 
11 Chinese Military Aviation 325 226 0.69538 
12 Mining - US 242 172 0.71074 
13 Entertainment 173 126 0.72832 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 35 0.72917 
15 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 9554 0.76334 
16 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 613 0.80552 
17 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 137 0.86709 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 13 0.00046 1 0.00013 
1 12 0.00063 2 0.00026 
1 11 0.00106 3 0.00038 
4 13 0.00191 4 0.00051 
4 12 0.00249 5 0.00064 
4 11 0.00406 6 0.00077 
2 13 0.00702 7 0.00090 
2 12 0.01131 8 0.00103 
5 13 0.01296 9 0.00115 
2 11 0.01852 10 0.00128 
5 12 0.01984 11 0.00141 
1 14 0.02027 12 0.00154 
1 8 0.02046 13 0.00167 
8 13 0.02789 14 0.00179 
5 11 0.03511 15 0.00192 
1 10 0.03662 16 0.00205 
2 14 0.04407 17 0.00218 
8 12 0.04453 18 0.00231 
6 13 0.04810 19 0.00244 
4 14 0.06598 20 0.00256 
1 5 0.06949 21 0.00269 
6 12 0.07934 22 0.00282 
8 11 0.08039 23 0.00295 
2 10 0.09031 24 0.00308 
4 8 0.10422 25 0.00321 
1 6 0.11644 26 0.00333 
2 8 0.12013 27 0.00346 
6 11 0.13230 28 0.00359 
4 10 0.13578 29 0.00372 
5 14 0.14647 30 0.00385 
1 9 0.15733 31 0.00397 
6 14 0.19397 32 0.00410 
2 9 0.20902 33 0.00423 
8 14 0.21291 34 0.00436 
2 5 0.21463 35 0.00449 
7 13 0.23485 36 0.00462 
2 6 0.24036 37 0.00474 
1 4 0.26868 38 0.00487 
7 12 0.32125 39 0.00500 
5 10 0.32816 40 0.00513 
7 14 0.32918 41 0.00526 
1 7 0.33619 42 0.00538 
4 5 0.34689 43 0.00551 
4 9 0.34947 44 0.00564 
10 13 0.39955 45 0.00577 
2 7 0.40370 46 0.00590 
7 11 0.41722 47 0.00603 
6 10 0.42463 48 0.00615 
4 6 0.43853 49 0.00628 
11 13 0.44198 50 0.00641 
2 4 0.45335 51 0.00654 
8 10 0.48720 52 0.00667 
5 8 0.53478 53 0.00679 
10 14 0.53730 54 0.00692 
5 9 0.54511 55 0.00705 
9 13 0.56079 56 0.00718 
10 12 0.56871 57 0.00731 
6 9 0.59570 58 0.00744 
7 10 0.59994 59 0.00756 
9 14 0.62105 60 0.00769 
11 14 0.63363 61 0.00782 
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4 7 0.67145 62 0.00795 
8 9 0.67467 63 0.00808 
7 9 0.67766 64 0.00821 
11 12 0.69249 65 0.00833 
12 13 0.69474 66 0.00846 
9 12 0.70112 67 0.00859 
6 8 0.75035 68 0.00872 
10 11 0.75733 69 0.00885 
12 14 0.79643 70 0.00897 
9 11 0.83573 71 0.00910 
7 8 0.88502 72 0.00923 
5 6 0.92476 73 0.00936 
5 7 0.94913 74 0.00949 
1 2 0.97361 75 0.00962 
6 7 0.98901 76 0.00974 
13 14 0.99073 77 0.00987 
9 10 0.99395 78 0.01000 
 
Decision Errors Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 11 0.00034 1 0.00028 
9 11 0.00064 2 0.00056 
4 11 0.00081 3 0.00083 
4 13 0.00267 4 0.00111 
4 10 0.00324 5 0.00139 
4 14 0.00534 6 0.00167 
6 11 0.00675 7 0.00194 
7 10 0.00701 8 0.00222 
8 11 0.00791 9 0.00250 
6 13 0.00843 10 0.00278 
7 13 0.00884 11 0.00306 
6 14 0.01282 12 0.00333 
6 10 0.01482 13 0.00361 
9 10 0.01606 14 0.00389 
9 13 0.01718 15 0.00417 
7 14 0.01868 16 0.00444 
8 13 0.01920 17 0.00472 
8 10 0.02954 18 0.00500 
8 14 0.03085 19 0.00528 
9 14 0.03237 20 0.00556 
4 9 0.10051 21 0.00583 
4 7 0.22708 22 0.00611 
6 9 0.23066 23 0.00639 
4 8 0.24376 24 0.00667 
11 14 0.39064 25 0.00694 
6 8 0.39525 26 0.00722 
10 14 0.39553 27 0.00750 
6 7 0.39768 28 0.00778 
11 13 0.41854 29 0.00806 
10 13 0.42863 30 0.00833 
7 9 0.47249 31 0.00861 
8 9 0.69915 32 0.00889 
4 6 0.86946 33 0.00917 
13 14 0.87363 34 0.00944 
7 8 0.90617 35 0.00972 
10 11 0.94437 36 0.01000 
 
 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases DE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 149 0.19580 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 32 0.20253 
3 Entertainment 173 45 0.26012 
4 Maintenance - Site 87 26 0.29885 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 3771 0.30129 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 19 0.31148 
7 Maintenance - Field 392 144 0.36735 
8 Critical Cases 161 60 0.37267 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 303 0.38896 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 71 0.49650 
11 Food Services 328 164 0.50000 
12 Mining - Australian 475 248 0.52211 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
14 Middle East Aviation 31 18 0.58065 
15 Mining - US 242 160 0.66116 
16 Chinese Military Aviation 325 223 0.68615 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 28 0.80000 
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Perceptual Errors Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PE p 
1 Mining - US 242 2 0.00826 
2 Entertainment 173 3 0.01734 
3 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 14 0.03571 
5 Critical Cases 161 6 0.03727 
6 Food Services 328 14 0.04268 
7 Mining - Australian 475 26 0.05474 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 4 0.06557 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 10 0.06993 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 56 0.07189 
11 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 55 0.07227 
12 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 946 0.07558 
13 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 19 0.12025 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 12 0.25000 
15 Middle East Aviation 31 10 0.32258 
16 Chinese Military Aviation 325 116 0.35692 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 13 0.37143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 12 0.00305 1 0.00018 
2 12 0.00382 2 0.00036 
2 11 0.00688 3 0.00055 
2 10 0.00711 4 0.00073 
4 11 0.01317 5 0.00091 
4 10 0.01374 6 0.00109 
2 9 0.01914 7 0.00127 
6 12 0.02531 8 0.00145 
2 7 0.04168 9 0.00164 
2 8 0.05725 10 0.00182 
3 12 0.06380 11 0.00200 
6 11 0.06592 12 0.00218 
5 12 0.06680 13 0.00236 
6 10 0.06830 14 0.00255 
3 11 0.08201 15 0.00273 
3 10 0.08355 16 0.00291 
7 12 0.09008 17 0.00309 
4 9 0.09065 18 0.00327 
5 11 0.10448 19 0.00345 
5 10 0.10715 20 0.00364 
3 9 0.12054 21 0.00382 
2 6 0.13633 22 0.00400 
4 7 0.18389 23 0.00418 
3 8 0.19601 24 0.00436 
5 9 0.20303 25 0.00455 
3 7 0.21084 26 0.00473 
6 9 0.21629 27 0.00491 
7 11 0.22556 28 0.00509 
7 10 0.23338 29 0.00527 
2 4 0.23867 30 0.00545 
2 5 0.26112 31 0.00564 
4 8 0.26674 32 0.00582 
5 8 0.36400 33 0.00600 
5 7 0.38084 34 0.00618 
3 6 0.39631 35 0.00636 
6 8 0.43452 36 0.00655 
6 7 0.44026 37 0.00673 
7 9 0.49647 38 0.00691 
3 5 0.54362 39 0.00709 
3 4 0.55011 40 0.00727 
4 6 0.63003 41 0.00745 
10 12 0.70456 42 0.00764 
7 8 0.72887 43 0.00782 
11 12 0.73704 44 0.00800 
2 3 0.75438 45 0.00818 
8 12 0.76790 46 0.00836 
5 6 0.77628 47 0.00855 
9 12 0.79919 48 0.00873 
8 11 0.84535 49 0.00891 
8 10 0.85372 50 0.00909 
8 9 0.91029 51 0.00927 
9 11 0.92072 52 0.00945 
4 5 0.92920 53 0.00964 
9 10 0.93350 54 0.00982 
10 11 0.97662 55 0.01000 
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Perceptual Errors Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PE p 
1 Mining - US 242 2 0.00826 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 19 0.12025 
3 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 12 0.25000 
4 Middle East Aviation 31 10 0.32258 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 325 116 0.35692 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 13 0.37143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 5 0.14526 1 0.00167 
3 6 0.23374 2 0.00333 
3 4 0.48223 3 0.00500 
4 6 0.67766 4 0.00667 
4 5 0.70242 5 0.00833 
5 6 0.86498 6 0.01000 
 
Violations Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases V p 
1 Mining - Australian 475 21 0.04421 
2 Maintenance - Site 87 4 0.04598 
3 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 10 0.06329 
4 Entertainment 173 11 0.06358 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 49 0.06439 
6 Maintenance - Field 392 29 0.07398 
7 Critical Cases 161 17 0.10559 
8 Mining - US 242 29 0.11983 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 1774 0.14174 
10 Food Services 328 47 0.14329 
11 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 9 0.18750 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 31 0.21678 
13 Middle East Aviation 31 8 0.25806 
14 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 16 0.26230 
15 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 205 0.26316 
16 Chinese Military Aviation 325 160 0.49231 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 24 0.68571 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 9 0.00014 1 0.00028 
6 10 0.00257 2 0.00056 
4 9 0.00332 3 0.00083 
3 9 0.00484 4 0.00111 
2 11 0.00763 5 0.00139 
4 10 0.00802 6 0.00167 
4 11 0.00811 7 0.00194 
6 11 0.00822 8 0.00222 
3 11 0.00920 9 0.00250 
3 10 0.01024 10 0.00278 
2 9 0.01056 11 0.00306 
2 10 0.01397 12 0.00333 
2 8 0.04921 13 0.00361 
6 8 0.05170 14 0.00389 
4 8 0.05557 15 0.00417 
3 8 0.06237 16 0.00444 
2 7 0.10757 17 0.00472 
7 11 0.13126 18 0.00500 
4 7 0.16631 19 0.00528 
3 7 0.17477 20 0.00556 
7 9 0.19072 21 0.00583 
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8 11 0.20440 22 0.00611 
6 7 0.22139 23 0.00639 
7 10 0.24536 24 0.00667 
8 9 0.33263 25 0.00694 
2 6 0.35086 26 0.00722 
9 11 0.36451 27 0.00750 
8 10 0.41545 28 0.00778 
10 11 0.42170 29 0.00806 
2 4 0.56560 30 0.00833 
2 3 0.57635 31 0.00861 
4 6 0.65700 32 0.00889 
3 6 0.65856 33 0.00917 
7 8 0.65960 34 0.00944 
9 10 0.93651 35 0.00972 
3 4 0.99129 36 0.01000 
 
Violations Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases V p 
1 Mining - Australian 475 21 0.04421 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 49 0.06439 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 31 0.21678 
4 Middle East Aviation 31 8 0.25806 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 16 0.26230 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 205 0.26316 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 325 160 0.49231 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 24 0.68571 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.24278 1 0.00167 
3 5 0.47971 2 0.00333 
3 4 0.61731 3 0.00500 
4 6 0.94963 4 0.00667 
4 5 0.96516 5 0.00833 
5 6 0.98824 6 0.01000 
 
Physical Environment Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 5 0.10417 
2 Middle East Aviation 31 4 0.12903 
3 Chinese Military Aviation 325 44 0.13538 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 55 0.14031 
5 Critical Cases 161 26 0.16149 
6 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 41 0.25949 
7 Entertainment 173 47 0.27168 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 18 0.29508 
9 Maintenance - Site 87 29 0.33333 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 55 0.38462 
11 Mining - Australian 475 183 0.38526 
12 Food Services 328 139 0.42378 
13 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 333 0.43758 
14 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 5616 0.44871 
15 Mining - US 242 130 0.53719 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
17 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 493 0.63286 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
11 14 0.00633 1 0.00036 
8 16 0.00770 2 0.00071 
9 16 0.01525 3 0.00107 
8 14 0.01609 4 0.00143 
11 16 0.02990 5 0.00179 
8 13 0.03039 6 0.00214 
9 14 0.03104 7 0.00250 
10 16 0.04484 8 0.00286 
8 12 0.05993 9 0.00321 
9 13 0.06256 10 0.00357 
11 13 0.06963 11 0.00393 
12 16 0.09422 12 0.00429 
13 16 0.11912 13 0.00464 
10 14 0.12541 14 0.00500 
9 12 0.12652 15 0.00536 
14 16 0.14494 16 0.00571 
8 11 0.17082 17 0.00607 
8 10 0.22196 18 0.00643 
10 13 0.24035 19 0.00679 
11 12 0.27365 20 0.00714 
9 11 0.35824 21 0.00750 
12 14 0.37021 22 0.00786 
10 12 0.42714 23 0.00821 
9 10 0.43344 24 0.00857 
13 14 0.54910 25 0.00893 
8 9 0.62270 26 0.00929 
12 13 0.67327 27 0.00964 
10 11 0.98887 28 0.01000 
 
Physical Environment Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 5 0.10417 
2 Middle East Aviation 31 4 0.12903 
3 Chinese Military Aviation 325 44 0.13538 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 55 0.14031 
5 Critical Cases 161 26 0.16149 
6 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 41 0.25949 
7 Entertainment 173 47 0.27168 
8 Mining - US 242 130 0.53719 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 493 0.63286 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 5 0.32672 1 0.00100 
3 5 0.44043 2 0.00200 
1 4 0.49104 3 0.00300 
4 5 0.52213 4 0.00400 
1 3 0.55007 5 0.00500 
2 5 0.64855 6 0.00600 
1 2 0.73411 7 0.00700 
3 4 0.84918 8 0.00800 
2 4 0.86154 9 0.00900 
2 3 0.92118 10 0.01000 
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Technological Environment Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases TE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 4 0.00032 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 1 0.00131 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 3 0.00385 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 3 0.02098 
6 Middle East Aviation 31 2 0.06452 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 325 22 0.06769 
8 Maintenance - Site 87 6 0.06897 
9 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 19 0.12025 
10 Entertainment 173 23 0.13295 
11 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 5 0.14286 
12 Maintenance - Field 392 70 0.17857 
13 Food Services 328 60 0.18293 
14 Critical Cases 161 32 0.19876 
15 Mining - Australian 475 165 0.34737 
16 Mining - US 242 140 0.57851 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 32 0.66667 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
8 14 0.00677 1 0.00036 
8 13 0.00977 2 0.00071 
8 12 0.01136 3 0.00107 
9 14 0.05577 4 0.00143 
6 14 0.07298 5 0.00179 
9 13 0.07941 6 0.00214 
9 12 0.09288 7 0.00250 
6 13 0.09548 8 0.00286 
6 12 0.10381 9 0.00321 
10 14 0.10515 10 0.00357 
8 10 0.12201 11 0.00393 
10 13 0.15253 12 0.00429 
10 12 0.17768 13 0.00464 
8 11 0.19744 14 0.00500 
8 9 0.20440 15 0.00536 
6 10 0.28462 16 0.00571 
6 11 0.30227 17 0.00607 
6 9 0.36660 18 0.00643 
11 14 0.44371 19 0.00679 
11 13 0.55672 20 0.00714 
12 14 0.57820 21 0.00750 
11 12 0.59471 22 0.00786 
13 14 0.67380 23 0.00821 
9 11 0.71386 24 0.00857 
9 10 0.72890 25 0.00893 
10 11 0.87553 26 0.00929 
12 13 0.87973 27 0.00964 
6 8 0.93257 28 0.01000 
 
Adverse Mental State Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 Critical Cases 161 2 0.01242 
2 Mining - US 242 7 0.02893 
3 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 5 0.03165 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 31 0.04074 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 807 0.06448 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 4 0.06557 
8 Maintenance - Field 392 27 0.06888 
9 Entertainment 173 12 0.06936 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 57 0.07317 
11 Maintenance - Site 87 8 0.09195 
12 Mining - Australian 475 56 0.11789 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 9 0.25714 
14 Middle East Aviation 31 8 0.25806 
15 Food Services 328 91 0.27744 
16 Chinese Military Aviation 325 171 0.52615 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 11 0.00238 1 0.00018 
1 10 0.00381 2 0.00036 
5 10 0.00611 3 0.00055 
1 8 0.00682 4 0.00073 
1 6 0.00725 5 0.00091 
5 6 0.00892 6 0.00109 
1 9 0.00947 7 0.00127 
2 10 0.01313 8 0.00145 
2 11 0.01565 9 0.00164 
2 6 0.02500 10 0.00182 
1 7 0.02925 11 0.00200 
2 8 0.03006 12 0.00218 
5 11 0.03073 13 0.00236 
5 8 0.03836 14 0.00255 
3 11 0.04388 15 0.00273 
2 9 0.05199 16 0.00291 
3 10 0.05554 17 0.00309 
4 11 0.06952 18 0.00327 
1 5 0.07893 19 0.00345 
3 8 0.09144 20 0.00364 
4 10 0.09358 21 0.00382 
3 6 0.09398 22 0.00400 
5 9 0.10484 23 0.00418 
3 9 0.12046 24 0.00436 
4 8 0.14324 25 0.00455 
4 6 0.15207 26 0.00473 
2 7 0.17144 27 0.00491 
4 9 0.17733 28 0.00509 
1 4 0.19089 29 0.00527 
1 3 0.24130 30 0.00545 
3 7 0.25687 31 0.00564 
1 2 0.27213 32 0.00582 
6 11 0.29905 33 0.00600 
4 7 0.32973 34 0.00618 
6 10 0.33956 35 0.00636 
5 7 0.35525 36 0.00655 
2 5 0.40191 37 0.00673 
8 11 0.45434 38 0.00691 
9 11 0.51892 39 0.00709 
10 11 0.52827 40 0.00727 
7 11 0.56277 41 0.00745 
3 5 0.59199 42 0.00764 
6 8 0.72713 43 0.00782 
2 4 0.74178 44 0.00800 
4 5 0.74609 45 0.00818 
8 10 0.78819 46 0.00836 
6 9 0.79503 47 0.00855 
7 10 0.82573 48 0.00873 
9 10 0.86133 49 0.00891 
3 4 0.87251 50 0.00909 
2 3 0.87612 51 0.00927 
7 9 0.91967 52 0.00945 
7 8 0.92426 53 0.00964 
6 7 0.97226 54 0.00982 
8 9 0.98322 55 0.01000 
 
Adverse Mental State Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 Mining - Australian 475 56 0.11789 
2 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 9 0.25714 
3 Middle East Aviation 31 8 0.25806 
4 Food Services 328 91 0.27744 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 325 171 0.52615 
6 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 4 0.79835 1 0.00333 
3 4 0.81753 2 0.00667 
2 3 0.99318 3 0.01000 
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Adverse Physiological State Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 14 0.00473 1 0.00011 
6 11 0.00540 2 0.00022 
1 11 0.00778 3 0.00033 
6 14 0.02423 4 0.00044 
1 13 0.03780 5 0.00055 
1 9 0.04036 6 0.00066 
5 11 0.04072 7 0.00077 
5 14 0.04875 8 0.00088 
1 10 0.05236 9 0.00099 
1 12 0.05385 10 0.00110 
4 14 0.05814 11 0.00121 
2 14 0.07202 12 0.00132 
4 11 0.07218 13 0.00143 
3 14 0.07589 14 0.00154 
1 8 0.08951 15 0.00165 
2 11 0.10332 16 0.00176 
3 11 0.10858 17 0.00187 
6 9 0.15729 18 0.00198 
1 7 0.18376 19 0.00209 
9 11 0.18781 20 0.00220 
2 13 0.19087 21 0.00231 
3 13 0.19705 22 0.00242 
1 6 0.21581 23 0.00253 
4 13 0.22763 24 0.00264 
2 12 0.23287 25 0.00275 
9 14 0.23588 26 0.00286 
3 12 0.23972 27 0.00297 
4 9 0.24314 28 0.00308 
2 9 0.24408 29 0.00319 
5 9 0.24731 30 0.00330 
2 10 0.24875 31 0.00341 
3 9 0.25281 32 0.00352 
1 5 0.25360 33 0.00363 
3 10 0.25652 34 0.00374 
6 13 0.26284 35 0.00385 
5 13 0.27408 36 0.00396 
4 12 0.27796 37 0.00407 
4 10 0.28247 38 0.00418 
6 10 0.30717 39 0.00429 
8 14 0.32086 40 0.00440 
6 12 0.32314 41 0.00451 
5 10 0.33208 42 0.00462 
5 12 0.33313 43 0.00473 
2 8 0.35012 44 0.00484 
3 8 0.35974 45 0.00495 
1 4 0.39969 46 0.00505 
4 8 0.40338 47 0.00516 
8 11 0.43186 48 0.00527 
6 8 0.45236 49 0.00538 
7 14 0.47228 50 0.00549 
2 7 0.47352 51 0.00560 
5 8 0.47965 52 0.00571 
3 7 0.48276 53 0.00582 
11 14 0.56444 54 0.00593 
4 7 0.56660 55 0.00604 
8 13 0.58119 56 0.00615 
1 3 0.60153 57 0.00626 
7 11 0.60750 58 0.00637 
10 14 0.60811 59 0.00648 
9 13 0.60990 60 0.00659 
1 2 0.61145 61 0.00670 
2 6 0.61403 62 0.00681 
7 13 0.62186 63 0.00692 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases APS p 
1 Chinese Military Aviation 325 1 0.00308 
2 Critical Cases 161 1 0.00621 
3 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 1 0.00633 
4 Mining - US 242 2 0.00826 
5 Maintenance - Field 392 4 0.01020 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 8 0.01051 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 1 0.01639 
8 Entertainment 173 3 0.01734 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 15 0.01926 
10 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
11 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 339 0.02709 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 1 0.02857 
13 Middle East Aviation 31 1 0.03226 
14 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
15 Mining - Australian 475 25 0.05263 
16 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 5 0.10417 
17 Food Services 328 53 0.16159 
179 
3 6 0.62703 64 0.00703 
2 5 0.65225 65 0.00714 
8 12 0.65907 66 0.00725 
3 5 0.66483 67 0.00736 
5 7 0.66690 68 0.00747 
6 7 0.67106 69 0.00758 
7 12 0.68761 70 0.00769 
9 12 0.69772 71 0.00780 
8 10 0.75438 72 0.00791 
4 6 0.75915 73 0.00802 
10 13 0.77830 74 0.00813 
7 10 0.77929 75 0.00824 
4 5 0.80642 76 0.00835 
9 10 0.81184 77 0.00846 
2 4 0.81431 78 0.00857 
10 11 0.81444 79 0.00868 
3 4 0.82640 80 0.00879 
12 14 0.85099 81 0.00890 
10 12 0.85708 82 0.00901 
11 13 0.85938 83 0.00912 
8 9 0.86718 84 0.00923 
7 9 0.87487 85 0.00934 
12 13 0.93051 86 0.00945 
13 14 0.94031 87 0.00956 
11 12 0.95687 88 0.00967 
7 8 0.96084 89 0.00978 
5 6 0.96101 90 0.00989 
2 3 0.98935 91 0.01000 
 
Physical Mental Limitation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 Maintenance - Field 392 1 0.00255 
2 Critical Cases 161 1 0.00621 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 18 0.02365 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 2 0.03279 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 36 0.04621 
7 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 3 0.08571 
8 Mining - US 242 24 0.09917 
9 Mining - Australian 475 51 0.10737 
10 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 1545 0.12344 
11 Maintenance - Site 87 12 0.13793 
12 Middle East Aviation 31 6 0.19355 
13 Food Services 328 71 0.21646 
14 Chinese Military Aviation 325 72 0.22154 
15 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 11 0.22917 
16 Entertainment 173 40 0.23121 
17 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 54 0.34177 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
8 15 0.01155 1 0.00048 
9 15 0.01285 2 0.00095 
10 15 0.02646 3 0.00143 
7 15 0.08480 4 0.00190 
8 12 0.11369 5 0.00238 
9 12 0.14144 6 0.00286 
11 15 0.17711 7 0.00333 
7 12 0.20265 8 0.00381 
10 12 0.23623 9 0.00429 
8 10 0.25488 10 0.00476 
9 10 0.29488 11 0.00524 
8 11 0.32061 12 0.00571 
9 11 0.40614 13 0.00619 
7 11 0.42696 14 0.00667 
11 12 0.45959 15 0.00714 
7 10 0.49787 16 0.00762 
10 11 0.68233 17 0.00810 
7 9 0.68782 18 0.00857 
12 15 0.70680 19 0.00905 
8 9 0.73458 20 0.00952 
7 8 0.80187 21 0.01000 
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Physical Mental Limitation Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 Maintenance - Field 392 1 0.00255 
2 Critical Cases 161 1 0.00621 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 18 0.02365 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 2 0.03279 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 36 0.04621 
7 Food Services 328 71 0.21646 
8 Chinese Military Aviation 325 72 0.22154 
9 Entertainment 173 40 0.23121 
10 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 54 0.34177 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.01611 1 0.00100 
2 6 0.01749 2 0.00200 
2 5 0.07202 3 0.00300 
2 4 0.12579 4 0.00400 
2 3 0.15698 5 0.00500 
3 5 0.43059 6 0.00600 
5 6 0.54865 7 0.00700 
4 6 0.62704 8 0.00800 
3 4 0.65596 9 0.00900 
4 5 0.93763 10 0.01000 
 
Crew Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Site 87 3 0.03448 
3 Entertainment 173 6 0.03468 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 48 0.06307 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 51 0.06547 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 923 0.07375 
7 Maintenance - Field 392 32 0.08163 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 5 0.08197 
9 Critical Cases 161 14 0.08696 
10 Middle East Aviation 31 3 0.09677 
11 Food Services 328 42 0.12805 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 22 0.15385 
13 Mining - US 242 41 0.16942 
14 Mining - Australian 475 114 0.24000 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 325 134 0.41231 
16 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 21 0.43750 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 7 0.04001 1 0.00028 
3 9 0.04422 2 0.00056 
3 6 0.05012 3 0.00083 
2 9 0.11860 4 0.00111 
3 10 0.12107 5 0.00139 
3 5 0.12261 6 0.00167 
2 7 0.12634 7 0.00194 
3 8 0.13354 8 0.00222 
3 4 0.14865 9 0.00250 
2 6 0.16189 10 0.00278 
2 10 0.17523 11 0.00306 
2 8 0.20858 12 0.00333 
4 7 0.24011 13 0.00361 
2 5 0.25695 14 0.00389 
4 9 0.27167 15 0.00417 
181 
4 6 0.27232 16 0.00444 
2 4 0.28795 17 0.00472 
5 7 0.30908 18 0.00500 
5 9 0.32792 19 0.00528 
5 6 0.38966 20 0.00556 
4 10 0.45367 21 0.00583 
5 10 0.49318 22 0.00611 
6 9 0.52437 23 0.00639 
6 7 0.55689 24 0.00667 
4 8 0.56322 25 0.00694 
5 8 0.61886 26 0.00722 
6 10 0.62427 27 0.00750 
7 10 0.76831 28 0.00778 
6 8 0.80643 29 0.00806 
8 10 0.81169 30 0.00833 
7 9 0.83683 31 0.00861 
4 5 0.84815 32 0.00889 
9 10 0.86014 33 0.00917 
8 9 0.90557 34 0.00944 
7 8 0.99292 35 0.00972 
2 3 0.99338 36 0.01000 
 
Crew Resource Management Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 328 42 0.12805 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 22 0.15385 
4 Mining - US 242 41 0.16942 
5 Mining - Australian 475 114 0.24000 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 325 134 0.41231 
7 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 21 0.43750 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 5 0.02924 1 0.00333 
4 5 0.02993 2 0.00667 
3 4 0.68978 3 0.01000 
 
Personal Readiness Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Field 392 1 0.00255 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 3 0.00385 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 49 0.00391 
6 Mining - Australian 475 2 0.00421 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 1 0.00633 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 5 0.00657 
9 Critical Cases 161 3 0.01863 
10 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 1 0.02083 
11 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
12 Entertainment 173 5 0.02890 
13 Mining - US 242 7 0.02893 
14 Food Services 328 14 0.04268 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 325 28 0.08615 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 5 0.14286 
17 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
182 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 12 0.00109 1 0.00028 
3 12 0.00486 2 0.00056 
6 12 0.00715 3 0.00083 
8 12 0.00999 4 0.00111 
4 11 0.02545 5 0.00139 
3 11 0.02882 6 0.00167 
4 9 0.03203 7 0.00194 
3 9 0.04261 8 0.00222 
6 11 0.05543 9 0.00250 
6 9 0.07333 10 0.00278 
3 10 0.07551 11 0.00306 
4 10 0.09978 12 0.00333 
8 11 0.10886 13 0.00361 
7 12 0.12416 14 0.00389 
8 9 0.13377 15 0.00417 
6 10 0.14614 16 0.00444 
7 11 0.25652 17 0.00472 
8 10 0.26398 18 0.00500 
7 9 0.32342 19 0.00528 
3 8 0.36889 20 0.00556 
7 10 0.36944 21 0.00583 
4 8 0.45800 22 0.00611 
3 7 0.50537 23 0.00639 
9 12 0.53970 24 0.00667 
6 8 0.59074 25 0.00694 
4 7 0.66312 26 0.00722 
3 6 0.67876 27 0.00750 
3 4 0.71898 28 0.00778 
6 7 0.73696 29 0.00806 
10 12 0.76088 30 0.00833 
11 12 0.78104 31 0.00861 
9 11 0.81587 32 0.00889 
4 6 0.92195 33 0.00917 
9 10 0.92223 34 0.00944 
10 11 0.93519 35 0.00972 
7 8 0.97267 36 0.01000 
 
Personal Readiness Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.0000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.0000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 49 0.0039 
4 Mining - US 242 7 0.0289 
5 Food Services 328 14 0.0427 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 325 28 0.0862 
7 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 5 0.1429 
8 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.1613 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 8 0.0048 1 0.0017 
5 7 0.0114 2 0.0033 
5 6 0.0236 3 0.0050 
6 8 0.1681 4 0.0067 
6 7 0.2693 5 0.0083 
7 8 0.8349 6 0.0100 
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Inadequate Supervision Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 2 0.00263 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 1 0.00633 
3 Maintenance - Field 392 7 0.01786 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 20 0.02567 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 2 0.03279 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 471 0.03763 
7 Entertainment 173 7 0.04046 
8 Critical Cases 161 7 0.04348 
9 Maintenance - Site 87 4 0.04598 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 12 0.08392 
11 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
12 Food Services 328 66 0.20122 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 11 0.22917 
14 Mining - Australian 475 130 0.27368 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 325 153 0.47077 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 23 0.65714 
17 Mining - US 242 160 0.66116 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 8 0.03387 1 0.00036 
2 9 0.03569 2 0.00071 
2 6 0.03893 3 0.00107 
3 6 0.04119 4 0.00143 
2 7 0.04341 5 0.00179 
3 8 0.08143 6 0.00214 
4 6 0.08597 7 0.00250 
3 7 0.11112 8 0.00286 
3 9 0.11319 9 0.00321 
2 5 0.13104 10 0.00357 
2 4 0.13417 11 0.00393 
4 8 0.21822 12 0.00429 
4 9 0.27388 13 0.00464 
4 7 0.28917 14 0.00500 
2 3 0.30688 15 0.00536 
3 4 0.40032 16 0.00571 
3 5 0.43697 17 0.00607 
6 9 0.68378 18 0.00643 
5 9 0.68880 19 0.00679 
6 8 0.69878 20 0.00714 
5 8 0.71843 21 0.00750 
4 5 0.73763 22 0.00786 
5 7 0.78867 23 0.00821 
7 9 0.83488 24 0.00857 
5 6 0.84272 25 0.00893 
6 7 0.84602 26 0.00929 
7 8 0.89069 27 0.00964 
8 9 0.92732 28 0.01000 
 
Inadequate Supervision Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 2 0.00263 
2 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 12 0.08392 
3 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
4 Food Services 328 66 0.20122 
5 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 11 0.22917 
6 Mining - Australian 475 130 0.27368 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 325 153 0.47077 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 23 0.65714 
9 Mining - US 242 160 0.66116 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 6 0.01878 1 0.00167 
3 6 0.17042 2 0.00333 
3 5 0.46356 3 0.00500 
5 6 0.50773 4 0.00667 
3 4 0.59369 5 0.00833 
4 5 0.65406 6 0.01000 
 
Planned Inappropriate Operations Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 392 0 0.00000 
3 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 7 0.00056 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 4 0.00513 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 2 0.01399 
9 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 3 0.01899 
10 Entertainment 173 4 0.02312 
11 Maintenance - Site 87 5 0.05747 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 325 23 0.07077 
13 Mining - Australian 475 50 0.10526 
14 Food Services 328 52 0.15854 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 7 0.20000 
16 Mining - US 242 62 0.25620 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 13 0.27083 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
8 12 0.01186 1 0.00100 
9 12 0.01799 2 0.00200 
10 12 0.02537 3 0.00300 
8 11 0.06263 4 0.00400 
9 11 0.10482 5 0.00500 
10 11 0.15281 6 0.00600 
8 10 0.55368 7 0.00700 
11 12 0.66159 8 0.00800 
8 9 0.73459 9 0.00900 
9 10 0.79401 10 0.01000 
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Planned Inappropriate Operations Secondary Grouping– Final False 
Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 392 0 0.00000 
3 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 7 0.00056 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 4 0.00513 
8 Mining - Australian 475 50 0.10526 
9 Food Services 328 52 0.15854 
10 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 7 0.20000 
11 Mining - US 242 62 0.25620 
12 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 13 0.27083 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
9 11 0.00396 1 0.00167 
9 12 0.05465 2 0.00333 
10 12 0.45618 3 0.00500 
10 11 0.47243 4 0.00667 
9 10 0.52738 5 0.00833 
11 12 0.83247 6 0.01000 
 
Fail to Correct Problem Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases FCP p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 392 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
4 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 0 0.00000 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 0 0.00000 
9 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
10 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 1 0.00008 
11 Entertainment 173 4 0.02312 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 325 9 0.02769 
13 Mining - Australian 475 14 0.02947 
14 Food Services 328 25 0.07622 
15 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 4 0.08333 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 7 0.20000 
17 Mining - US 242 94 0.38843 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
 
 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
13 14 0.00245 1 0.00100 
12 14 0.00526 2 0.00200 
11 14 0.01553 3 0.00300 
186 
11 15 0.04815 4 0.00400 
12 15 0.04977 5 0.00500 
13 15 0.05109 6 0.00600 
11 13 0.66335 7 0.00700 
11 12 0.76067 8 0.00800 
14 15 0.86301 9 0.00900 
12 13 0.88227 10 0.01000 
 
Supervisory Violation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SV p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 392 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
4 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
5 Mining - Australian 475 0 0.00000 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 0 0.00000 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 0 0.00000 
10 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
11 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 2 0.00257 
12 Entertainment 173 1 0.00578 
13 Chinese Military Aviation 325 7 0.02154 
14 Food Services 328 8 0.02439 
15 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 2 0.04167 
16 Mining - US 242 25 0.10331 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
12 15 0.05730 1 0.00167 
12 14 0.13592 2 0.00333 
12 13 0.18292 3 0.00500 
13 15 0.39627 4 0.00667 
14 15 0.48718 5 0.00833 
13 14 0.80784 6 0.01000 
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Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases RM p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 0 0.00000 
4 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 5 0.00040 
6 Mining - Australian 475 3 0.00632 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 1 0.00699 
8 Entertainment 173 2 0.01156 
9 Food Services 328 7 0.02134 
10 Maintenance - Field 392 9 0.02296 
11 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
12 Critical Cases 161 4 0.02484 
13 Middle East Aviation 31 1 0.03226 
14 Mining - US 242 30 0.12397 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 325 73 0.22462 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 21 0.60000 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 33 0.68750 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 10 0.03683 1 0.00036 
6 12 0.05148 2 0.00071 
6 9 0.05912 3 0.00107 
6 13 0.11405 4 0.00143 
6 11 0.12787 5 0.00179 
7 12 0.22191 6 0.00214 
7 10 0.22754 7 0.00250 
7 13 0.23155 8 0.00286 
7 9 0.26781 9 0.00321 
7 11 0.29981 10 0.00357 
8 12 0.36107 11 0.00393 
8 10 0.36609 12 0.00429 
8 13 0.37799 13 0.00464 
8 9 0.43322 14 0.00500 
8 11 0.47991 15 0.00536 
6 8 0.49968 16 0.00571 
7 8 0.67685 17 0.00607 
9 13 0.69388 18 0.00643 
10 13 0.74287 19 0.00679 
11 13 0.77830 20 0.00714 
9 12 0.80606 21 0.00750 
12 13 0.81240 22 0.00786 
9 10 0.88340 23 0.00821 
10 12 0.89423 24 0.00857 
9 11 0.92530 25 0.00893 
11 12 0.92766 26 0.00929 
6 7 0.92945 27 0.00964 
10 11 0.99868 28 0.01000 
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Organizational Climate Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OC p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Entertainment 173 0 0.00000 
3 Food Services 328 0 0.00000 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 0 0.00000 
5 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
6 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 0 0.00000 
10 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 0 0.00000 
11 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 3 0.00385 
13 Chinese Military Aviation 325 3 0.00923 
14 Mining - Australian 475 7 0.01474 
15 Mining - US 242 4 0.01653 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 4 0.11429 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 10 0.20833 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
12 14 0.03552 1 0.00167 
12 15 0.03683 2 0.00333 
12 13 0.26782 3 0.00500 
13 15 0.43632 4 0.00667 
13 14 0.49118 5 0.00833 
14 15 0.85353 6 0.01000 
 
Organizational Process Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 173 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 328 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
5 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 18 0.00144 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 2 0.00263 
8 Maintenance - Field 392 5 0.01276 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 22 0.02824 
10 Critical Cases 161 10 0.06211 
11 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 9 0.06294 
12 Mining - Australian 475 38 0.08000 
13 Middle East Aviation 31 3 0.09677 
14 Chinese Military Aviation 325 59 0.18154 
15 Mining - US 242 110 0.45455 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 19 0.54286 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
10 12 0.45773 1 0.00167 
10 13 0.48180 2 0.00333 
11 12 0.49978 3 0.00500 
11 13 0.50030 4 0.00667 
12 13 0.74018 5 0.00833 
10 11 0.97633 6 0.01000 
 
Organizational Process Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 173 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 328 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
5 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 18 0.00144 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 2 0.00263 
8 Maintenance - Field 392 5 0.01276 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 22 0.02824 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 325 59 0.18154 
11 Mining - US 242 110 0.45455 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 19 0.54286 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
11 13 0.17114 1 0.00333 
11 12 0.32759 2 0.00667 
12 13 0.85888 3 0.01000 
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APPENDIX C: FILTERING CALCULATIONS 
Unsafe Acts Tier – Accident and Near Miss Cases 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases UA p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 61 0.49194 
2 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 48 0.50526 
3 Entertainment 336 173 0.51488 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 761 0.59084 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 509 325 0.63851 
6 Maintenance - Site 129 87 0.67442 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 158 0.70852 
8 Critical Cases 216 161 0.74537 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 12516 0.75804 
10 Middle East Aviation 40 31 0.77500 
11 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 143 0.79006 
12 Maintenance - Field 486 392 0.80658 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 35 0.85366 
14 Food Services 384 328 0.85417 
15 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 779 0.92849 
16 Mining - Australian 508 475 0.93504 
17 Mining - US 255 242 0.94902 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 12 0.00130 1 0.00036 
7 12 0.00365 2 0.00071 
9 12 0.01360 3 0.00107 
6 11 0.02182 4 0.00143 
6 13 0.02635 5 0.00179 
6 9 0.02731 6 0.00214 
7 13 0.05407 7 0.00250 
7 11 0.06149 8 0.00286 
8 12 0.06715 9 0.00321 
7 9 0.08661 10 0.00357 
8 13 0.13516 11 0.00393 
9 13 0.15320 12 0.00429 
6 8 0.15609 13 0.00464 
6 10 0.22599 14 0.00500 
8 11 0.29510 15 0.00536 
9 11 0.31695 16 0.00571 
11 13 0.35628 17 0.00607 
10 13 0.36221 18 0.00643 
7 8 0.38644 19 0.00679 
7 10 0.38924 20 0.00714 
12 13 0.46038 21 0.00750 
6 7 0.50272 22 0.00786 
10 12 0.62848 23 0.00821 
11 12 0.63376 24 0.00857 
8 9 0.66584 25 0.00893 
8 10 0.69098 26 0.00929 
9 10 0.80246 27 0.00964 
10 11 0.83321 28 0.01000 
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Preconditions for Unsafe Acts Tier – Accident and Near Miss Cases 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PUA p 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 43 0.45263 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 57 0.45968 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 253 0.52058 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 686 0.53261 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 9427 0.57095 
6 Critical Cases 216 125 0.57870 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 106 0.58564 
8 Middle East Aviation 40 26 0.65000 
9 Chinese Military Aviation 509 332 0.65226 
10 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 148 0.66368 
11 Maintenance - Site 129 91 0.70543 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 610 0.72706 
13 Entertainment 336 269 0.80060 
14 Mining - Australian 508 408 0.80315 
15 Food Services 384 318 0.82813 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 34 0.82927 
17 Mining - US 255 229 0.89804 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 5 0.00746 1 0.00036 
2 5 0.01265 2 0.00071 
1 5 0.02018 3 0.00107 
3 5 0.02706 4 0.00143 
2 7 0.03030 5 0.00179 
2 6 0.03416 6 0.00214 
1 7 0.03518 7 0.00250 
1 8 0.03619 8 0.00286 
2 8 0.03631 9 0.00321 
1 6 0.03990 10 0.00357 
3 8 0.11490 11 0.00393 
2 4 0.12032 12 0.00429 
1 4 0.13187 13 0.00464 
3 7 0.13396 14 0.00500 
4 8 0.14259 15 0.00536 
3 6 0.15391 16 0.00571 
4 7 0.18020 17 0.00607 
4 6 0.20849 18 0.00643 
1 3 0.22567 19 0.00679 
2 3 0.22598 20 0.00714 
5 8 0.31301 21 0.00750 
6 8 0.39974 22 0.00786 
7 8 0.45256 23 0.00821 
3 4 0.65067 24 0.00857 
5 7 0.69140 25 0.00893 
5 6 0.81912 26 0.00929 
6 7 0.88909 27 0.00964 
1 2 0.91737 28 0.01000 
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Unsafe Supervision Tier – Accident and Near Miss Cases 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SUP p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 2 0.00155 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 2 0.01613 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 8 0.01646 
4 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 7 0.03139 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 524 0.03174 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 28 0.03337 
7 Critical Cases 216 9 0.04167 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 18 0.09945 
9 Entertainment 336 40 0.11905 
10 Maintenance - Site 129 17 0.13178 
11 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 22 0.23158 
12 Middle East Aviation 40 12 0.30000 
13 Mining - Australian 508 179 0.35236 
14 Food Services 384 139 0.36198 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 509 186 0.36542 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 31 0.75610 
17 Mining - US 255 218 0.85490 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 7 0.04495 1 0.00067 
3 5 0.05663 2 0.00133 
3 6 0.06802 3 0.00200 
3 4 0.19962 4 0.00267 
2 7 0.20018 5 0.00333 
2 6 0.30223 6 0.00400 
2 5 0.32242 7 0.00467 
2 4 0.39139 8 0.00533 
5 7 0.40906 9 0.00600 
6 7 0.55460 10 0.00667 
4 7 0.56569 11 0.00733 
5 6 0.79217 12 0.00800 
4 6 0.88279 13 0.00867 
4 5 0.97662 14 0.00933 
2 3 0.97928 15 0.01000 
 
Organizational Influence Tier – Accident and Near Miss Cases 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases ORG p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 2 0.00155 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 26 0.00157 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 2 0.01613 
5 Food Services 384 8 0.02083 
6 Entertainment 336 9 0.02679 
7 Maintenance - Site 129 4 0.03101 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 33 0.03933 
9 Maintenance - Field 486 20 0.04115 
10 Mining - Australian 508 45 0.08858 
11 Critical Cases 216 21 0.09722 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 25 0.13812 
13 Middle East Aviation 40 10 0.25000 
14 Chinese Military Aviation 509 231 0.45383 
15 Mining - US 255 138 0.54118 
16 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 58 0.61053 
17 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 28 0.68293 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 9 0.09176 1 0.00067 
5 8 0.09530 2 0.00133 
4 9 0.18222 3 0.00200 
4 8 0.19750 4 0.00267 
6 9 0.27238 5 0.00333 
6 8 0.29519 6 0.00400 
4 7 0.43686 7 0.00467 
4 6 0.50679 8 0.00533 
5 7 0.50830 9 0.00600 
7 9 0.59687 10 0.00667 
5 6 0.59973 11 0.00733 
7 8 0.64616 12 0.00800 
4 5 0.74302 13 0.00867 
6 7 0.80470 14 0.00933 
8 9 0.87059 15 0.01000 
 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts Tier – Accident Cases 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PUA p 
1 Maintenance - Field 392 161 0.41071 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 26 0.42623 
3 Critical Cases 161 73 0.45342 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 392 0.51511 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 80 0.55944 
6 Maintenance - Site 87 50 0.57471 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 7426 0.59332 
8 Entertainment 173 107 0.61850 
9 Middle East Aviation 31 20 0.64516 
10 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 103 0.65190 
11 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 556 0.71374 
12 Mining - Australian 475 380 0.80000 
13 Food Services 328 265 0.80793 
14 Chinese Military Aviation 325 265 0.81538 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 31 0.88571 
16 Mining - US 242 216 0.89256 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 43 0.89583 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 10 0.00234 1 0.00048 
2 7 0.00806 2 0.00095 
2 8 0.00914 3 0.00143 
2 9 0.04713 4 0.00190 
2 6 0.07525 5 0.00238 
2 5 0.08125 6 0.00286 
5 10 0.10084 7 0.00333 
7 10 0.13622 8 0.00381 
6 10 0.23251 9 0.00429 
5 8 0.28772 10 0.00476 
5 9 0.38148 11 0.00524 
5 7 0.41222 12 0.00571 
6 9 0.49295 13 0.00619 
6 8 0.49580 14 0.00667 
7 8 0.50310 15 0.00714 
8 10 0.52851 16 0.00762 
7 9 0.55727 17 0.00810 
6 7 0.72477 18 0.00857 
8 9 0.77792 19 0.00905 
5 6 0.82075 20 0.00952 
9 10 0.94264 21 0.01000 
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Unsafe Supervision Tier – Accident Cases 
 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 11 0.00115 1 0.00048 
3 9 0.00800 2 0.00095 
3 10 0.00903 3 0.00143 
3 8 0.01041 4 0.00190 
7 11 0.01308 5 0.00238 
4 11 0.02800 6 0.00286 
7 9 0.06181 7 0.00333 
7 10 0.06657 8 0.00381 
7 8 0.07717 9 0.00429 
4 10 0.10671 10 0.00476 
4 9 0.11325 11 0.00524 
4 8 0.13245 12 0.00571 
8 11 0.24567 13 0.00619 
9 11 0.30496 14 0.00667 
3 7 0.37409 15 0.00714 
10 11 0.39247 16 0.00762 
4 7 0.71843 17 0.00810 
3 4 0.76144 18 0.00857 
8 10 0.77723 19 0.00905 
8 9 0.87013 20 0.00952 
9 10 0.89185 21 0.01000 
 
Organizational Influence Tier – Accident Cases 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases ORG p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 23 0.00184 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 2 0.00263 
5 Entertainment 173 2 0.01156 
6 Food Services 328 7 0.02134 
7 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 25 0.03209 
9 Maintenance - Field 392 14 0.03571 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 10 0.06993 
11 Critical Cases 161 12 0.07453 
12 Mining - Australian 475 43 0.09053 
13 Middle East Aviation 31 4 0.12903 
14 Chinese Military Aviation 325 110 0.33846 
15 Mining - US 242 128 0.52893 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 26 0.74286 
17 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 38 0.79167 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SUP p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 2 0.00263 
2 Maintenance - Field 392 7 0.01786 
3 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 4 0.02532 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 2 0.03279 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 26 0.03338 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 477 0.03811 
7 Critical Cases 161 7 0.04348 
8 Entertainment 173 16 0.09249 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 14 0.09790 
10 Maintenance - Site 87 9 0.10345 
11 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
12 Mining - Australian 475 163 0.34316 
13 Food Services 328 123 0.37500 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 22 0.45833 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 325 159 0.48923 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 28 0.80000 
17 Mining - US 242 205 0.84711 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 13 0.00036 1 0.00036 
6 13 0.00088 2 0.00071 
5 11 0.00411 3 0.00107 
6 11 0.00423 4 0.00143 
8 13 0.00439 5 0.00179 
5 10 0.00689 6 0.00214 
6 10 0.00933 7 0.00250 
8 11 0.01170 8 0.00286 
9 13 0.01321 9 0.00321 
7 13 0.02102 10 0.00357 
8 10 0.02953 11 0.00393 
9 11 0.05009 12 0.00429 
9 10 0.09065 13 0.00464 
7 11 0.09325 14 0.00500 
5 9 0.11066 15 0.00536 
7 10 0.12054 16 0.00571 
5 8 0.14114 17 0.00607 
6 9 0.25370 18 0.00643 
10 13 0.27276 19 0.00679 
11 13 0.31474 20 0.00714 
6 8 0.32962 21 0.00750 
5 6 0.43322 22 0.00786 
5 7 0.47991 23 0.00821 
7 9 0.55011 24 0.00857 
7 8 0.64308 25 0.00893 
8 9 0.74445 26 0.00929 
10 11 0.87710 27 0.00964 
6 7 0.92530 28 0.01000 
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APPENDIX D: ACCIDENT AND NEAR MISS FILTERED BENCHMARKING 
CALCULATIONS 
Skill-Based Error Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SBE p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 77 0.42541 
2 Food Services 384 179 0.46615 
3 Critical Cases 216 101 0.46759 
4 Maintenance - Field 486 232 0.47737 
5 Middle East Aviation 40 21 0.52500 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 22 0.53659 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 9554 0.57864 
8 Mining - Australian 508 296 0.58268 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 499 0.59476 
10 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 137 0.61435 
11 Mining - US 255 172 0.67451 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 9 0.00076 1 0.00048 
3 7 0.00103 2 0.00095 
3 10 0.00203 3 0.00143 
3 8 0.00441 4 0.00190 
7 10 0.28337 5 0.00238 
5 10 0.28801 6 0.00286 
6 10 0.34976 7 0.00333 
7 9 0.35643 8 0.00381 
5 9 0.38056 9 0.00429 
3 6 0.41751 10 0.00476 
8 10 0.42234 11 0.00524 
6 9 0.45928 12 0.00571 
5 8 0.47693 13 0.00619 
5 7 0.49256 14 0.00667 
3 5 0.50429 15 0.00714 
6 8 0.56525 16 0.00762 
6 7 0.58595 17 0.00810 
9 10 0.59568 18 0.00857 
8 9 0.66220 19 0.00905 
7 8 0.85612 20 0.00952 
5 6 0.91680 21 0.01000 
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Skill-Based Error Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SBE p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 77 0.42541 
2 Food Services 384 179 0.46615 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 232 0.47737 
4 Mining - US 255 172 0.67451 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 3 0.23151 1 0.00333 
1 2 0.36413 2 0.00667 
2 3 0.74202 3 0.01000 
 
Decision Error Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases DE p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 32 0.1435 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 3771 0.2284 
3 Critical Cases 216 60 0.2778 
4 Maintenance - Field 486 144 0.2963 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 303 0.3611 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 71 0.3923 
7 Food Services 384 164 0.4271 
8 Middle East Aviation 40 18 0.4500 
9 Mining - Australian 508 248 0.4882 
10 Mining - US 255 160 0.6275 
11 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 28 0.6829 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.0157 1 0.0010 
4 5 0.0161 2 0.0020 
4 6 0.0184 3 0.0030 
3 5 0.0215 4 0.0040 
3 8 0.0297 5 0.0050 
4 8 0.0430 6 0.0060 
5 8 0.2542 7 0.0070 
5 6 0.4307 8 0.0080 
6 8 0.5004 9 0.0090 
3 4 0.6179 10 0.0100 
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Decision Error Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases DE p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 32 0.14350 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 3771 0.22839 
3 Food Services 384 164 0.42708 
4 Mining - Australian 508 248 0.48819 
5 Mining - US 255 160 0.62745 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 28 0.68293 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 5 0.00027 1 0.00333 
4 6 0.01644 2 0.00667 
5 6 0.49341 3 0.01000 
 
Perceptual Error Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PE p 
1 Mining - US 255 2 0.00784 
2 Critical Cases 216 6 0.02778 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 14 0.02881 
4 Food Services 384 14 0.03646 
5 Mining - Australian 508 26 0.05118 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 10 0.05525 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 946 0.05730 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 56 0.06675 
9 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 19 0.08520 
10 Middle East Aviation 40 10 0.25000 
11 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 13 0.31707 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 9 0.00093 1 0.00036 
3 8 0.00293 2 0.00071 
3 7 0.00733 3 0.00107 
2 9 0.00944 4 0.00143 
4 9 0.01067 5 0.00179 
2 8 0.02989 6 0.00214 
4 8 0.03432 7 0.00250 
2 7 0.06283 8 0.00286 
3 5 0.07277 9 0.00321 
7 9 0.07577 10 0.00357 
5 9 0.07806 11 0.00393 
4 7 0.08123 12 0.00429 
3 6 0.10301 13 0.00464 
2 5 0.16098 14 0.00500 
2 6 0.16570 15 0.00536 
6 9 0.24610 16 0.00571 
5 8 0.24688 17 0.00607 
7 8 0.25229 18 0.00643 
4 5 0.29280 19 0.00679 
4 6 0.30143 20 0.00714 
8 9 0.33899 21 0.00750 
3 4 0.52543 22 0.00786 
5 7 0.55861 23 0.00821 
6 8 0.56850 24 0.00857 
2 4 0.56965 25 0.00893 
5 6 0.83277 26 0.00929 
6 7 0.90619 27 0.00964 
2 3 0.93972 28 0.01000 
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 Violation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases V p 
1 Mining - Australian 508 21 0.04134 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 10 0.04484 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 29 0.05967 
4 Critical Cases 216 17 0.07870 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1774 0.10744 
6 Mining - US 255 29 0.11373 
7 Food Services 384 47 0.12240 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 31 0.17127 
9 Middle East Aviation 40 8 0.20000 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 205 0.24434 
11 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 24 0.58537 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 8 0.00484 1 0.00067 
5 8 0.00596 2 0.00133 
4 9 0.01760 3 0.00200 
5 9 0.05926 4 0.00267 
6 8 0.08567 5 0.00333 
4 7 0.09608 6 0.00400 
7 8 0.11608 7 0.00467 
6 9 0.12559 8 0.00533 
7 9 0.16448 9 0.00600 
4 5 0.17472 10 0.00667 
4 6 0.20204 11 0.00733 
5 7 0.35028 12 0.00800 
8 9 0.66622 13 0.00867 
6 7 0.74022 14 0.00933 
5 6 0.74796 15 0.01000 
 
Violation Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases V p 
1 Mining - Australian 508 21 0.041339 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 10 0.044843 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 29 0.059671 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 205 0.244338 
5 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 24 0.585366 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 3 0.186213 1 0.003333 
2 3 0.421351 2 0.006667 
1 2 0.828607 3 0.010000 
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Physical Environment Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Middle East Aviation 40 4 0.10000 
2 Chinese Military Aviation 509 74 0.14538 
3 Critical Cases 216 32 0.14815 
4 Maintenance - Field 486 74 0.15226 
5 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 46 0.20628 
6 Entertainment 336 115 0.34226 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 67 0.37017 
8 Maintenance - Site 129 48 0.37209 
9 Mining - Australian 508 196 0.38583 
10 Food Services 384 161 0.41927 
11 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 7154 0.43329 
12 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 597 0.46351 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
14 Mining - US 255 142 0.55686 
15 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 525 0.62574 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
9 12 0.00283 1 0.00048 
7 12 0.01814 2 0.00095 
9 11 0.03341 3 0.00143 
11 12 0.03512 4 0.00190 
8 12 0.04683 5 0.00238 
7 11 0.08824 6 0.00286 
7 13 0.09320 7 0.00333 
9 13 0.11138 8 0.00381 
8 13 0.11153 9 0.00429 
10 12 0.12642 10 0.00476 
8 11 0.16231 11 0.00524 
10 13 0.25304 12 0.00571 
7 10 0.26694 13 0.00619 
11 13 0.30853 14 0.00667 
9 10 0.31276 15 0.00714 
8 10 0.34542 16 0.00762 
12 13 0.53836 17 0.00810 
10 11 0.58370 18 0.00857 
7 9 0.70959 19 0.00905 
8 9 0.77446 20 0.00952 
7 8 0.97238 21 0.01000 
 
Physical Environment Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Middle East Aviation 40 4 0.10000 
2 Chinese Military Aviation 509 74 0.14538 
3 Critical Cases 216 32 0.14815 
4 Maintenance - Field 486 74 0.15226 
5 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 46 0.20628 
6 Entertainment 336 115 0.34226 
7 Mining - US 255 142 0.55686 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 525 0.62574 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 5 0.04054 1 0.00100 
4 5 0.07492 2 0.00200 
3 5 0.11116 3 0.00300 
1 5 0.11471 4 0.00400 
1 4 0.37131 5 0.00500 
1 3 0.42104 6 0.00600 
1 2 0.42859 7 0.00700 
2 4 0.76046 8 0.00800 
3 4 0.88823 9 0.00900 
2 3 0.92322 10 0.01000 
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Technological Environment Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases TE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 9 0.00055 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 1 0.00078 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 4 0.00477 
4 Middle East Aviation 40 2 0.05000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 11 0.06077 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 509 44 0.08644 
7 Maintenance - Site 129 14 0.10853 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 7 0.17073 
9 Food Services 384 73 0.19010 
10 Entertainment 336 64 0.19048 
11 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 54 0.24215 
12 Maintenance - Field 486 141 0.29012 
13 Critical Cases 216 74 0.34259 
14 Mining - Australian 508 181 0.35630 
15 Mining - US 255 149 0.58431 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 11 0.00221 1 0.00067 
4 11 0.00627 2 0.00133 
4 9 0.02711 3 0.00200 
4 10 0.02726 4 0.00267 
7 9 0.03267 5 0.00333 
7 10 0.03421 6 0.00400 
4 8 0.08388 7 0.00467 
9 11 0.12855 8 0.00533 
10 11 0.14263 9 0.00600 
4 7 0.26932 10 0.00667 
7 8 0.29167 11 0.00733 
8 11 0.31869 12 0.00800 
8 10 0.76016 13 0.00867 
8 9 0.76293 14 0.00933 
9 10 0.98988 15 0.01000 
 
Adverse Mental State Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 Critical Cases 216 2 0.00926 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 5 0.02242 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 31 0.02407 
4 Mining - US 255 8 0.03137 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
6 Entertainment 336 13 0.03869 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 859 0.05203 
8 Maintenance - Field 486 30 0.06173 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 60 0.07151 
10 Maintenance - Site 129 11 0.08527 
11 Mining - Australian 508 57 0.11220 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 9 0.21951 
13 Food Services 384 97 0.25260 
14 Middle East Aviation 40 11 0.27500 
15 Chinese Military Aviation 509 184 0.36149 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 10 0.00638 1 0.00036 
2 9 0.00656 2 0.00071 
7 9 0.01395 3 0.00107 
4 9 0.02007 4 0.00143 
4 10 0.02143 5 0.00179 
2 8 0.02487 6 0.00214 
6 9 0.03519 7 0.00250 
6 10 0.04208 8 0.00286 
5 10 0.04693 9 0.00321 
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2 7 0.04720 10 0.00357 
5 9 0.05706 11 0.00393 
4 8 0.07511 12 0.00429 
7 10 0.09108 13 0.00464 
4 7 0.13941 14 0.00500 
6 8 0.14474 15 0.00536 
5 8 0.14637 16 0.00571 
5 7 0.25451 17 0.00607 
6 7 0.27470 18 0.00643 
2 6 0.28598 19 0.00679 
8 10 0.34062 20 0.00714 
7 8 0.34369 21 0.00750 
8 9 0.49510 22 0.00786 
2 5 0.50998 23 0.00821 
2 4 0.54836 24 0.00857 
9 10 0.57685 25 0.00893 
4 6 0.63410 26 0.00929 
5 6 0.74940 27 0.00964 
4 5 0.91742 28 0.01000 
 
Adverse Mental State Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 Critical Cases 216 2 0.00926 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 31 0.02407 
3 Mining - Australian 508 57 0.11220 
4 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 9 0.21951 
5 Food Services 384 97 0.25260 
6 Middle East Aviation 40 11 0.27500 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 509 184 0.36149 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 6 0.56259 1 0.00333 
4 5 0.64157 2 0.00667 
5 6 0.75703 3 0.01000 
 
Adverse Physiological State Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases APS p 
1 Chinese Military Aviation 509 2 0.00393 
2 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
3 Mining - US 255 2 0.00784 
4 Maintenance - Field 486 4 0.00823 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 11 0.00854 
6 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 2 0.00897 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 18 0.02145 
8 Maintenance - Site 129 3 0.02326 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 400 0.02423 
10 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 1 0.02439 
11 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
12 Entertainment 336 11 0.03274 
13 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
14 Mining - Australian 508 30 0.05906 
15 Food Services 384 60 0.15625 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 9 0.00031 1 0.00011 
5 12 0.00063 2 0.00022 
1 12 0.00087 3 0.00033 
1 13 0.00161 4 0.00044 
1 9 0.00298 5 0.00055 
5 13 0.00375 6 0.00066 
4 12 0.00986 7 0.00077 
1 7 0.00988 8 0.00088 
5 7 0.01207 9 0.00099 
4 13 0.01853 10 0.00110 
4 9 0.02251 11 0.00121 
1 8 0.02618 12 0.00132 
2 12 0.02710 13 0.00143 
2 13 0.03152 14 0.00154 
3 12 0.04099 15 0.00165 
3 13 0.05238 16 0.00176 
2 9 0.06139 17 0.00187 
6 12 0.06786 18 0.00198 
4 7 0.06946 19 0.00209 
1 11 0.08175 20 0.00220 
6 13 0.08277 21 0.00231 
1 10 0.08704 22 0.00242 
3 9 0.08968 23 0.00253 
2 7 0.09729 24 0.00264 
5 8 0.10716 25 0.00275 
2 8 0.11789 26 0.00286 
6 9 0.13939 27 0.00297 
4 8 0.15268 28 0.00308 
3 7 0.15538 29 0.00319 
2 11 0.17890 30 0.00330 
2 10 0.18681 31 0.00341 
3 8 0.20826 32 0.00352 
6 7 0.22279 33 0.00363 
7 12 0.25994 34 0.00374 
6 8 0.27506 35 0.00385 
5 11 0.27863 36 0.00396 
5 10 0.29087 37 0.00407 
4 11 0.29342 38 0.00418 
1 5 0.29868 39 0.00429 
4 10 0.30536 40 0.00440 
3 11 0.31464 41 0.00451 
9 12 0.31673 42 0.00462 
3 10 0.32618 43 0.00473 
7 13 0.34649 44 0.00484 
6 11 0.37930 45 0.00495 
1 4 0.38103 46 0.00505 
6 10 0.39186 47 0.00516 
1 6 0.39464 48 0.00527 
9 13 0.43832 49 0.00538 
1 3 0.47964 50 0.00549 
2 5 0.54994 51 0.00560 
2 6 0.58116 52 0.00571 
8 12 0.59214 53 0.00582 
2 4 0.60054 54 0.00593 
8 13 0.60908 55 0.00604 
7 9 0.60946 56 0.00615 
2 3 0.66224 57 0.00626 
10 13 0.77197 58 0.00637 
10 12 0.77376 59 0.00648 
11 13 0.78998 60 0.00659 
11 12 0.79240 61 0.00670 
7 11 0.88024 62 0.00681 
3 6 0.89280 63 0.00692 
1 2 0.89312 64 0.00703 
7 8 0.89596 65 0.00714 
7 10 0.89949 66 0.00725 
7 10 0.89949 67 0.00736 
3 5 0.91138 68 0.00747 
3 5 0.91138 69 0.00758 
4 6 0.92064 70 0.00769 
4 6 0.92064 71 0.00780 
8 9 0.94306 72 0.00791 
8 9 0.94306 73 0.00802 
5 6 0.94903 74 0.00813 
5 6 0.94903 75 0.00824 
4 5 0.94930 76 0.00835 
4 5 0.94930 77 0.00846 
8 11 0.94945 78 0.00857 
8 11 0.94945 79 0.00868 
3 4 0.95543 80 0.00879 
3 4 0.95543 81 0.00890 
8 10 0.96670 82 0.00901 
8 10 0.96670 83 0.00912 
9 11 0.97464 84 0.00923 
9 11 0.97464 85 0.00934 
12 13 0.98005 86 0.00945 
12 13 0.98005 87 0.00956 
10 11 0.98589 88 0.00967 
10 11 0.98589 89 0.00978 
9 10 0.99456 90 0.00989 
9 10 0.99456 91 0.01000 
 
 
204 
Physical Mental Limitation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 Maintenance - Field 486 1 0.00206 
2 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 25 0.01941 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 39 0.04648 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 3 0.07317 
7 Mining - US 255 24 0.09412 
8 Mining - Australian 508 54 0.10630 
9 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1757 0.10641 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 509 73 0.14342 
11 Middle East Aviation 40 6 0.15000 
12 Maintenance - Site 129 26 0.20155 
13 Food Services 384 91 0.23698 
14 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 61 0.27354 
15 Entertainment 336 109 0.32440 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
9 12 0.00050 1 0.00048 
7 12 0.00313 2 0.00095 
8 12 0.00355 3 0.00143 
9 10 0.00794 4 0.00190 
7 10 0.05359 5 0.00238 
6 12 0.05695 6 0.00286 
8 10 0.07339 7 0.00333 
10 12 0.10336 8 0.00381 
6 10 0.20987 9 0.00429 
6 11 0.27132 10 0.00476 
7 11 0.27696 11 0.00524 
9 11 0.37214 12 0.00571 
8 11 0.39409 13 0.00619 
11 12 0.46719 14 0.00667 
6 9 0.49041 15 0.00714 
6 8 0.50353 16 0.00762 
7 9 0.52713 17 0.00810 
7 8 0.60033 18 0.00857 
6 7 0.66546 19 0.00905 
10 11 0.90908 20 0.00952 
8 9 0.99341 21 0.01000 
 
Physical Mental Limitation Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 Maintenance - Field 486 1 0.00206 
2 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 25 0.01941 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 6 0.03315 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 39 0.04648 
6 Food Services 384 91 0.23698 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 61 0.27354 
8 Entertainment 336 109 0.32440 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 8 0.00898 1 0.00333 
7 8 0.20053 2 0.00667 
6 7 0.31616 3 0.01000 
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Crew Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
2 Entertainment 336 16 0.04762 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 9 0.06977 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 95 0.07376 
5 Maintenance - Field 486 38 0.07819 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1403 0.08497 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 75 0.08939 
8 Critical Cases 216 21 0.09722 
9 Food Services 384 46 0.11979 
10 Middle East Aviation 40 6 0.15000 
11 Mining - US 255 44 0.17255 
12 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 34 0.18785 
13 Mining - Australian 508 123 0.24213 
14 Chinese Military Aviation 509 146 0.28684 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 9 0.00057 1 0.00028 
4 9 0.00438 2 0.00056 
2 10 0.00911 3 0.00083 
2 6 0.01466 4 0.00111 
2 7 0.01549 5 0.00139 
6 9 0.01601 6 0.00167 
2 8 0.02294 7 0.00194 
5 9 0.03911 8 0.00222 
4 10 0.07322 9 0.00250 
2 5 0.08200 10 0.00278 
2 4 0.09085 11 0.00306 
7 9 0.09843 12 0.00333 
3 9 0.11209 13 0.00361 
5 10 0.11484 14 0.00389 
3 10 0.11902 15 0.00417 
6 10 0.14105 16 0.00444 
4 6 0.16259 17 0.00472 
4 7 0.19377 18 0.00500 
7 10 0.19540 19 0.00528 
4 8 0.23163 20 0.00556 
8 10 0.31817 21 0.00583 
2 3 0.34310 22 0.00611 
3 8 0.38122 23 0.00639 
8 9 0.39949 24 0.00667 
5 8 0.40155 25 0.00694 
3 7 0.46104 26 0.00722 
5 7 0.48166 27 0.00750 
6 8 0.52161 28 0.00778 
3 6 0.53700 29 0.00806 
9 10 0.57938 30 0.00833 
5 6 0.59667 31 0.00861 
6 7 0.65470 32 0.00889 
7 8 0.72122 33 0.00917 
3 5 0.74892 34 0.00944 
4 5 0.75193 35 0.00972 
3 4 0.86840 36 0.01000 
 
Crew Resource Management Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
2 Mining - US 255 44 0.17255 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 34 0.18785 
4 Mining - Australian 508 123 0.24213 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 509 146 0.28684 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 4 0.02834 1 0.00333 
3 4 0.13493 2 0.00667 
2 3 0.68134 3 0.01000 
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Personal Readiness Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 50 0.00303 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 3 0.00358 
4 Mining - Australian 508 2 0.00394 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 137 1288 6 0.00466 
6 Maintenance - Field 486 4 0.00823 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 2 0.00897 
8 Maintenance - Site 129 2 0.01550 
9 Critical Cases 216 5 0.02315 
10 Entertainment 336 10 0.02976 
11 Mining - US 255 8 0.03137 
12 Food Services 384 18 0.04688 
13 Chinese Military Aviation 509 29 0.05697 
14 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 5 0.12195 
15 Middle East Aviation 40 8 0.20000 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 8 0.01144 1 0.00048 
2 6 0.04458 2 0.00095 
3 8 0.07849 3 0.00143 
2 7 0.11339 4 0.00190 
5 8 0.11702 5 0.00238 
4 8 0.13750 6 0.00286 
3 6 0.25999 7 0.00333 
3 7 0.29571 8 0.00381 
2 5 0.31436 9 0.00429 
5 6 0.37013 10 0.00476 
4 6 0.38236 11 0.00524 
4 7 0.39583 12 0.00571 
5 7 0.41286 13 0.00619 
6 8 0.45498 14 0.00667 
7 8 0.57726 15 0.00714 
3 5 0.70694 16 0.00762 
2 4 0.71472 17 0.00810 
2 3 0.77926 18 0.00857 
4 5 0.83619 19 0.00905 
3 4 0.91583 20 0.00952 
6 7 0.92064 21 0.01000 
 
Personal Readiness Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
2 Critical Cases 216 5 0.02315 
3 Entertainment 336 10 0.02976 
4 Mining - US 255 8 0.03137 
4 Food Services 384 18 0.04688 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 509 29 0.05697 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 5 0.12195 
7 Middle East Aviation 40 8 0.20000 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 6 0.00271 1 0.00100 
3 6 0.00436 2 0.00200 
4 6 0.04342 3 0.00300 
2 5 0.04880 4 0.00400 
3 5 0.06502 5 0.00500 
5 6 0.09652 6 0.00600 
2 4 0.14623 7 0.00700 
3 4 0.23604 8 0.00800 
4 5 0.50341 9 0.00900 
2 3 0.64091 10 0.01000 
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Inadequate Supervision Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 1 0.00448 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 2 0.01613 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 8 0.01646 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 21 0.02503 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 516 0.03125 
6 Critical Cases 216 8 0.03704 
7 Maintenance - Site 129 7 0.05426 
8 Entertainment 336 22 0.06548 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 15 0.08287 
10 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 11 0.11579 
11 Food Services 384 78 0.20313 
12 Mining - Australian 508 140 0.27559 
13 Middle East Aviation 40 12 0.30000 
14 Chinese Military Aviation 509 177 0.34774 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 26 0.63415 
16 Mining - US 255 173 0.67843 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 7 0.00253 1 0.00048 
3 7 0.01335 2 0.00095 
1 6 0.01612 3 0.00143 
1 5 0.02175 4 0.00190 
1 4 0.05554 5 0.00238 
3 5 0.06299 6 0.00286 
4 7 0.06512 7 0.00333 
3 6 0.09180 8 0.00381 
2 7 0.10162 9 0.00429 
5 7 0.13566 10 0.00476 
1 3 0.18594 11 0.00524 
1 2 0.26151 12 0.00571 
2 6 0.27206 13 0.00619 
3 4 0.30424 14 0.00667 
4 5 0.31002 15 0.00714 
2 5 0.33409 16 0.00762 
4 6 0.33579 17 0.00810 
6 7 0.44776 18 0.00857 
2 4 0.54458 19 0.00905 
5 6 0.62773 20 0.00952 
2 3 0.97928 21 0.01000 
 
Inadequate Supervision Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 Entertainment 336 22 0.06548 
2 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 15 0.08287 
3 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 11 0.11579 
4 Food Services 384 78 0.20313 
5 Mining - Australian 508 140 0.27559 
6 Middle East Aviation 40 12 0.30000 
7 Chinese Military Aviation 509 177 0.34774 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 26 0.63415 
9 Mining - US 255 173 0.67843 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 5 0.01264 1 0.00333 
4 6 0.15389 2 0.00667 
5 6 0.73989 3 0.01000 
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Planned Inappropriate Operations Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 8 0.00048 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 5 0.00596 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 3 0.01657 
7 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
8 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 6 0.02691 
9 Entertainment 336 14 0.04167 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 509 24 0.04715 
11 Maintenance - Site 129 10 0.07752 
12 Mining - Australian 508 56 0.11024 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 13 0.13684 
14 Food Services 384 58 0.15104 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 7 0.17073 
16 Mining - US 255 63 0.24706 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 11 0.00832 1 0.00067 
8 11 0.02805 2 0.00133 
6 10 0.06844 3 0.00200 
9 11 0.11769 4 0.00267 
6 9 0.12699 5 0.00333 
10 11 0.17019 6 0.00400 
8 10 0.20350 7 0.00467 
7 11 0.23943 8 0.00533 
8 9 0.35753 9 0.00600 
6 8 0.48411 10 0.00667 
7 10 0.51760 11 0.00733 
7 9 0.61065 12 0.00800 
9 10 0.70654 13 0.00867 
6 7 0.71755 14 0.00933 
7 8 0.94502 15 0.01000 
 
Planned Inappropriate Operations Secondary Grouping– Final False 
Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 8 0.00048 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 5 0.00596 
6 Mining - Australian 508 56 0.11024 
7 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 13 0.13684 
8 Food Services 384 58 0.15104 
9 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 7 0.17073 
10 Mining - US 255 63 0.24706 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 8 0.07070 1 0.00167 
6 9 0.24237 2 0.00333 
6 7 0.45463 3 0.00500 
7 9 0.60859 4 0.00667 
7 8 0.72728 5 0.00833 
8 9 0.73917 6 0.01000 
Fail to Correct Known Problem Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
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Rank Data Set Number of Cases FCP p 
1 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 0 0.00000 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
6 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 2 0.00012 
8 Critical Cases 216 1 0.00463 
9 Entertainment 336 5 0.01488 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 509 12 0.02358 
11 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
12 Mining - Australian 508 17 0.03346 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 4 0.04211 
14 Food Services 384 26 0.06771 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 8 0.19512 
16 Mining - US 255 101 0.39608 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
8 13 0.01551 1 0.00067 
8 12 0.02262 2 0.00133 
8 10 0.07872 3 0.00200 
9 12 0.09719 4 0.00267 
9 13 0.10132 5 0.00333 
8 11 0.17890 6 0.00400 
8 9 0.25695 7 0.00467 
10 13 0.30187 8 0.00533 
10 12 0.34345 9 0.00600 
9 10 0.37832 10 0.00667 
9 11 0.62925 11 0.00733 
11 13 0.63084 12 0.00800 
12 13 0.67330 13 0.00867 
11 12 0.77244 14 0.00933 
10 11 0.95451 15 0.01000 
 
Supervisory Violation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SV p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
4 Mining - Australian 508 0 0.00000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 223 0 0.00000 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 91 16511 1 0.00006 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 2 0.00238 
10 Entertainment 336 1 0.00298 
11 Chinese Military Aviation 509 8 0.01572 
12 Food Services 384 8 0.02083 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 2 0.02105 
14 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
15 Mining - US 255 26 0.10196 
16 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 22 0.53659 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
9 12 0.00088 1 0.00067 
9 11 0.00568 2 0.00133 
9 13 0.00827 3 0.00200 
9 14 0.01657 4 0.00267 
10 12 0.03143 5 0.00333 
10 13 0.06133 6 0.00400 
10 14 0.07026 7 0.00467 
10 11 0.07744 8 0.00533 
11 12 0.56826 9 0.00600 
11 14 0.65619 10 0.00667 
11 13 0.70831 11 0.00733 
9 10 0.85572 12 0.00800 
12 14 0.86187 13 0.00867 
13 14 0.88702 14 0.00933 
12 13 0.98932 15 0.01000 
 
Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases RM p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 0 0.00000 
2 Mining - Australian 508 3 0.00591 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 1 0.00806 
4 Food Services 384 8 0.02083 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 4 0.02210 
6 Entertainment 336 8 0.02381 
7 Maintenance - Field 486 13 0.02675 
8 Maintenance - Site 129 4 0.03101 
9 Critical Cases 216 7 0.03241 
10 Middle East Aviation 40 5 0.12500 
11 Mining - US 255 33 0.12941 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 509 184 0.36149 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 22 0.53659 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 53 0.55789 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 9 0.00518 1 0.00036 
2 7 0.00905 2 0.00071 
2 8 0.01460 3 0.00107 
2 6 0.02477 4 0.00143 
2 4 0.04547 5 0.00179 
2 5 0.06211 6 0.00214 
3 9 0.15404 7 0.00250 
3 8 0.18995 8 0.00286 
3 7 0.21491 9 0.00321 
3 6 0.27929 10 0.00357 
3 5 0.34307 11 0.00393 
3 4 0.34871 12 0.00429 
4 9 0.38341 13 0.00464 
4 8 0.50830 14 0.00500 
5 9 0.53314 15 0.00536 
6 9 0.54428 16 0.00571 
4 7 0.57240 17 0.00607 
5 8 0.62583 18 0.00643 
6 8 0.66116 19 0.00679 
7 9 0.67747 20 0.00714 
5 7 0.73476 21 0.00750 
2 3 0.78578 22 0.00786 
4 6 0.78694 23 0.00821 
6 7 0.79287 24 0.00857 
7 8 0.79311 25 0.00893 
5 6 0.90197 26 0.00929 
4 5 0.92241 27 0.00964 
8 9 0.94292 28 0.01000 
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Organizational Climate Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OC p 
1 Critical Cases 216 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 384 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Field 486 0 0.00000 
4 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 0 0.00000 
7 Entertainment 336 1 0.00298 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 4 0.00477 
9 Chinese Military Aviation 509 4 0.00786 
10 Mining - Australian 508 7 0.01378 
11 Mining - US 255 4 0.01569 
12 Middle East Aviation 40 1 0.02500 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 10 0.10526 
14 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 5 0.12195 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 12 0.07026 1 0.00067 
8 11 0.07311 2 0.00133 
8 10 0.07488 3 0.00200 
7 11 0.09474 4 0.00267 
8 12 0.09645 5 0.00333 
7 10 0.11284 6 0.00400 
9 12 0.27183 7 0.00467 
9 11 0.31619 8 0.00533 
9 10 0.36138 9 0.00600 
7 9 0.36512 10 0.00667 
8 9 0.47382 11 0.00733 
10 12 0.56890 12 0.00800 
7 8 0.66991 13 0.00867 
11 12 0.67136 14 0.00933 
10 11 0.83490 15 0.01000 
 
Organizational Process Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 336 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 384 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 1 0.00806 
5 Maintenance - Field 486 7 0.01440 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 29 0.03456 
7 Critical Cases 216 17 0.07870 
8 Mining - Australian 508 40 0.07874 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 181 21 0.11602 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 509 76 0.14931 
11 Middle East Aviation 40 6 0.15000 
12 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 33 0.34737 
13 Mining - US 255 119 0.46667 
14 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 10 0.00932 1 0.00167 
7 11 0.14749 2 0.00333 
7 9 0.20811 3 0.00500 
9 10 0.26843 4 0.00667 
9 11 0.55261 5 0.00833 
10 11 0.99063 6 0.01000 
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Organizational Process Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 336 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 384 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 129 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 124 1 0.00806 
5 Maintenance - Field 486 7 0.01440 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 839 29 0.03456 
7 Mining - Australian 508 40 0.07874 
8 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 95 33 0.34737 
9 Mining - US 255 119 0.46667 
10 Chinese Civil Aviation 41 21 0.51220 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 6 0.02959 1 0.00333 
4 6 0.11286 2 0.00667 
4 5 0.57971 3 0.01000 
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APPENDIX E: ACCIDENT FILTERED BENCHMARKING CALCULATIONS 
Physical Environment Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 5 0.10417 
2 Middle East Aviation 31 4 0.12903 
3 Chinese Military Aviation 325 44 0.13538 
4 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 41 0.25949 
5 Entertainment 173 47 0.27168 
6 Maintenance - Site 87 29 0.33333 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 55 0.38462 
8 Mining - Australian 475 183 0.38526 
9 Food Services 328 139 0.42378 
10 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 333 0.43758 
11 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 5616 0.44871 
12 Mining - US 242 130 0.53719 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
14 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 493 0.63286 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 8 0.00418 1 0.00067 
2 8 0.00419 2 0.00133 
2 7 0.00643 3 0.00200 
5 8 0.00751 4 0.00267 
4 7 0.02002 5 0.00333 
2 6 0.02955 6 0.00400 
5 7 0.03257 7 0.00467 
2 5 0.09121 8 0.00533 
2 4 0.11892 9 0.00600 
4 6 0.22083 10 0.00667 
5 6 0.30234 11 0.00733 
6 8 0.35824 12 0.00800 
6 7 0.43344 13 0.00867 
4 5 0.80213 14 0.00933 
7 8 0.98887 15 0.01000 
 
Physical Environment Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PHYE p 
1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 5 0.10417 
2 Chinese Military Aviation 325 44 0.13538 
3 Food Services 328 139 0.42378 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 333 0.43758 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 5616 0.44871 
6 Mining - US 242 130 0.53719 
7 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 493 0.63286 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 6 0.00614 1 0.00100 
4 6 0.00678 2 0.00200 
3 6 0.00734 3 0.00300 
3 7 0.09422 4 0.00400 
4 7 0.11912 5 0.00500 
5 7 0.14494 6 0.00600 
3 5 0.37021 7 0.00700 
4 5 0.54910 8 0.00800 
3 4 0.67327 9 0.00900 
6 7 0.70397 10 0.01000 
 
Technological Environment Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
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Rank Data Set Number of Cases TE p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 4 0.00032 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 1 0.00131 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 3 0.00385 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 3 0.02098 
5 Middle East Aviation 31 2 0.06452 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 325 22 0.06769 
7 Maintenance - Site 87 6 0.06897 
8 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 19 0.12025 
9 Entertainment 173 23 0.13295 
10 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 5 0.14286 
11 Food Services 328 60 0.18293 
12 Mining - Australian 475 165 0.34737 
13 Mining - US 242 140 0.57851 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 32 0.66667 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 9 0.01559 1 0.00067 
6 8 0.05184 2 0.00133 
6 10 0.10869 3 0.00200 
7 9 0.12201 4 0.00267 
7 10 0.19744 5 0.00333 
7 8 0.20440 6 0.00400 
5 9 0.28462 7 0.00467 
5 10 0.30227 8 0.00533 
5 8 0.36660 9 0.00600 
8 10 0.71386 10 0.00667 
8 9 0.72890 11 0.00733 
9 10 0.87553 12 0.00800 
5 7 0.93257 13 0.00867 
5 6 0.94627 14 0.00933 
6 7 0.96657 15 0.01000 
 
Adverse Mental State Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 Mining - US 242 7 0.02893 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 5 0.03165 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 31 0.04074 
5 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 807 0.06448 
6 Entertainment 173 12 0.06936 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 57 0.07317 
8 Maintenance - Site 87 8 0.09195 
9 Mining - Australian 475 56 0.11789 
10 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 9 0.25714 
11 Middle East Aviation 31 8 0.25806 
12 Food Services 328 91 0.27744 
13 Chinese Military Aviation 325 171 0.52615 
14 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
215 
 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 7 0.00611 1 0.00036 
4 5 0.00892 2 0.00071 
1 7 0.01313 3 0.00107 
1 8 0.01565 4 0.00143 
1 5 0.02500 5 0.00179 
4 8 0.03073 6 0.00214 
2 8 0.04388 7 0.00250 
1 6 0.05199 8 0.00286 
2 7 0.05554 9 0.00321 
3 8 0.06952 10 0.00357 
3 7 0.09358 11 0.00393 
2 5 0.09398 12 0.00429 
4 6 0.10484 13 0.00464 
2 6 0.12046 14 0.00500 
3 5 0.15207 15 0.00536 
3 6 0.17733 16 0.00571 
5 8 0.29905 17 0.00607 
5 7 0.33956 18 0.00643 
1 4 0.40191 19 0.00679 
6 8 0.51892 20 0.00714 
7 8 0.52827 21 0.00750 
2 4 0.59199 22 0.00786 
1 3 0.74178 23 0.00821 
3 4 0.74609 24 0.00857 
5 6 0.79503 25 0.00893 
6 7 0.86133 26 0.00929 
2 3 0.87251 27 0.00964 
1 2 0.87612 28 0.01000 
 
Adverse Mental State Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases AMS p 
1 Mining - Australian 475 56 0.11789 
2 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 9 0.25714 
3 Middle East Aviation 31 8 0.25806 
4 Food Services 328 91 0.27744 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 325 171 0.52615 
6 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 4 0.79835 1 0.00333 
3 4 0.81753 2 0.00667 
2 3 0.99318 3 0.01000 
 
Adverse Physiological State Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases APS p 
1 Chinese Military Aviation 325 1 0.00308 
2 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 1 0.00633 
3 Mining - US 242 2 0.00826 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 8 0.01051 
5 Entertainment 173 3 0.01734 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 15 0.01926 
7 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 339 0.02709 
9 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 1 0.02857 
10 Middle East Aviation 31 1 0.03226 
11 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
12 Mining - Australian 475 25 0.05263 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 5 0.10417 
14 Food Services 328 53 0.16159 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
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D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 11 0.00473 1 0.00018 
4 8 0.00540 2 0.00036 
1 8 0.00778 3 0.00055 
4 11 0.02423 4 0.00073 
1 10 0.03780 5 0.00091 
1 6 0.04036 6 0.00109 
1 7 0.05236 7 0.00127 
1 9 0.05385 8 0.00145 
3 11 0.05814 9 0.00164 
3 8 0.07218 10 0.00182 
2 11 0.07589 11 0.00200 
1 5 0.08951 12 0.00218 
2 8 0.10858 13 0.00236 
4 6 0.15729 14 0.00255 
6 8 0.18781 15 0.00273 
2 10 0.19705 16 0.00291 
1 4 0.21581 17 0.00309 
3 10 0.22763 18 0.00327 
6 11 0.23588 19 0.00345 
2 9 0.23972 20 0.00364 
3 6 0.24314 21 0.00382 
2 6 0.25281 22 0.00400 
2 7 0.25652 23 0.00418 
4 10 0.26284 24 0.00436 
3 9 0.27796 25 0.00455 
3 7 0.28247 26 0.00473 
4 7 0.30717 27 0.00491 
5 11 0.32086 28 0.00509 
4 9 0.32314 29 0.00527 
2 5 0.35974 30 0.00545 
1 3 0.39969 31 0.00564 
3 5 0.40338 32 0.00582 
5 8 0.43186 33 0.00600 
4 5 0.45236 34 0.00618 
8 11 0.56444 35 0.00636 
5 10 0.58119 36 0.00655 
1 2 0.60153 37 0.00673 
7 11 0.60811 38 0.00691 
6 10 0.60990 39 0.00709 
2 4 0.62703 40 0.00727 
5 9 0.65907 41 0.00745 
6 9 0.69772 42 0.00764 
5 7 0.75438 43 0.00782 
3 4 0.75915 44 0.00800 
7 10 0.77830 45 0.00818 
6 7 0.81184 46 0.00836 
7 8 0.81444 47 0.00855 
2 3 0.82640 48 0.00873 
9 11 0.85099 49 0.00891 
7 9 0.85708 50 0.00909 
8 10 0.85938 51 0.00927 
5 6 0.86718 52 0.00945 
9 10 0.93051 53 0.00964 
10 11 0.94031 54 0.00982 
8 9 0.95687 55 0.01000 
 
Physical Mental Limitation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 18 0.02365 
2 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 36 0.04621 
4 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 3 0.08571 
5 Mining - US 242 24 0.09917 
6 Mining - Australian 475 51 0.10737 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 1545 0.12344 
8 Maintenance - Site 87 12 0.13793 
9 Middle East Aviation 31 6 0.19355 
10 Food Services 328 71 0.21646 
11 Chinese Military Aviation 325 72 0.22154 
12 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 11 0.22917 
13 Entertainment 173 40 0.23121 
14 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 54 0.34177 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
4 13 0.05256 1 0.00048 
4 11 0.06011 2 0.00095 
4 10 0.06798 3 0.00143 
8 13 0.07601 4 0.00190 
4 12 0.08480 5 0.00238 
8 11 0.08558 6 0.00286 
8 10 0.10352 7 0.00333 
8 12 0.17711 8 0.00381 
4 9 0.20265 9 0.00429 
4 8 0.42696 10 0.00476 
8 9 0.45959 11 0.00524 
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9 13 0.64400 12 0.00571 
10 13 0.70543 13 0.00619 
9 12 0.70680 14 0.00667 
9 11 0.71886 15 0.00714 
9 10 0.76638 16 0.00762 
11 13 0.80550 17 0.00810 
10 12 0.84222 18 0.00857 
10 11 0.87541 19 0.00905 
11 12 0.90559 20 0.00952 
12 13 0.97624 21 0.01000 
 
Physical Mental Limitation Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PML p 
1 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 18 0.02365 
2 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 5 0.03497 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 36 0.04621 
4 Mining - US 242 24 0.09917 
5 Mining - Australian 475 51 0.10737 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 1545 0.12344 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 54 0.34177 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
1 3 0.01611 1 0.00333 
1 2 0.43059 2 0.00667 
2 3 0.54865 3 0.01000 
 
Crew Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Site 87 3 0.03448 
3 Entertainment 173 6 0.03468 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 48 0.06307 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 51 0.06547 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 923 0.07375 
7 Middle East Aviation 31 3 0.09677 
8 Food Services 328 42 0.12805 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 22 0.15385 
10 Mining - US 242 41 0.16942 
11 Mining - Australian 475 114 0.24000 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 325 134 0.41231 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 21 0.43750 
14 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.05012 1 0.00067 
3 7 0.12107 2 0.00133 
3 5 0.12261 3 0.00200 
3 4 0.14865 4 0.00267 
2 6 0.16189 5 0.00333 
2 7 0.17523 6 0.00400 
2 5 0.25695 7 0.00467 
4 6 0.27232 8 0.00533 
2 4 0.28795 9 0.00600 
5 6 0.38966 10 0.00667 
4 7 0.45367 11 0.00733 
5 7 0.49318 12 0.00800 
6 7 0.62427 13 0.00867 
4 5 0.84815 14 0.00933 
2 3 0.99338 15 0.01000 
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Crew Resource Management Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases CRM p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 328 42 0.12805 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 22 0.15385 
4 Mining - US 242 41 0.16942 
5 Mining - Australian 475 114 0.24000 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 325 134 0.41231 
7 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 21 0.43750 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 4 0.16630 1 0.00333 
2 3 0.45248 2 0.00667 
3 4 0.68978 3 0.01000 
 
Personal Readiness Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
2 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 3 0.00385 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 49 0.00391 
4 Mining - Australian 475 2 0.00421 
5 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 1 0.00633 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 137 761 5 0.00657 
7 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 1 0.02083 
8 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
9 Entertainment 173 5 0.02890 
10 Mining - US 242 7 0.02893 
11 Food Services 328 14 0.04268 
12 Chinese Military Aviation 325 28 0.08615 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 5 0.14286 
14 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 10 0.00054 1 0.00036 
2 9 0.00109 2 0.00071 
4 10 0.00494 3 0.00107 
6 10 0.00533 4 0.00143 
4 9 0.00715 5 0.00179 
6 9 0.00999 6 0.00214 
2 8 0.02545 7 0.00250 
4 8 0.05543 8 0.00286 
2 7 0.09978 9 0.00321 
6 8 0.10886 10 0.00357 
5 10 0.11456 11 0.00393 
5 9 0.12416 12 0.00429 
4 7 0.14614 13 0.00464 
5 8 0.25652 14 0.00500 
6 7 0.26398 15 0.00536 
5 7 0.36944 16 0.00571 
2 6 0.45800 17 0.00607 
4 6 0.59074 18 0.00643 
2 5 0.66312 19 0.00679 
4 5 0.73696 20 0.00714 
7 10 0.75451 21 0.00750 
7 9 0.76088 22 0.00786 
8 10 0.77092 23 0.00821 
8 9 0.78104 24 0.00857 
2 4 0.92195 25 0.00893 
7 8 0.93519 26 0.00929 
5 6 0.97267 27 0.00964 
9 10 0.99886 28 0.01000 
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Personal Readiness Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PR p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 49 0.00391 
3 Food Services 328 14 0.04268 
4 Chinese Military Aviation 325 28 0.08615 
5 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 5 0.14286 
6 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
3 6 0.00481 1 0.00167 
3 5 0.01142 2 0.00333 
3 4 0.02357 3 0.00500 
4 6 0.16811 4 0.00667 
4 5 0.26933 5 0.00833 
5 6 0.83488 6 0.01000 
 
Inadequate Supervision Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 1 0.00633 
2 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 20 0.02567 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 2 0.03279 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 471 0.03763 
5 Entertainment 173 7 0.04046 
6 Critical Cases 161 7 0.04348 
7 Maintenance - Site 87 4 0.04598 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 12 0.08392 
9 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
10 Food Services 328 66 0.20122 
11 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 11 0.22917 
12 Mining - Australian 475 130 0.27368 
13 Chinese Military Aviation 325 153 0.47077 
14 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 23 0.65714 
15 Mining - US 242 160 0.66116 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 8 0.00047 1 0.00036 
1 8 0.00094 2 0.00071 
4 8 0.00407 3 0.00107 
1 6 0.03387 4 0.00143 
1 7 0.03569 5 0.00179 
1 4 0.03893 6 0.00214 
1 5 0.04341 7 0.00250 
2 4 0.08597 8 0.00286 
5 8 0.10580 9 0.00321 
1 3 0.13104 10 0.00357 
1 2 0.13417 11 0.00393 
6 8 0.14600 12 0.00429 
3 8 0.18602 13 0.00464 
2 6 0.21822 14 0.00500 
7 8 0.27275 15 0.00536 
2 7 0.27388 16 0.00571 
2 5 0.28917 17 0.00607 
4 7 0.68378 18 0.00643 
3 7 0.68880 19 0.00679 
4 6 0.69878 20 0.00714 
3 6 0.71843 21 0.00750 
2 3 0.73763 22 0.00786 
3 5 0.78867 23 0.00821 
5 7 0.83488 24 0.00857 
3 4 0.84272 25 0.00893 
4 5 0.84602 26 0.00929 
5 6 0.89069 27 0.00964 
6 7 0.92732 28 0.01000 
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Inadequate Supervision Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases IS p 
1 Middle East Aviation 31 5 0.16129 
2 Food Services 328 66 0.20122 
3 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 11 0.22917 
4 Mining - Australian 475 130 0.27368 
5 Chinese Military Aviation 325 153 0.47077 
6 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 23 0.65714 
7 Mining - US 242 160 0.66116 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 4 0.01878 1 0.00167 
1 4 0.17042 2 0.00333 
1 3 0.46356 3 0.00500 
3 4 0.50773 4 0.00667 
1 2 0.59369 5 0.00833 
2 3 0.65406 6 0.01000 
 
Planned Inappropriate Operations Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 7 0.00056 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 4 0.00513 
6 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 2 0.01399 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 3 0.01899 
8 Entertainment 173 4 0.02312 
9 Maintenance - Site 87 5 0.05747 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 325 23 0.07077 
11 Mining - Australian 475 50 0.10526 
12 Food Services 328 52 0.15854 
13 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 7 0.20000 
14 Mining - US 242 62 0.25620 
15 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 13 0.27083 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 10 0.01186 1 0.00100 
7 10 0.01799 2 0.00200 
8 10 0.02537 3 0.00300 
6 9 0.06263 4 0.00400 
7 9 0.10482 5 0.00500 
8 9 0.15281 6 0.00600 
6 8 0.55368 7 0.00700 
9 10 0.66159 8 0.00800 
6 7 0.73459 9 0.00900 
7 8 0.79401 10 0.01000 
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Planned Inappropriate Operations Secondary Grouping– Final False 
Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases PIO p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
3 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 7 0.00056 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 4 0.00513 
6 Mining - Australian 475 50 0.10526 
7 Food Services 328 52 0.15854 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 7 0.20000 
8 Mining - US 242 62 0.25620 
9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 13 0.27083 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 8 0.00396 1 0.00333 
7 9 0.05465 2 0.00667 
8 9 0.83247 3 0.01000 
 
Fail to Correct Known Problem Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases FCP p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
3 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
4 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
7 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
8 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 1 0.00008 
9 Entertainment 173 4 0.02312 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 325 9 0.02769 
11 Mining - Australian 475 14 0.02947 
12 Food Services 328 25 0.07622 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 4 0.08333 
14 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 7 0.20000 
15 Mining - US 242 94 0.38843 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
11 12 0.00245 1 0.00100 
10 12 0.00526 2 0.00200 
9 12 0.01553 3 0.00300 
9 13 0.04815 4 0.00400 
10 13 0.04977 5 0.00500 
11 13 0.05109 6 0.00600 
9 11 0.66335 7 0.00700 
9 10 0.76067 8 0.00800 
12 13 0.86301 9 0.00900 
10 11 0.88227 10 0.01000 
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Supervisory Violation Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases SV p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
3 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
4 Mining - Australian 475 0 0.00000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
6 US General Aviation - FAR 133 61 0 0.00000 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 91 12516 0 0.00000 
8 US Gyroplane Aviation 158 0 0.00000 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 2 0.00257 
10 Entertainment 173 1 0.00578 
11 Chinese Military Aviation 325 7 0.02154 
12 Food Services 328 8 0.02439 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 2 0.04167 
14 Mining - US 242 25 0.10331 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 20 0.57143 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
10 13 0.05730 1 0.00167 
10 12 0.13592 2 0.00333 
10 11 0.18292 3 0.00500 
11 13 0.39627 4 0.00667 
12 13 0.48718 5 0.00833 
11 12 0.80784 6 0.01000 
 
Resource Management Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases RM p 
1 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 0 0.00000 
2 Mining - Australian 475 3 0.00632 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 1 0.00699 
4 Entertainment 173 2 0.01156 
5 Food Services 328 7 0.02134 
6 Maintenance - Field 392 9 0.02296 
7 Maintenance - Site 87 2 0.02299 
8 Critical Cases 161 4 0.02484 
9 Middle East Aviation 31 1 0.03226 
10 Mining - US 242 30 0.12397 
11 Chinese Military Aviation 325 73 0.22462 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 21 0.60000 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 33 0.68750 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
2 6 0.03683 1 0.00036 
2 8 0.05148 2 0.00071 
2 5 0.05912 3 0.00107 
2 9 0.11405 4 0.00143 
2 7 0.12787 5 0.00179 
3 8 0.22191 6 0.00214 
3 6 0.22754 7 0.00250 
3 9 0.23155 8 0.00286 
3 5 0.26781 9 0.00321 
3 7 0.29981 10 0.00357 
4 8 0.36107 11 0.00393 
4 6 0.36609 12 0.00429 
4 9 0.37799 13 0.00464 
4 5 0.43322 14 0.00500 
4 7 0.47991 15 0.00536 
2 4 0.49968 16 0.00571 
3 4 0.67685 17 0.00607 
5 9 0.69388 18 0.00643 
6 9 0.74287 19 0.00679 
7 9 0.77830 20 0.00714 
5 8 0.80606 21 0.00750 
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8 9 0.81240 22 0.00786 
5 6 0.88340 23 0.00821 
6 8 0.89423 24 0.00857 
5 7 0.92530 25 0.00893 
7 8 0.92766 26 0.00929 
2 3 0.92945 27 0.00964 
6 7 0.99868 28 0.01000 
 
Organizational Climate Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OC p 
1 Critical Cases 161 0 0.00000 
2 Entertainment 173 0 0.00000 
3 Food Services 328 0 0.00000 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 0 0.00000 
5 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
6 Middle East Aviation 31 0 0.00000 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 0 0.00000 
8 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 3 0.00385 
9 Chinese Military Aviation 325 3 0.00923 
10 Mining - Australian 475 7 0.01474 
11 Mining - US 242 4 0.01653 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 4 0.11429 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 10 0.20833 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
8 10 0.03552 1 0.00167 
8 11 0.03683 2 0.00333 
8 9 0.26782 3 0.00500 
9 11 0.43632 4 0.00667 
9 10 0.49118 5 0.00833 
10 11 0.85353 6 0.01000 
 
Organizational Process Main Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 173 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 328 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 5 0.01276 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 22 0.02824 
6 Critical Cases 161 10 0.06211 
7 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 143 9 0.06294 
8 Mining - Australian 475 38 0.08000 
9 Middle East Aviation 31 3 0.09677 
10 Chinese Military Aviation 325 59 0.18154 
11 Mining - US 242 110 0.45455 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 19 0.54286 
13 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
6 8 0.45773 1 0.00167 
6 9 0.48180 2 0.00333 
7 8 0.49978 3 0.00500 
7 9 0.50030 4 0.00667 
8 9 0.74018 5 0.00833 
6 7 0.97633 6 0.01000 
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Organizational Process Secondary Grouping– Final False Discovery Rate 
Rank Data Set Number of Cases OP p 
1 Entertainment 173 0 0.00000 
2 Food Services 328 0 0.00000 
3 Maintenance - Site 87 0 0.00000 
4 Maintenance - Field 392 5 0.01276 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 779 22 0.02824 
6 Chinese Military Aviation 325 59 0.18154 
7 Mining - US 242 110 0.45455 
8 Chinese Civil Aviation 35 19 0.54286 
9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 48 27 0.56250 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 9 0.17114 1 0.00333 
7 8 0.32759 2 0.00667 
8 9 0.85888 3 0.01000 
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APPENDIX F: ASSOCIATIONS SAMPLING AND CONTINGENCY TABLES 
Precondition for Unsafe Act Tier Analysis – Supervisory Tier 
Rank Data Source Cases SUP p 
1 Critical Cases 17 5 0.29412 
2 Maintenance - Field 16 5 0.31250 
3 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 20 9 0.45000 
4 US General Aviation - FAR 133 2 1 0.50000 
5 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 39 22 0.56410 
6 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 38 22 0.57895 
7 Middle East Aviation 11 8 0.72727 
8 Maintenance - Site 16 13 0.81250 
9 Chinese Military Aviation 186 154 0.82796 
10 Entertainment 38 32 0.84211 
11 Mining - Australian 166 147 0.88554 
12 Chinese Civil Aviation 29 27 0.93103 
13 Mining - US 211 198 0.93839 
14 US General Aviation - FAR 91 249 235 0.94378 
15 Food Services 123 119 0.96748 
16 US Gyroplane Aviation 6 6 1.00000 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
7 14 0.00447 1 0.00028 
7 13 0.00830 2 0.00056 
4 14 0.00836 3 0.00083 
4 13 0.01277 4 0.00111 
10 14 0.02186 5 0.00139 
11 14 0.03170 6 0.00167 
8 14 0.03777 7 0.00194 
10 13 0.03959 8 0.00222 
4 12 0.04613 9 0.00250 
8 13 0.05787 10 0.00278 
4 16 0.06408 11 0.00306 
11 13 0.06760 12 0.00333 
7 12 0.08187 13 0.00361 
4 11 0.09421 14 0.00389 
7 11 0.12336 15 0.00417 
7 16 0.15865 16 0.00444 
4 10 0.21459 17 0.00472 
8 12 0.22584 18 0.00500 
8 16 0.25373 19 0.00528 
10 12 0.26603 20 0.00556 
10 16 0.29494 21 0.00583 
4 8 0.31623 22 0.00611 
11 16 0.37959 23 0.00639 
7 10 0.38640 24 0.00667 
8 11 0.39202 25 0.00694 
10 11 0.46137 26 0.00722 
11 12 0.46590 27 0.00750 
12 16 0.50767 28 0.00778 
4 7 0.52179 29 0.00806 
13 16 0.53061 30 0.00833 
14 16 0.55021 31 0.00861 
7 8 0.60070 32 0.00889 
12 14 0.78039 33 0.00917 
8 10 0.78981 34 0.00944 
13 14 0.80653 35 0.00972 
12 13 0.87808 36 0.01000 
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Precondition for Unsafe Act Tier Analysis – Organizational Influences Tier 
Rank Data Source Cases ORG p 
1 US Gyroplane Aviation 6 0 0.00000 
2 US General Aviation - FAR 91 249 14 0.05622 
3 Food Services 123 7 0.05691 
4 Entertainment 38 7 0.18421 
5 Maintenance - Site 16 3 0.18750 
6 Mining - Australian 166 40 0.24096 
7 US General Aviation - FAR 133 2 1 0.50000 
8 Chinese Military Aviation 186 98 0.52688 
9 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 135 39 21 0.53846 
10 US Commercial Aviation - FAR 121 20 11 0.55000 
11 Mining - US 211 126 0.59716 
12 Middle East Aviation 11 7 0.63636 
13 Critical Cases 17 12 0.70588 
14 Maintenance - Field 16 12 0.75000 
15 Chinese Civil Aviation 29 25 0.86207 
16 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Operations 38 36 0.94737 
Data source in grey rows are not included in analysis. 
D1 D2 p Rank FDR 
5 11 0.00143 1 0.00028 
5 14 0.00143 2 0.00056 
5 13 0.00280 3 0.00083 
5 8 0.00918 4 0.00111 
5 9 0.01714 5 0.00139 
5 12 0.01764 6 0.00167 
5 10 0.02663 7 0.00194 
8 14 0.08550 8 0.00222 
9 14 0.14583 9 0.00250 
8 13 0.15622 10 0.00278 
8 11 0.15880 11 0.00306 
10 14 0.21445 12 0.00333 
11 14 0.22730 13 0.00361 
9 13 0.24162 14 0.00389 
5 7 0.31623 15 0.00417 
10 13 0.32989 16 0.00444 
11 13 0.37763 17 0.00472 
7 14 0.45675 18 0.00500 
8 12 0.47944 19 0.00528 
9 11 0.49387 20 0.00556 
12 14 0.52518 21 0.00583 
7 13 0.55352 22 0.00611 
9 12 0.56346 23 0.00639 
10 12 0.64104 24 0.00667 
10 11 0.68160 25 0.00694 
12 13 0.70047 26 0.00722 
7 12 0.71539 27 0.00750 
13 14 0.77611 28 0.00778 
7 11 0.78046 29 0.00806 
11 12 0.79588 30 0.00833 
8 10 0.84397 31 0.00861 
7 10 0.89230 32 0.00889 
8 9 0.89520 33 0.00917 
7 9 0.91528 34 0.00944 
9 10 0.93289 35 0.00972 
7 8 0.93963 36 0.01000 
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Unsafe Acts Tier Associations – Sample Size 
  Unsafe Act Precondition for Unsafe Act Unsafe Supervision Organizational Influence 
Lower Confidence Interval -- 48.61% 1.91% 0.40% 
Mean -- 58.13% 7.95% 4.96% 
Upper Confidence Interval -- 67.65% 14.00% 9.53% 
Sample Size -- 142 58 33 
 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts Tier Associations – Sample Size 
  Precondition for Unsafe Act Unsafe Supervision Organizational Influence 
Lower Confidence Interval -- 67.53% 37.77% 
Mean -- 84.23% 55.47% 
Upper Confidence Interval -- 100.00% 73.17% 
Sample Size -- 78 25 
 
Unsafe Supervision Tier Associations – Sample Size 
  Unsafe Supervision Organizational Influence 
Lower Confidence Interval -- -- 
Mean -- -- 
Upper Confidence Interval -- -- 
Sample Size -- 24 
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Unsafe Acts Tier Associations – Contingency Tables 
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Precondition for Unsafe Acts Tier Associations – Contingency Tables 
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  Physical Mental Limitation 
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Unsafe Supervision Tier Associations – Contingency Tables 
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APPENDIX G: ASSOCIATIONS ADJACENT TIER FULL RESULTS 
Unsafe Act X Precondition for Unsafe Act 
Unsafe Act Precondition Chi-Square DF p-value Sig Fisher Performed? Fisher p-value 
Skill-Based Error Physical Environment 0.006 1 0.938       
Decision Error Physical Environment 4.397 1 0.036       
Perceptual Error Physical Environment 7.332 1 0.007       
Violation Physical Environment 4.153 1 0.042       
Skill-Based Error Technological Environment 0.684 1 0.408       
Decision Error Technological Environment 2.715 1 0.099       
Perceptual Error Technological Environment 2.691 1 0.101       
Violation Technological Environment 10.679 1 0.001       
Skill-Based Error Adverse Mental State 1.265 1 0.261       
Decision Error Adverse Mental State 12.212 1 0.000 ***     
Perceptual Error Adverse Mental State 43.499 1 0.000 ***     
Violation Adverse Mental State 23.951 1 0.000 ***     
Skill-Based Error Adverse Physiological State 37.824 1 0.000 ***     
Decision Error Adverse Physiological State 8.310 1 0.004       
Perceptual Error Adverse Physiological State 8.937 1 0.003       
Violation Adverse Physiological State 0.313 1 0.576       
Skill-Based Error Physical Mental Limitation 0.700 1 0.403       
Decision Error Physical Mental Limitation 0.247 1 0.619       
Perceptual Error Physical Mental Limitation 5.440 1 0.020       
Violation Physical Mental Limitation 2.816 1 0.093       
Skill-Based Error Crew Resource Management 7.941 1 0.005       
Decision Error Crew Resource Management 42.719 1 0.000 ***     
Perceptual Error Crew Resource Management 29.544 1 0.000 ***     
Violation Crew Resource Management 52.462 1 0.000 ***     
Skill-Based Error Personal Readiness 0.017 1 0.896       
Decision Error Personal Readiness 2.498 1 0.114       
Perceptual Error Personal Readiness 1.024 1 0.312   Yes 0.327 
Violation Personal Readiness 1.775 1 0.183       
Significance measured at 0.001. 
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Precondition for Unsafe Act X Unsafe Supervision 
Precondition Supervision Chi-Square DF p-value Sig Fisher Performed? Fisher p-value 
Physical Environment Inadequate Supervision 4.805 1 0.028       
Technological Environment Inadequate Supervision 2.284 1 0.131       
Adverse Mental State Inadequate Supervision 1.211 1 0.271       
Adverse Physiological State Inadequate Supervision 9.539 1 0.002       
Physical Mental Limitation Inadequate Supervision 0.120 1 0.729       
Crew Resource Management Inadequate Supervision 9.301 1 0.002       
Personal Readiness Inadequate Supervision 1.560 1 0.212       
Physical Environment Plan Inapp Ops 0.406 1 0.524       
Technological Environment Plan Inapp Ops 0.806 1 0.369       
Adverse Mental State Plan Inapp Ops 0.058 1 0.810       
Adverse Physiological State Plan Inapp Ops 12.736 1 0.000 ***     
Physical Mental Limitation Plan Inapp Ops 0.273 1 0.601       
Crew Resource Management Plan Inapp Ops 1.779 1 0.182       
Personal Readiness Plan Inapp Ops 0.227 1 0.634       
Physical Environment Fail to Correct 10.345 1 0.001       
Technological Environment Fail to Correct 53.444 1 0.000 ***     
Adverse Mental State Fail to Correct 9.603 1 0.002       
Adverse Physiological State Fail to Correct 0.083 1 0.773       
Physical Mental Limitation Fail to Correct 15.515 1 0.000 ***     
Crew Resource Management Fail to Correct 2.092 1 0.148       
Personal Readiness Fail to Correct 0.378 1 0.539       
Physical Environment Supervisory Violation 2.601 1 0.107       
Technological Environment Supervisory Violation 3.188 1 0.074       
Adverse Mental State Supervisory Violation 0.069 1 0.793       
Adverse Physiological State Supervisory Violation 1.555 1 0.212   Yes 0.344 
Physical Mental Limitation Supervisory Violation 4.136 1 0.042       
Crew Resource Management Supervisory Violation 0.282 1 0.595       
Personal Readiness Supervisory Violation 3.941 1 0.047   Yes 0.057 
Significance measured at 0.001. 
Unsafe Supervision X Organizational Influence 
Supervision Organizational Chi-Square DF p-value Sig Fisher Performed? Fisher p-value 
Inadequate Supervision Resouce Management 0.474 1 0.491       
Plan Inapp Ops Resouce Management 1.045 1 0.307       
Fail to Correct Resouce Management 1.161 1 0.281   Yes 0.432 
Supervisory Violation Resouce Management 4.603 1 0.032       
Inadequate Supervision Organization Climate 3.279 1 0.070   Yes 0.104 
Plan Inapp Ops Organization Climate 3.515 1 0.061   Yes 0.082 
Fail to Correct Organization Climate 0.342 1 0.559   Yes 0.477 
Supervisory Violation Organization Climate 0.007 1 0.933   Yes 1.000 
Inadequate Supervision Organization Process 0.627 1 0.428   Yes 0.531 
Plan Inapp Ops Organization Process 0.086 1 0.769       
Fail to Correct Organization Process 0.740 1 0.390   Yes 0.664 
Supervisory Violation Organization Process 0.432 1 0.511   Yes 0.491 
Significance measured at 0.001. 
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APPENDIX H: ASSOCIATIONS ADJACENT TIER CALCULATIONS 
Unsafe Act X Precondition for Unsafe Act 
Unsafe Act Precondition a b c d SE 
Decision Error Adverse Mental State 164 133 496 635 0.131 
Perceptual Error Adverse Mental State 64 233 92 1039 0.178 
Violation Adverse Mental State 79 218 165 966 0.156 
Skill-Based Error Adverse Physiological State 30 51 941 406 0.238 
Decision Error Crew Resource Management 193 115 467 653 0.132 
Perceptual Error Crew Resource Management 60 248 96 1024 0.179 
Violation Crew Resource Management 95 213 149 971 0.152 
 
Unsafe Act Precondition 
Odds 
Ratio Sig 
Higher Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Lower Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Decision Error Adverse Mental State 1.579 ** 1.259   1.435 ** 
Perceptual Error Adverse Mental State 3.102 ** 2.649 ** 2.240 ** 
Violation Adverse Mental State 2.122 ** 1.823 ** 1.758 ** 
Skill-Based Error Adverse Physiological State 0.254 ** 0.530 ** 0.277 ** 
Decision Error Crew Resource Management 2.347 ** 1.503 ** 1.953 ** 
Perceptual Error Crew Resource Management 2.581 ** 2.273 ** 1.973 ** 
Violation Crew Resource Management 2.907 ** 2.318 ** 2.164 ** 
Significance determined at 0.01. 
Precondition for Unsafe Act X Unsafe Supervision 
Precondition Supervision a b c d SE 
Adverse Physiological State Plan Inapp Ops 17 104 16 339 0.366 
Technological Environment Fail to Correct 46 32 77 321 0.263 
Physical Mental Limitation Fail to Correct 7 71 122 276 0.411 
 
Precondition Supervision 
Odds 
Ratio Sig 
Higher Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Lower Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Adverse Physiological State Plan Inapp Ops 3.463 ** 3.117 ** 2.194   
Technological Environment Fail to Correct 5.993 ** 3.048 ** 4.126 ** 
Physical Mental Limitation Fail to Correct 0.223 ** 0.293 ** 0.265 ** 
Significance determined at 0.01. 
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APPENDIX I: ASSOCIATIONS NON-ADJACENT TIER FULL RESULTS 
Unsafe Act X Unsafe Supervision 
Unsafe Act Supervision Chi-Square DF p-value Sig Fisher Performed? Fisher p-value 
Skill-Based Error Inadequate Supervision 7.7430 1 0.0054       
Decision Error Inadequate Supervision 8.2580 1 0.0041       
Perceptual Error Inadequate Supervision 1.3670 1 0.2423       
Violation Inadequate Supervision 0.1770 1 0.6740       
Skill-Based Error Plan Inapp Ops 6.2170 1 0.0127       
Decision Error Plan Inapp Ops 1.3340 1 0.2481       
Perceptual Error Plan Inapp Ops 0.8190 1 0.3655       
Violation Plan Inapp Ops 0.4010 1 0.5266       
Skill-Based Error Fail to Correct Problem 1.8030 1 0.1794       
Decision Error Fail to Correct Problem 13.9940 1 0.0002 ***     
Perceptual Error Fail to Correct Problem 0.4590 1 0.4981       
Violation Fail to Correct Problem 0.6350 1 0.4255       
Skill-Based Error Supervisory Violation 1.1370 1 0.2863       
Decision Error Supervisory Violation 2.5810 1 0.1082       
Perceptual Error Supervisory Violation 4.9190 1 0.0266       
Violation Supervisory Violation 32.2600 1 0.0000 ***     
Significance measured at 0.001. 
Unsafe Act X Organization Influence 
Unsafe Act Organizational Chi-Square DF p-value Sig Fisher Performed? Fisher p-value 
Skill-Based Error Resource Management 0.7140 1 0.3981       
Decision Error Resource Management 0.0510 1 0.8213       
Perceptual Error Resource Management 13.0540 1 0.0003 ***     
Violation Resource Management 7.4090 1 0.0065       
Skill-Based Error Organization Climate 0.6000 1 0.4386       
Decision Error Organization Climate 0.5180 1 0.4717       
Perceptual Error Organization Climate 0.0320 1 0.8580   Yes 0.7450 
Violation Organization Climate 2.8100 1 0.0937       
Skill-Based Error Organization Process 4.1720 1 0.0411       
Decision Error Organization Process 0.5520 1 0.4575       
Perceptual Error Organization Process 3.6880 1 0.0548       
Violation Organization Process 0.1630 1 0.6864       
Significance measured at 0.001. 
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Precondition for Unsafe Act X Organization Influence 
Precondition Organizational Chi-Square DF p-value Sig Fisher Performed? Fisher p-value 
Physical Environment Resource Management 1.0860 1 0.2974       
Technological Environment Resource Management 6.6080 1 0.0102       
Adverse Mental State Resource Management 7.9080 1 0.0049       
Adverse Physiological State Resource Management 0.0500 1 0.8231   Yes 1.0000 
Physical Mental Limitation Resource Management 0.5600 1 0.4543       
Crew Resource Management Resource Management 2.6490 1 0.1036       
Personal Readiness Resource Management 0.0040 1 0.9496   Yes 1.0000 
Physical Environment Organization Climate 0.0040 1 0.9496       
Technological Environment Organization Climate 3.4470 1 0.0634       
Adverse Mental State Organization Climate 0.0200 1 0.8875       
Adverse Physiological State Organization Climate 5.9070 1 0.0151   Yes 0.0660 
Physical Mental Limitation Organization Climate 2.3470 1 0.1255   Yes 0.1610 
Crew Resource Management Organization Climate 7.4430 1 0.0064       
Personal Readiness Organization Climate 0.0720 1 0.7884   Yes 1.0000 
Physical Environment Organization Process 0.4350 1 0.5095       
Technological Environment Organization Process 0.8210 1 0.3649       
Adverse Mental State Organization Process 0.0110 1 0.9165       
Adverse Physiological State Organization Process 0.0030 1 0.9563   Yes 1.0000 
Physical Mental Limitation Organization Process 0.4220 1 0.5159       
Crew Resource Management Organization Process 0.5500 1 0.4583       
Personal Readiness Organization Process 0.6270 1 0.4285   Yes 0.4810 
Significance measured at 0.001. 
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APPENDIX J: ASSOCIATIONS NON-ADJACENT TIER CALCULATIONS 
Unsafe Act X Unsafe Supervision 
Unsafe Act Supervision a b c d SE 
Decision Error Fail to Correct Problem 63 25 165 170 0.260 
Violation Supervisory Violation 21 15 69 318 0.363 
 
Unsafe Act Supervision 
Odds 
Ratio Sig 
Higher Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Lower Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Decision Error Fail to Correct Problem 2.596 ** 1.454   2.155 ** 
Violation Supervisory Violation 6.452 ** 3.272 ** 5.180 ** 
Significance determined at 0.01. 
 
Unsafe Act X Organizational Influence 
Unsafe Act Organizational a b c d SE 
Perceptual Error Resource Management 24 110 11 188 0.383 
 
Unsafe Act Organizational 
Odds 
Ratio Sig 
Higher Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Lower Tier Relative 
Risk Sig 
Perceptual Error Resource Management 3.729 ** 3.240 ** 1.858   
Significance determined at 0.01. 
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